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Abstract 
 
Housing affordability is an agenda item at all levels of government in Australia 
and many other countries around the world.  Affordability is more than just house 
prices.  It also includes ready access to public transport, schools and good road 
networks, and of course access to all the basic utilities.  However, in fast growing 
areas, governments don’t have the funds to build all the infrastructure new housing 
estates need and existing communities refuse to pay for it by way of higher rates and 
taxes.  So, developer infrastructure charges have been introduced as a “user pays” 
method of funding new urban infrastructure.  These infrastructure charges are levied 
on property developers by local authorities at the time of development approval.  
Property developers claim that it is uneconomical for them to pay, and that these 
infrastructure charges are passed on to home buyers, making new homes 
unaffordable.  In the United States, research suggests that for every extra $1.00 of 
infrastructure charge, new house prices increase by around $1.60.  In Queensland, 
where the maximum infrastructure charge for a new house was set at $28,000 in July 
2011, if we apply the US models and the $1.00:$1.60 ratio, this one charge alone 
could equate to an increase to new house prices of $45,000.  Quantitative research on 
the impact of infrastructure charges on house prices has been undertaken in the 
US/Canada for the past three decades.  However to date, no such studies have been 
undertaken in Australia. 
This research investigates whether the US models are applicable in Australia, 
and how much infrastructure charges increase new house prices by in Australia.  
Why is this question important? Because the Queensland State Government has dual 
policies of housing affordability and developer-levied infrastructure charges.  
However to date, there has been no evidence of the impact of one policy objective on 
the other.    
In understanding this flow on effect to housing affordability, this sequential, 
mixed method research firstly, identifies and analyses a number of empirical studies 
in the US where infrastructure charges have been in existence since the 1970’s.  A 
comparative analysis of the structure of the US systems, and housing markets to 
those in Queensland, Australia is then carried out to identify key similarities and 
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differences and test the external validity of the US models.  The findings of this first 
qualitative stage informs the second quantitative stage of research.  Stage two 
develops an econometric model that estimates the extent of shifting or “over-
shifting” of infrastructure charges to home buyers in Brisbane, Australia.  
This research makes two important contributions to the existing research.  
Firstly, it provides the first empirical estimation of the impact infrastructure charges 
have on house prices in Australia.   This data is important as industry and policy 
makers are at odds as to the causes of declining housing affordability across the 
country.  It is important that policy makers are equipped with evidence based data on 
the flow on effects of infrastructure charges so as to be fully informed on the housing 
affordability impacts of the infrastructure charging policies.  Secondly, this study 
tests the house price effects of infrastructure charges outside of North America where 
these effects have been well established.  This research adds to the international 
literature by identifying factors that need to be considered when specifying such 
models in markets with different institutional environments.  This is important as it 
establishes a framework for analysis of this topic in other countries, adds an 
international perspective to the well established US literature and challenges the 
external validity of the US conclusions.  
Stage 2 of this study employs hedonic regression methods to estimate the 
impact of infrastructure charges on house prices and vacant residential lot prices in 
Brisbane, Australia during 2005-2011, using a data set of 29,752 house sales, 
comprising 4,699 new house sales and 25,053 existing house sales and 13,739 lot 
sales.  The regression results for the effect of infrastructure charges on house prices 
in Brisbane indicated that for every $1.00 of infrastructure charge levied on 
developers, all house prices increase by $3.95, with existing house prices increasing 
by $3.56 and new house prices increasing by $4.69.  These findings were higher than 
expected and higher than the US model average findings, particularly for new 
housing.  Findings for the vacant lot models indicated that for every $1.00 of 
infrastructure charge levied on developers, all vacant lot prices increase by $1.69. 
In summary, understanding “Who really pays for urban infrastructure” is 
critical to both the housing affordability and infrastructure funding debates in 
Australia and this research provides the first empirical data for policy makers to 
assess their policy objectives and outcomes against.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Housing is widely touted as the largest investment most Australians make in 
their lifetime, however despite all levels of government having housing affordability 
policies, housing affordability remains at critical levels in Australia (Demographia, 
2013).  Affordability is more than just house prices.  It also includes ready access to 
public transport, schools and good road networks, and of course access to all the 
basic utilities.  However, in fast growing areas, governments don’t have the funds to 
build all the new urban infrastructure new housing estates need.  Sourcing this 
funding for the provision of new urban infrastructure in growing communities has 
been a policy dilemma for governments since the 1950s (Neutze, 1995).  Existing 
communities refuse to pay for this new infrastructure by way of higher rates and 
taxes.  So instead, developer infrastructure charges have been introduced as a “user 
pays” method of funding new urban infrastructure.  In this way, governments 
appease existing residents by shifting the responsibility of funding new growth 
related infrastructure from the government (community) to the development industry 
(Burge, 2006); however the passing-on of these costs to new homeowners is said to 
directly contribute to reduced housing affordability (Been, 2005).  The question is 
then raised:  who really pays for urban infrastructure?  The purpose of this thesis is to 
empirically examine the impact of current government infrastructure funding policies 
on housing affordability in Brisbane, Australia.   
In the United States (“US”), research suggests that for every extra $1.00 of 
infrastructure charge, new house prices increase by around $1.60 (Nelson, Bowles, 
Juergensmeyer and Nichols, 2008).  In the State of Queensland, where the maximum 
infrastructure charge for a new house was set at $28,000 in July 2011 (Persign, 
2011), if we apply the US models and the $1.00:$1.60 ratio, this one charge alone 
could equate to an increase to new house prices of $45,000.  Quantitative research on 
the impact of infrastructure charges on house prices has been undertaken in the 
 2 Chapter 1:  Introduction 
US/Canada for the past three decades.  However to date, no such studies have been 
undertaken in Australia. 
This research investigates whether the US models are applicable in Australia, 
and how much infrastructure charges increase new house prices by here.  Why is this 
question important?  Because to date there has been no empirical evidence on the 
linkage between the Queensland State Government’s dual policy objectives of 
housing affordability and developer-levied infrastructure charges.  Whilst it is 
acknowledged that the issue of housing affordability is a wider issue than that of 
house prices alone, the initial and ongoing capital costs associated with housing is a 
significant contributor to the housing affordability conundrum and is the focus of this 
research. 
House price movements are frequently reported on in the media, with specific 
focus often on affordability issues and much debate ensues on the relative causes.  
Australian housing is reported to be some of the most unaffordable in the world, with 
more than 75% of Australian housing markets considered severely unaffordable, with 
Australia ranked second behind Hong Kong as providing the most unaffordable 
housing on an international scale (Demographia, 2013).   
Looking at the drivers of house prices in Australia, both demand and supply 
factors are identified as contributing to this phenomenon.  Demand factors that 
contribute to escalating housing prices are:  the availability of cheaper and more 
accessible finance, combined with strong economic and population growth, as well 
as tax and other incentives such as negative gearing and the first home owners grant 
(Worthington, 2012) together with low unemployment rates and strong household 
income growth (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2012).  Supply side contributors to 
escalating house prices in Australia are suggested to be due to unresponsive housing 
supply resulting from governmental policy in the land release and zoning process, as 
well as in building and environmental regulation and infrastructure cost recovery 
(Ruming, Gurran and Randolph 2011, Australian Government, 2012).   
With all of this conjecture as to the causes of rising house prices, it is 
unsurprising that there is little consensus on how house prices are determined, what 
contributes to house price increases and hence how government policies impact 
house prices.  Data from empirical studies is required to ensure evidence based 
policy can be formulated.  
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The focus of this research is to examine the impact of infrastructure charges 
which are a government growth management tool, on house prices in Brisbane, 
Australia.  Sourcing appropriate funding for the provision of new urban 
infrastructure has been a policy dilemma for governments around the world for 
decades.  This is particularly relevant in high growth areas where new services and 
amenities are required to support rapidly growing populations (Ellickson and Been, 
2005).  The Australian infrastructure funding policy dilemmas are reflective of 
similar matters to some extent in the United Kingdom (“UK”), and to a greater extent 
the US and Canada.  In these countries, infrastructure cost recovery policies have 
been in place since the 1940’s and 1970’s respectively (Evans, 2004b; Been, 2005).  
The term “Infrastructure Charges” is a term that is used to encompass the 
estimated proportionate cost of providing trunk and other off-site urban infrastructure 
such as local roads, stormwater, community facilities and parks to new developments 
(refer to Section 1.8 for more detailed definition).  These costs historically were 
borne by the public purse, however in high growth areas, local governments have 
been increasingly reluctant to fund such infrastructure through general revenue.  
Hence, various user-pays infrastructure charging schemes have been introduced in 
Australia in recent years (Productivity Commission, 2011) following patterns of 
development in other industrialised countries such as the UK and US.  Industry has 
argued that the quantum of these charges in many jurisdictions have made 
development uneconomical and housing unaffordable (Housing Industry 
Association, 2003; Urban Development Institute of Australia, 2007; Residential 
Development Council, 2006 and 2007).   
It is important to note that the State of Queensland is not a pioneer in Australia 
in its desire to shift the cost of new infrastructure from public to private funding.  
Nor is the debate on the associated impact on house prices only an issue in the 
Queensland state capital of Brisbane.  Each of the seven States and Territories in 
Australia has relevant cost recovery legislation that enables the cost of new 
infrastructure to be recouped from developers at the time of statutory approval.1  The 
                                                            
 
1 See Chapter 6 of Productivity Commission 2011 for an overview of each State and Territory’s 
legislative provisions. 
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debate on the responsibility for funding new urban infrastructure and the impact of 
infrastructure charges on housing affordability started with the industry bodies from 
as early as the 1970s, and has more recently been identified as a policy issue by all 
levels of government.  At a Federal Government level these include a number of 
inquiries into housing affordability at the highest level including:  Ken Henry’s 2010 
report into Australia’s Future Tax System (see Commonwealth of Australia, 2010), 
the Council of Australian Governments (“COAG”) Communique (see COAG, 2010), 
the Housing Supply and Affordability Reform Working Party Report (see COAG, 
2012), three reports by the National Housing Supply Council (see National Housing 
Supply Council 2008, 2010 and, 2013), two reports by the Productivity Commission 
(see Chan, Forwood, Roper and Sayers 2009 and Productivity Commission 2011) 
and the yet to be concluded 2013 Senate Economics References Committee review 
on affordable housing.  At a state level, review of infrastructure charges was 
formalised in Queensland in 2011 when the State Government established the 
Infrastructure Charges Taskforce to examine the issue (See Infrastructure Charges 
Taskforce, 2011).  
Despite these state and federal government reports, there remains limited 
evidence based research on the impact of infrastructure charges on house prices from 
which policy makers can base decisions on in Australia.  This poses a significant gap 
in the research on this topic.  Formulation of a relevant model to quantify the impact 
of infrastructure charges on house prices in Australia will be the outcome of this 
research.  This work is a keystone in the housing affordability debate, with state 
governments in high growth areas having user-pays infrastructure charging policies 
operating in tandem with housing affordability objectives, with no empirical 
evidence of the impact of one policy objective on the other.  The contribution of this 
research is to provide Australian policy makers with the first quantitative study of its 
kind, providing empirical evidence of the impact of growth enabling infrastructure 
charges on house prices.   
This initial chapter sets the scene for this research project.  Further to this 
introduction, the problem statement is presented in Section 1.2.  The research 
questions are set out in Section 1.3, followed by the research hypothesis in Section 
1.4.  Sections 1.5 and 1.6 outline the research methodology adopted and objectives 
respectively.  Infrastructure charges for the purposes of this research are defined in 
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section 1.7.  Section 1.8 describes the outline of the remaining chapters of this thesis 
and finally, Section 1.9 concludes this introductory chapter.   
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
All levels of government in Australia are under pressure to provide growth 
enabling urban infrastructure, as well as maintaining existing infrastructure in older 
established suburbs.  Various funding mechanisms are available, however ratepayers 
and voters in general resist the introduction of new rates and taxes to fund 
infrastructure for which they perceive no benefit (Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 2003) 
and debt adverse governments refuse to consider infrastructure bond issues (Chan et 
al., 2009).  This is particularly relevant in high growth areas where new road, water, 
sewerage and waste water and other public services are required to support rapidly 
growing populations with limited public-purse budgets and equally limited debt 
appetites.  As indicated in Section 1.1, the result has been the introduction of 
government policies for any new urban infrastructure to be paid for by the property 
developer as a condition of approval (Productivity Commission, 2011).  However, 
property developers claim that these costs are merely passed on to home buyers, with 
a corresponding erosion of housing affordability (Residential Development Council 
of Australia, 2006, 2007; Urban Development Institute of Australia, 2007).   
This section provides the background for the policy dilemma in Queensland, 
whereby over the study period, despite an increasing population and the effects of the 
Global Financial Crisis (“GFC”), house prices increased and housing supply fell.  
Developers claim the fall in supply and increase to house prices was due to the high 
infrastructure charges that government levied on new development at the time.  This 
section will outline how the Queensland State Government’s growth management 
and housing affordability policies appear to be having outcomes that are at odds with 
their stated objectives over this period.  The study period for this research of 2005 – 
2011 co-incides with a period of high population growth in Queensland, as well as 
the time for which the Priority Infrastructure Plan2 provisions of the Integrated 
                                                            
 
2 For further details of Priority Infrastructure Plans refer to Productivity Commission, 2011 (Chapter 
6) and Queensland Government, 2009 (sections 88, 89 and 625). 
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Planning Act 1997, Integrated Planning and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2003 
and its successor the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 were in effect (see Queensland 
Government, 1997, 2003 and 2009)3.  It also straddles the years of the GFC where 
booming housing markets stalled further to global credit constraints and falling asset 
values.  Further details of selection of the study area and period are provided in 
Section 5.3.   
The State of Queensland, Australia was the subject of significant population 
growth over the decade to 2010, growing at an average rate of 2.5%.  This growth 
was significantly in excess of the national population growth average of 1.6%.  In 
real numbers, this equated to an average influx to Queensland of approximately 
112,900 new residents per annum; or at 2.6 persons per household demand in the 
order of over 43,000 new households each year (Queensland Government, 2010).  
Approximately half of this growth occurred in the Greater Brisbane region (Brisbane 
Marketing, 2014).  This amount of growth placed significant demand on the State’s 
planning systems specifically on the availability of appropriately zoned and serviced 
land, including the provision of new infrastructure as well as the upgrading of 
existing systems, amenities and services.  In order to manage this growth, the State 
Government responded with a number of policy responses.  These policy responses 
were aimed at managing the supply of new housing, with the overriding intent to be 
for new housing to be provided where sufficient infrastructure was available, and that 
housing remained affordable (Queensland Government, 2009).  
The legislative response to manage this growth was to introduce amendments 
to the Integrated Planning Act 1997 in 2003 (see Queensland Government, 2003) 
whereby new housing developments became liable for the cost of the infrastructure 
required to service that growth for the first time (Nicholls, 2011) with further 
provisions contained in the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (see Queensland 
Government, 2009).  Further to the 2003 enabling legislation, local authorities within 
Queensland increasingly sought to recoup from developers not only 100% of the 
proportionate costs of new trunk infrastructure (i.e. on site) to service new estates, 
                                                            
 
3 For further details of the legislative reform process see England, 2010 and Steele and Dodson, 
2014. 
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but also the partial costs of offsite infrastructure be it for district, regional or even 
State wide services.  Infrastructure charges were able to be levied on a wider range of 
social and economic infrastructure including: water supply, sewer, transport, 
bikeways, roads, community purpose, parks, recreation waterways and stormwater 
(Urbis JHD, 2010).   
This 100% cost recovery change to the infrastructure charging regime lead to 
significant and rapid increase in infrastructure charges in many local government 
areas.  Examples of the subsequent rapid and significant increases in infrastructure 
charges provided by the development industry include:  water headworks charges 
increasing 1300% in four years;  an increase from $6,000 to $50,000 per lot for 
infrastructure charges in one increment;  an increase from $8,000 to $47,000 in 
another example;  as well as a number of examples where infrastructure and other 
charges increased between $5,000 and $40,000 per lot during the time taken for the 
assessment of the development application (Urban Development Instutite of 
Australia, 2007).  Infrastructure charges in one South East Queensland region were 
reported to have increased 41% each year in the years 2006 to 2010 effectively 
increasing from $8,000 per lot to $32,000 per lot (Urbis JHD, 2010).  In Brisbane, 
infrastructure charges were reported to have increased 100% between 1995 and 2006 
(Productivity Commission, 2011).  By 2010, infrastructure charges in Greater 
Brisbane were reported to be $25,000 - $30,000 per lot in many areas and up to 
$50,000 and $60,000 per lot for greenfield developments (Urbis JHD, 2010).  
Over the same period, a number of authors identified a chronic and growing 
undersupply of housing supply in Queensland, with many citing poor planning policy 
as a key cause (see Commonwealth Government, 2008; Residential Development 
Council, 2006, 2007; Urban Development Instutite of Australia, 2007; Urbis JHD, 
2006; National Housing Supply Council, 2008, 2010, and 2013).  Research 
Commissioned by the Residential Development Council in 2006 indicated that South 
East Queensland was forecast to have a deficit of 10,484 lots by 2016 due to new 
land release constraints.  This however pre-dated the GFC and subsequent figures 
released by Queensland Government and ABS indicated new housing approvals 
dropped 16% in 2008 and new housing starts a further 24% in 2009, despite the 
persistent population growth of 2.8% - 2.4% in the same period (ABS, 2011).  The 
National Housing Supply Council (“NHSC”) (2010) reported a similar deficit on a 
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national level with an estimated gap in the number of dwellings of 178,400 as at June 
2009, up from 99,500 just a year prior, with that gap forecast to grow.   
Over the corresponding period, house prices in Queensland went through 
unprecedented growth averaging 18.8% increase per annum between 2002 and 2010 
(ABS, 2010) and housing affordability became a key policy issue for all levels of 
government (Queensland Government, 2007).   
Housing statistics for Brisbane from the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(“ABS”) illustrate this conundrum.  Figure 1.1 demonstrates a growing average 
house price (solid line to right hand axis) combined with falling new 
commencements (dashed line from left hand axis, together with downward sloping 
fine trend line).  It can be seen that during the study period, Queensland’s housing 
market experienced significant stresses from high demand, combined with growing 
undersupply.  These conditions lead to steep house price growth as demand 
outstripped supply. 
Figure 1.1  
Brisbane Dwelling Commencement and House Price Growth 2002 - 2011 
 
Source:  (ABS, 2011)  
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Industry bodies and developers claimed that the rapid and significant increases 
to infrastructure charges were responsible for pushing house prices to a level that was 
unaffordable to the market (Housing Industry Association, 2003; Residential 
Development Council, 2006, 2007; Urban Development Instutite of Australia, 2007).  
This was occurring by virtue of the combined effects of:  
 Developers passing these additional costs on to home buyers; and  
 These additional costs rendering projects commercially unviable, and with 
fewer projects proceeding, demand drove up prices in an environment of 
reduced supply.   
On the other hand, other industry experts such as AEC Group (2009) claimed 
that there is little relationship between infrastructure charges and housing 
affordability, with charges more likely to be reflected in lower developer profit 
margins, or lower land prices. 
This evidence of increasing house prices occurring in concert with rapidly 
increasing infrastructure charges appears to be in direct conflict with the State 
Government’s 2007 Housing Affordability Strategy where the primary aim was “(to) 
ensure that the State’s land and housing is on the market quickly and at the lowest 
cost.” (Queensland Government, 2007, p. 1).  This was to be achieved via a number 
of measures which specifically included regulating infrastructure charging across the 
State (Queensland Government, 2007).  
What is clear, is that the policy objectives of the Queensland 2007 Housing 
Affordability Strategy and the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (and its 2011 
amendments4) appear to be at odds.  On one hand the government believes it is 
facilitating affordable housing supply via developer paid infrastructure charges, 
whilst on the other hand developers claim these charges are merely passed onto new 
home buyers.  In the United States, research suggests that for every extra $1.00 of 
                                                            
 
4 A number of key provisions of the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 relating to infrastructure charges 
were amended by the Sustainable Planning (Housing Affordability and Infrastructure Charges 
Reform) Amendment Act 2011, which introduced “maximum adopted infrastructure charges” in 
November 2011 (see Queensland Government, 2011).  The impact of the 2011 legislation is outside 
the scope of this thesis as explained further in Chapter 5.  
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infrastructure charge, new house prices increase by around $1.60 (Nelson et al., 
2008).  In Queensland, where the maximum infrastructure charge for a new house 
was set at $28,000 in July 2011 (Persign, 2011), if the US models can be applied to 
the Australian housing markets and the $1.00:$1.60 ratio is valid, then this one 
government charge alone could equate to an increase in new house prices in the order 
of $45,000.   
Quantitative research on the impact of infrastructure charges on house prices 
has been undertaken in the US/Canada for the past three decades.  However to date, 
no such studies have been undertaken in Australia.  This is a significant gap in the 
research in Australia, with a lack of empirical evidence to support the claims of 
either side of the debate as to whether or not infrastructure charges increase the price 
of housing.   
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the question of who really pays for 
urban infrastructure within the residential sector and the corresponding impact 
infrastructure charges have on housing affordability in Australia.  This research 
question is important because governments throughout Australia have dual policies 
of housing affordability and growth management.  However to date there has been no 
empirical evidence of the linkage between the dual policy objectives of housing 
affordability and user-pays provision of infrastructure in Australia.  Whilst it is 
acknowledged that issue of housing affordability is a wider issue than that of house 
prices alone, the initial and ongoing capital costs associated with housing is a 
significant contributor to the housing affordability conundrum and is the focus of this 
research. 
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1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The specific purpose of this research is to address the following questions: 
1. Is there empirical evidence in Australia that the imposition of 
infrastructure charges by governments increases the price of housing?   
2. Is there empirical evidence internationally that the imposition of 
infrastructure charges by governments increases the price of housing?   
3. Can international models be used to assess the impact of infrastructure 
charges on the price of housing in Brisbane, Australia?  
4. What is the impact of infrastructure charges on the price of housing in 
Brisbane, Australia?  
The outcome of this research will be to produce empirical evidence of the 
impact of infrastructure charges on house prices in Australia.  This is important as 
these results will inform policy makers on the outcomes of their growth management 
strategies and the consequent impact infrastructure charges have on the objectives of 
their housing affordability policies.  This research will provide evidence in response 
to the overarching thesis question of:  who really pays for urban infrastructure?  
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this research is to provide empirical evidence on outcomes of 
the parallel policy objectives of the State Government’s growth management policy 
(developer paid infrastructure charges) and its housing affordability strategies.   
Specifically it will develop a model that will estimate the impact of 
infrastructure charges on the price of housing in Brisbane, Australia.  This will be 
achieved through the use of an econometric model to estimate these price impacts.  
In doing so, this research will provide evidence to inform the ongoing policy debate 
on the contribution of infrastructure charges to Australia’s declining housing 
affordability and thus respond to the question of who really pays for urban 
infrastructure.  
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1.5 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
The hypothesis for this research is that infrastructure charges are a cost of 
development, or in other words a supply chain input.  Whilst these charges are levied 
on developers by government, in an uncertain and rapidly changing infrastructure 
charging regime, these costs are not borne by developers but are passed on to home 
owners, thus increasing house prices and adversely affecting housing affordability.   
Further, it is hypothesised that infrastructure charges are not passed on in a 
dollar for dollar fashion to home buyers, but that these costs are “over passed” with 
the impact on house prices being in excess of the actual amount of the infrastructure 
charge itself.  
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This research will seek to quantify the effect of infrastructure charging policies 
to house prices in Brisbane, the State capital and major metropolitan area of 
Queensland, Australia during the years 2005 - 2011.  In undertaking the preliminary 
exploratory phases of this research, two key sub-issues became apparent.  Firstly, a 
number of US studies on this topic were identified that employed a range of differing 
econometric techniques.  Whilst there was a reported consistency in their findings of 
overpassing of infrastructure charges in the range of $1.50 - $1.70 (Nelson et al., 
2008), there appeared to be little consistency in approach and there appeared little 
evidence of a preferred econometric methodology or evidence of preferred model 
evolution over time.  Study area, study duration, study size, and data requirements 
varied considerably between studies also, giving little indication as to a preferred 
approach for use in the Australian context, particularly given such a study would be 
the first of its kind identified outside of the US/Canada.  Detailed examination of 
these matters was considered important to ensure an appropriate econometric 
technique, data set and study area/duration/size was selected for use in this study.  
Secondly, nuances of the US housing market were apparent in these studies 
that did not apply in the Australian context.  Whether these institutional factors could 
be removed from the models, and the models adapted for the Australian context 
without affecting their predictive qualities, was an important consideration in 
determining the external validity of these studies, their findings and conclusions.   
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Addressing these issues within the research questions requires a multifaceted 
approach that includes:  pragmatism, deductive and inductive logic, integrated 
qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis, which are all features of 
mixed methods research (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009).  The sequential and 
exploratory nature of the research questions lends itself to an exploratory mixed 
method research design, beginning qualitatively to explore the phenomenon of the 
incidence of infrastructure charges on house prices in the US in depth and then 
measure its prevalence in Australia.   
Mixed methods provide a means for combining the strengths of both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches to best understand the research problem 
(Creswell, 2008).  A two stage, exploratory sequential mixed method design has been 
adopted, consistent with Creswell and Plano Clark’s (2007) framework for an 
instrument development model.  This is an appropriate methodology as it provides 
for qualitative data to be collected and analysed in the first stage, with those results 
then used to specify the model to be tested quantitatively in the second phase 
(Creswell, 2011).  This design typology focuses on the qualitative phase, the findings 
of which are used in the development of an instrument for use in the qualitative 
phase (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007).   
Mixed methods research is often described as the third research paradigm as it 
bridges the gap between quantitative and qualitative research (Burke-Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  The advantages of an exploratory mixed method design are 
that the separate phases make it easy to describe, implement and report on;  it is 
easily applied to multi-phase research and can answer a broader and more complete 
range of research questions because the researcher is not confined to a single method 
or approach; it can provide stronger evidence for a conclusion through convergence 
and corroboration of findings;  it can add insights and understanding that might be 
missed when only a single method is used;  qualitative and quantitative research used 
together produce more complete knowledge necessary to inform theory and practice;  
and despite its qualitative emphasis, makes its findings more acceptable to 
quantitative audiences (Burke-Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Creswell and Plano 
Clark, 2007).   
However this methodology is not without its challenges.  These include 
extended timeframes for implementation due to the two stage approach; unknown 
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nature of the quantitative stage at the outset; the researcher has to learn multiple 
methods and approaches and understand how to mix them appropriately;  and 
deciding which data to use from the qualitative stage to build the quantitative 
instrument (Burke-Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Creswell and Plano Clark, 
2007).   
The mixed methods approach is appropriate for this study as it meets each of 
the criteria for Teddlie and Tashakkori’s (2011) “Eight Contemporary Characteristics 
of Mixed Methods Research” (p. 287) as indicated in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1   
Mixed Method Characteristics 
Characteristic Study Features 
1. Methodological eclecticism Combination of qualitative and quantitative methodologies 
2. Paradigm pluralism Pragmatism, post positivism, interpretivism 
3. Emphasis on diversity at all levels of the 
research enterprise 
Diverse range of exploratory and confirmatory research questions 
4. Emphasis on continua rather than a set of 
dichotomies 
“Either-or” dichotomies are replaced with integrated sequential questions 
and innovative methods 
5. Iterative, cyclical approach to research Sequential research questions and research design 
6. Focus on the research question (or research 
problem) in determining the methods employed 
Research questions/problem have directed the path of the research and the 
research design 
7. Set of basic “signature” research designs and 
analytical processes 
Exploratory sequential instrument development model adopted 
8. Tendency toward balance and compromise that 
is implicit within the “third methodological 
community” 
Pragmatic approach that combines the strengths of both qualitative and 
quantitative  methologies 
Source:  Teddlie and Tashakkori’s (2011) and author 
 
The two stages of this exploratory sequential instrument development model 
are illustrated in Figure 1.2.  Stage 1 of this research encompasses the qualitative 
techniques of archival research and semi-structured interviews to address the two 
sub-issues identified above.  The data collected from these two methods are then 
triangulated with the ongoing literature review to establish the basis for the second 
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quantitative stage of this research.  The findings of Stage 1 informs the specification 
of the econometric model which is then used for quantitative analysis in Stage 2.   
Figure 1.2  
Research Design and Methodology 
 
Source:  Created by Author 
This approach is consistent with Creswell’s (2008) data mixing approach 
whereby the quantitative and qualitative data is mixed by connecting the data 
analysis step of the first stage to the data collection step of the second stage, thus 
building on the first stage findings.  One advantage of using mixed methods research 
is that the use of both qualitative and quantitative approaches will provide a more 
complete understanding of the research problem than either approach alone 
(Creswell, 2008). 
The activities associated with each stage of this exploratory sequential 
instrument design approach and how these address the research questions are detailed 
below.  
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1.6.1 Stage 1 
Stage 1 research is the qualitative phase of this thesis and is designed to 
address the first three research questions.  As indicated in Figure 1.2 this stage 
triangulates the literature review and the qualitative techniques of archival research 
and semi-structured interviews.  The purpose of the archival research phase is to 
reveal any evidence of econometric methodological evolution from prior works on 
this topic.  The semi-structured interviews will inform this process by providing a 
deeper level of insight into implicit assumptions in the model and data selection 
process, as well as insight into the functionality and characteristics of the 
international housing markets that are relevant to econometric model design and 
assumptions.  This Stage is important to ensure that the econometric model design 
utilised in Stage 2, and the underlying assumptions adopted are appropriate in the 
Australian context.  It will also be important to understand the respective housing 
markets and institutional characteristics to ensure appropriate data is utilised and the 
results interpreted in a practical and applied manner.  
The theoretical basis for the selection of these qualitative research methods is 
described below:   
Archival Research 
Archival research involves “the locating, evaluating, and systematic 
interpretation and analysis of sources found in archives” (Archival Research, null).  
Archival research is appropriate for a wide range of research activities due to its 
versatility and wide range of knowledge that can be served (Berg, 2009).  The 
premise of archival research lies is the observational nature of the research, where 
researchers can examine a phenomenon without interfering with it or changing it 
(Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009).  Often related to social research, this technique is 
appropriate as it includes collecting data from existing sources (Kellehar, 1993). 
Archival research can apply to a range of data sources, be these privately or 
publicly held (Berg, 2009) and include written and audio-visual records as well as 
material culture (Kellehar, 1993).  Repositories of such data include:  registries, 
archives, libraries and museums (Kellehar, 1993).   
For this research, it is the written record that is of interest, specifically 
scholarly journal articles and other prior works such as PhD theses.  The strengths of 
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this technique lie is in its unobtrusive nature and that it can be used for historical 
data, which is readily available from web linked databases (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 
2009) such as university PhD repositories and other academic databases. 
Kellehar (1993, p53) outlines four advantages of this technique when applied 
to published sources: 
 Provision of a comprehensive data source (both primary and secondary 
data as well as support literature); 
 Data gathered is often unique (historically, methodologically or 
administratively); 
 Provision of a source of longitudinal data;  and 
 Highly reliable data source which can be readily re-checked by others. 
A potential limitation of this method is that of information gaps due to 
incomplete or dated studies, or limited access to information.  This potential 
shortcoming will be sought to overcome through the mixed method design whereby 
the data gathered from the published works (eg. Journal articles and prior theses) can 
be supplemented with the interview data from the semi-structured interviews 
(Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009) as discussed under the following heading, and 
triangulation (Berg, 2009).   
The primary purpose of the archival research will be to assess and document 
the evolution of econometric modelling techniques that have been used elsewhere for 
the purposes of estimating the effect of infrastructure charges on house prices.  
Further details of this research are provided in Chapter 3.  From this basis, the 
external validity of existing models will be assessed in Chapter 4 and inform the 
development of the instrument in Stage 2 of this thesis, being the specification and 
application of a quantitative model to be adopted for this research.  
Semi-structured Interviews 
As indicated previously, semi-structured interviews have been selected for use 
in this exploratory sequential instrument design mixed methods approach in order to 
overcome the limitations of utilising archival research alone (Berg, 2009).  
Specifically the purpose of this phase is to provide a deeper level of insight into 
implicit assumptions in the model and data selection process, as well as insight into 
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the functionality and characteristics of the international housing markets that are 
relevant to econometric model design and assumptions. 
Semi-structured interviews sit on the continuum between structured 
(questionnaire) and unstructured (observation) interview techniques (Newton, 2010).  
Given the triangulation nature of this phase of the research, and the fact that each 
archival source will be unique to its author, these semi-structured interviews will be 
based on an interview guide that lists only areas for discussion (Plowright, 2011) and 
open-ended questions (to uncover additional or unforseen information) (Hove and 
Anda, 2005).  This open framework interview design allows a focused, yet 
conversational, two-way communication between the interviewer and interviewee 
where they can both give and receive information (Creswell, 2003). 
Interviewees will be questioned broadly on the local context surrounding their 
models, selection of independent variables, implicit assumptions made, housing 
market structure matters, the interpretation of results and other related items.   
A limitation of this method is that it relies on the inter-personal skills of the 
interviewer and their ability to establish relationship and rapport in order to elicit 
data (Newton, 2010).  A further limitation is that in the interview guide approach 
topics may be inadvertently missed and the method depends significantly on the skill 
of the interviewer (Patton, 2002).   
Criteria for selection of the interviewees included: 
 Have authored (or co-authored) empirical studies on the house price 
effects of infrastructure charges in the past decade and these works 
resulted in findings of significance; or 
 Were acknowledged industry experts in the field of housing 
development and infrastructure charges; and  
 Were available for interview during this researcher’s three week study 
tour of the US in September, 2012. 
Interviewees will be recruited primarily via direct email approach, with email 
addresses sourced from internet searches of academic profiles.  Face-to-face 
meetings with the interviewees will be arranged where possible.  Opportunistic 
interviews may occur if further expert/academics that meet the criteria are identified 
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and available within the study tour agenda.  Further details of these interviews are 
provided in Chapter 4.  
The main purpose of this semi-structured interview process is to aid in the 
understanding and analysis of the data already gathered by the archival research.  
Triangulation of this data with that gathered from the archival research, together with 
the literature review will inform the specification of the model to be developed and 
applied in Stage 2 of this research.  The findings from Stage 1 of this research are 
detailed in Chapter 4.  
The specific activities involved in addressing each of the research questions 
involved in Stage 1 are detailed below: 
Question 1:  Is there empirical evidence in Australia that the imposition of 
infrastructure charges by governments increases the price of housing?   
 Comprehensive literature review of Australian scholarly literature on the 
relationship between infrastructure charges (or the interstate equivalent) on 
house prices;   
 Review research and advocacy produced or sponsored by industry bodies in 
Australia on the relationship between infrastructure charges and house prices; 
and  
 Review state and federal government research and publications that identify 
infrastructure charges as an impact on housing policy. 
Question 2:  Is there empirical evidence internationally that the imposition of 
infrastructure charges by governments increases the price of housing?   
 Comprehensive and systematic literature review of international scholarly 
literature on the relationship between infrastructure charges (or the 
international equivalent) on house prices.  International sources will be 
focused on the US and UK which have comparable planning systems to 
Australia and established infrastructure cost-recovery policies.  Literature 
from other countries will searched; and 
 Review of any empirical studies used in international literature that quantify 
the impacts of infrastructure charges (or equivalent) on house prices. 
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Question 3: Can international empirical models be used to assess the impact of 
infrastructure charges on the cost of new housing in `Brisbane, Australia? 
 Archival research of studies identified in the previous step including the 
critical analysis of the study characteristics, key findings, methodology and 
assumptions used in those models to determine the level of relevance in 
comparison with the Queensland market mechanisms, availability of data, 
appropriateness of variables employed, infrastructure charging policies, and 
planning and taxation regimes;   
 A comparative analysis of the structure of the international taxation systems 
and housing markets to those in Australia will then be carried out to identify 
key similarities and differences that may impact underlying assumptions and 
thus specification of the model; and 
 This research will be enriched by a research tour to carry out semi-structured 
interviews with international academics and other infrastructure charging 
experts.  The purpose of these interviews will be to supplement the archival 
research of the existing models for the purposes of better understanding the 
external validity of any prior studies.  
 
1.6.2 Stage 2 
Stage 2 comprises the quantitative component of this research.  Using the Stage 
1 findings, the instrument developed in Stage 2 will be an econometric model 
appropriate to the Australian housing market characteristics.  This technique will 
quantitatively estimate the direct impact of infrastructure charges on house prices in 
Brisbane, Australia and provide the empirical evidence of the extent of any on 
passing or “over passing” of infrastructure charges onto home buyers.   
Econometric Modelling 
Econometric modelling is the application of mathematical and statistical 
methods to the analysis of economic data.  This quantitative technique aims “to give 
empirical content to economic relations for testing economic theories, forecasting, 
decision making, and for ex post decision/policy evaluation” (Geweke, Horowitz, 
and Pesaran, 2006, p,2) .  It encompasses a set of quantitative or statistical techniques 
that are used to quantify the impact of one economic phenomenon on another.  A 
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form of multiple regression analysis, econometrics utilises multiple variables, 
including dummy variables to measure economic impacts or hypotheses (Thomas, 
1988).   
By quantifying aspects of economic problems, econometrics calls for a 
marriage of measurement and theory in economics.  Theory without measurement, 
being a branch of logic, can only have limited relevance for the analysis of actual 
economic problems.  While on the other hand, measurement without theory, being 
devoid of a framework necessary for the interpretation of the statistical observations, 
is unlikely to result in a satisfactory explanation of the way economic forces interact 
with each other.  Neither measurement nor theory on their own is sufficient to 
advance our understanding of economic phenomena, hence the evolution of 
econometrics (Pesaran, null). 
The use of econometrics for examining the effect of changes in economic 
conditions on real estate markets is well established (Brooks and Tsolacos, 2010).  
Malpezzi (2002) credits Maclennan with publishing the seminal works on the use of 
econometrics in house price modelling in the mid 1970’s.  Since then, advances in 
computational capacity and data availability have seen the proliferation of these 
techniques (Cho, 1996).     
The steps involved in forming an econometric model are indicated in Figure 
1.3 overleaf.  
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Figure 1.3  
Forming an Econometric Model 
 
Source:  Brooks and Tsolacos, 2010, adapted by author 
As indicated previously, one of the challenges of an exploratory sequential 
instrument design approach is the unknown nature of the quantitative stage at the 
outset.  As will become apparent in Chapters 2 and 3, a wide range of econometric 
techniques are available.  As noted by Brooks and Tsolacos (2010) the particular 
characteristics of a real estate market will affect model outcomes, and “for this 
reason they should be well understood” (p 6).  Hence, the adoption of the mixed 
methods approach for this thesis.  It is important to undertake the Stage 1 qualitative 
process in order to first understand the particular housing market characteristics of 
the previous studies, and compare these to the study area in question, to ensure 
correct specification and interpretation of an Australian model.   
Econometric models suffer from numerous potential errors.  These can include 
errors due to model specification, omitted variables, inclusion of irrelevant variables, 
adoption of the incorrect functional form, highly correlated variables 
(multicollinearity) and interpretation errors (Washington, Karlaftis and Mannering, 
2011).  One of the important purposes of the Stage 1 qualitative stage of this research 
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is to assist in Step 1 and reduce the potential for such errors, particularly since this is 
the first Australian study of its kind.  The theoretical model for passing of 
infrastructure charges onto new house buyers is detailed in Chapter 2.  Details on 
established econometric techniques associated with house price models are included 
in Chapter 3.  A limitation of econometric techniques is the availability of the 
requisite economic data (Meen, 2001) which impacts Step 2.  This deficit can impact 
the effectiveness of this methodology and is identified as a potential limitation of this 
research as discussed further in Chapter 5, together with the model estimation (Step 
3).  The results and findings of the Stage 2 model (Steps 4, 5 and 6) are detailed in 
Chapter 6.  
Hence, Stage 2 specifically addresses research question four in a quantitative 
manner, and the overarching thesis question of “who really pays for infrastructure?”  
The specific activities that will address this research question are identified below: 
Question 4:  What is the impact of infrastructure charges on the price of housing 
in Brisbane, Australia? 
 Using the findings of Stage 1, an appropriate econometric model will be 
specified to estimate house price impacts of infrastructure charges in 
Queensland; 
 A data set for the Greater Brisbane region will be gathered.  This data set will 
comprise the relevant structural, locational and jurisdictional characteristics 
of housing in the study areas.  Infrastructure charge data will need to be 
obtained; 
 Testing and validation of the model; 
 Application and interpretation of the econometric model to determine how 
the Queensland infrastructure charges regime impacts the price of housing in 
Brisbane, Queensland;  and  
 Separate models for all houses, new houses existing houses and vacant 
residential lots will be specified in order to estimate any differential effects.  
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1.7 SCOPE 
It is appropriate at this point to clarify the scope of this research project.  Given 
the focus of the research is the residential sector and single unit dwellings in 
particular, the impact of infrastructure charges on other development types such as 
commercial, retail or industrial, will not be examined.   
This research will focus on detached suburban dwellings, as this is the 
predominant housing type in Greater Brisbane, particularly in greenfield 
development areas.   
Whilst the focus on this research is on increased house prices, this research 
project does not specifically examine whether these increases make housing 
affordable or not.  There is certainly an implied connection between the two, 
however housing affordability is a wider topic that takes into consideration many 
other consumer factors such as household income and expenditure that are outside of 
the direct scope of this project, and may be the subject of further research.   
Whilst the discussion within this document refers to all of the State of 
Queensland, the model that is developed will be tested on data from the Greater 
Brisbane region only.  This study area has been selected as data on infrastructure 
charges at a regional council level has not been made available to the author despite 
numerous attempts to access such data.  
The purpose of this research is not to critique the previous or new legislative 
provisions in Queensland, nor is it to examine alternative urban infrastructure 
funding options.  The study period selected pre-dates the 2011 introduction of 
Adopted Infrastructure Charges, due to the temporary nature of that policy change 
and the complexities associated with its transitionary arrangements (see Queensland 
Government, 2011).  Analysis of the further 2014 legislative changes that were 
announced during the finalisation of this thesis are also outside of scope.   
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1.8 DEFINITIONS  
As indicated previously, the term “Infrastructure Charges” is a term that is used 
to encompass the estimated proportionate cost of providing trunk and other off-site 
urban infrastructure such as local roads, stormwater, community facilities and parks 
to new developments.  It is a one off charge levied on the developer, generally at the 
time of rezoning/planning approval (Been, 2005; Burge, 2006; Campbell, 2004; 
Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004; Mathur, Waddell, and Blanco, 2004).  These costs 
historically were born by the public purse, however in high growth areas, 
governments have been increasingly reluctant to fund such infrastructure through 
general revenue.  Existing home owners resist paying higher rates and taxes to fund 
new development.  Hence infrastructure charges were introduced to shift these costs 
to the private sector (Burge, 2005).   
Around the globe, various terminologies are used to describe what are 
essentially urban infrastructure funding mechanisms.  For example, the term “impact 
fees” is used throughout the majority of the US, “development charges” is prominent 
in Canada, “planning obligation”, “planning gain” or “Section 106 agreements” are 
all terms used to describe the equivalent to an infrastructure charging system in the 
UK (Evans, 2004a).  “Exactions” is a general term used in Indian (3i Network, 2009) 
and some American literature (Been, 2005), whilst in Australia “infrastructure 
charges”, “developer contributions” or “development levies” are largely 
interchangeable terms depending on the jurisdiction (Productivity Commission, 
2011).56 
For clarity, this paper uses the term “infrastructure charges” when referring to 
the one off fees chargeable by a local authority for the provision of urban 
infrastructure required to support new residential development.  The term “local 
rates” is used to describe regular local jurisdictional levies on existing home owners 
for the purposes of infrastructure repairs, maintenance and renewal, amongst other 
local government services.  Whilst not directly interchangeable, for the purposes of 
                                                            
 
5  
6 Clinch and O’Neill (2010) provide a distinction between infrastructure charges and development 
charges (Ireland).  However this distinction is not made in this research.   
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this paper this term is used in lieu of terms such as “property taxes” (US) and “local 
government taxes” (UK).  Given the topic of this research is based on house price 
impacts, the scope of this review is limited to residential development only, even 
though infrastructure charges are levied on all development sectors.   
Another important definition to clarify at this point is the use of the term 
“vacant land”.  In the residential development sphere, “vacant land” could refer to 
either the subdivided and serviced developed lot that is yet to have a home built upon 
it, or the undeveloped (englobo) land (zoned or unzoned) that is awaiting subdivision 
and the provision of utilities and amenities.  In order to avoid confusion, for the 
purposes of this research the term “lot” is used to describe the subdivided and 
serviced developed vacant land;  and “land” is used in relation to the description of 
undeveloped (englobo) land that is awaiting subdivision.   
Whilst on the topic of lots, it is acknowledged that any price effect of 
infrastructure charges technically should impact lots, and not the new house price 
given infrastructure charges are associated with the subdivision process and not the 
actual house construction.  However for the purposes of this research, and its 
contribution to the housing affordability debate, the impact on house prices is the 
primary focus of this research.  This methodology assumes that the house price 
construction cost remains relatively standard across a market due to the highly 
competitive nature of this industry, and that new house price fluctuations are largely 
due to factors associated with the lot price and structural factors associated with the 
house.  In any case, where data is available both house and lot price effects will be 
examined.  
Finally, all dollar figures noted within this thesis are in the currency of the 
country associated with that study.  For example, the references, data and findings of 
the US literature are expressed in US dollars.  The data and references sourced from 
UK literature is more obvious as it is expressed in pounds.  The data and findings 
associated with this thesis are expressed in Australian dollars.  Currency conversion 
is not required as it is the on passing ratio (amount of the charge compared to the 
associated increase in house price) that is relevant in this analysis.   
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1.9 THESIS OUTLINE 
This introductory chapter has provided the background and context for this 
research into the impact of infrastructure charges on house prices in Australia.  It has 
also defined the purpose, significance and scope of study to be carried out.   
Chapter 2 reviews the theory behind the conundrum of “who really pays for 
urban infrastructure”.  It goes on to examine the Australian literature on the topic as 
well as the international literature.  In doing so, it addresses the first two research 
questions. 
 Chapter 3 documents the findings of the archival research process.  It analyses 
the extant models that estimate the impact of infrastructure charges on house prices.  
This analysis focuses on the methodology, assumptions, independent variables, 
theory and findings of recent similar studies.  Chapter 4 analyses the data collected 
from the semi-structured interview process, tying together all the data collected to 
this stage and presents the findings and contributions from this initial Stage 1.  This 
analysis addresses the third research question and concludes the Stage 1 research.   
Stage 2 of this research is addressed in Chapters 5 and 6.  It is here that the 
findings from Stage 1 are utilised to inform specification and application of a suitable 
model to estimate the house price effects of infrastructure charges in Australia.  This 
process commences in Chapter 5 with a detailed description of the approach, data 
and model. Chapter 6 presents the findings of this study and contribution to 
knowledge, responding to research question 4. The conclusions, implications for 
industry and policy makers, and an agenda for further research are drawn in Chapter 
7.  This thesis outline is illustrated in Figure 1.4. 
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Figure 1.4  
Thesis Outline 
 
Source:  Created by Author 
This document has been prepared in completion of the requirements for the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy.  It has been prepared in accordance with Queensland 
University of Technology Thesis Presentation and Management in Word 2007 
document and template.   
1.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Housing affordability is at critical levels in Australia and the reasons for this 
are the subject of much debate.  Development industry bodies maintain that 
infrastructure charges are a significant contributor to the supply-side drivers of 
increasing house prices.  Are housing prices being driven by demand only, or are 
there other contributory factors at play?  There is a long established international 
research base concluding and verifying that infrastructure charges contribute to 
increased house prices (Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 2003), and reduced housing 
affordability (Been, 2005).  To date the academic community in Australia has not 
responded to this issue in an empirical manner.   This is a significant gap in 
Australian research in quantifying these contributory affects and this research seeks 
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to verify that infrastructure charges are a major contributor to increasing house prices 
and seeks to quantify that impact for the first time in Australia. 
In understanding the flow on effect of infrastructure charges to housing 
affordability, an exploratory sequential, instrument design, mixed method approach 
firstly, identifies and analyses a number of empirical studies in the US where 
infrastructure charges have been in existence since the 1970’s.  A comparative 
analysis of the structure of the US systems, and housing markets to those in 
Queensland, Australia is then carried out to identify key similarities and differences 
and test the external validity of the US models.  The findings of this first qualitative 
stage informs the second quantitative stage of research.  Stage two develops an 
econometric model that estimates the extent of shifting or “over-shifting” of 
infrastructure charges to home buyers in Brisbane, Australia.  
This outcome of this research will be to provide empirical evidence of the 
impact of infrastructure charges on house prices in Australia.  These results will 
inform government on the outcomes of their infrastructure charging policies on 
housing affordability, providing the first evidence of its kind in Australia.  
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Chapter 2: Theory and Literature Review 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research is to test the hypothesis that infrastructure charges 
increase house prices in Australia.  Whilst there are numerous government and 
industry reports that suggest such costs are passed onto the consumer to the detriment 
of housing affordability, there remains virtually no quantitative research on the 
impact of infrastructure charges on house prices in Australia from which policy 
makers can make informed decisions.  In a climate where housing affordability is a 
policy objective for many governments, a clear understanding of the impacts these 
government charges have on the price of housing is imperative.  This gap in research 
becomes evident from review of the abundance of related literature.  This literature 
review provides an analysis of the Australian and international literature on this topic 
and provides a platform for the remainder of this research project.   
The Australian infrastructure funding policy dilemmas are reflective of similar 
matters to some extent in the UK, and to a greater extent the US and Canada.  In 
these countries, infrastructure cost recovery policies have been in place since the 
1940’s and 1970’s respectively.  The purpose of this chapter is to provide a 
systematic overview of the Australian and international literature on this topic, 
examining both the theoretical and empirical evidence that suggests infrastructure 
charges contribute to increased house prices.  This review will address the first two 
research questions of this thesis and form the basis for the later questions which seek 
to quantify these price impacts on the housing market in Queensland, Australia.    
This chapter is arranged as follows:  section 2.1 provides the introductory 
framework for the literature review.  Next sections 2.2 and 2.3 present the theory of 
infrastructure effects on house prices and discuss the various parties that might 
ultimately bear cost of urban infrastructure:  the developer, the original land owner, 
the new home buyer or other parties.  Sections 2.4 and 2.5 present the Australian and 
UK literature respectively on the house price effects of infrastructure charges.  
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Section 2.6 reviews the literature from US where a large body of work exists.  Here, 
the phenomenon of “over-shifting” is introduced as are the results of extant empirical 
models.  Relevant literature from other countries is presented in section 2.7, followed 
by conclusions in section 2.8.   
2.2 INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGE EFFECT THEORY  
Sourcing appropriate funding for the provision of new urban infrastructure has 
been a policy dilemma for governments around the world for decades.  This is 
particularly relevant in high growth areas where new services are required to support 
expanding populations.  These new services generally include basic utilities such as 
local roads, water supply and sewerage, but depending on the services provided at a 
jurisdictional level, can also apply to broader community services such as regional 
road, water storage and treatment plants, schools, libraries, police and fire stations 
(Baden and Coursey, 1999).  Existing communities resist the introduction of new 
taxes to subsidise newcomers into their communities, hence the introduction of 
infrastructure charges paid by the developer to fund these works has flourished 
(Brueckner, 1997). 
Academics have been theorising on the impact of infrastructure charges on 
house prices from as early as the 1970’s.  Many academics have used urban 
economic theory and the response of the market to various elasticity conditions via 
supply and demand curves to argue the relative effects of infrastructure charges on 
house prices in both the long and short term (see Ellickson, 1977; Huffman et 
al.,1988; Lawhon, 1996; Singell and Lilydahl, 1990; Baden and Coursey, 1999; 
Shaughnessy, 2003; Been, 2005).  These arguments are based around the theory that 
additional supply chain costs (for example infrastructure charges), will be absorbed 
by consumers in situations of high demand (high growth) where there is high price 
elasticity.  Thus increasing house prices in the short term.  Where low demand exists 
(low price elasticity), and the supply chain costs remain high through the imposition 
of infrastructure charges, supply will drop to meet the diminished demand for houses 
with higher prices due to increased supply chain inputs.  Over the longer term, in the 
absence of supply of lower priced housing, demand driven price increases will occur.  
Thus increasing house prices in the long term as well.   
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The urban growth model is another theoretical basis for such analysis (see 
Brueckner 1990 and 1997, Burge and Ihlandfeldt, 2006).  This model assumes a 
centralised city form where all development occurs on the urban fringe, with 
farmland being redeveloped to residential subdivisions at the time when market 
conditions favour residential uses over farming.  This theory takes into account 
demand factors for new housing by way of increasing house prices and supply 
factors such as supply chain input costs (the inclusion of infrastructure charges to 
developer costs).  Importantly, this theory is based around growth management, with 
retardation of urban growth a desired outcome.  This is in an environment of wishing 
to protect the quality of life and level of service and amenity for existing residents.  
Demand for new housing will push up prices to the extent where the change of use 
for land on the fringes will be financially viable, even when the cost of providing 
new infrastructure and services is added to the cost of that housing.  Thus house 
prices are increased in either the long or short term depending on the level of 
demand. 
Yinger (1998) considered yet another alternate house price theory based on 
household bidding model.  This framework is based on the premise that households 
will pay more for improved services and amenities within their budgetary 
constraints.  It is up to the household to differentiate between different service:tax 
packages and make housing choice decisions based on the desired amenity.  This 
theory assumes households are mobile and that there are numerous communities 
from which to choose from.  The implication being that there are different service-
tax propositions across those communities.  This theory relies heavily on the 
existence of an ongoing property tax for the provision of community services and 
amenity consistent with the US public finance model and concludes that 
infrastructure charges will increase house prices to the extent that households 
perceive a benefit from the services/amenities funded by those charges (that they 
would not have received in communities without those charges). 
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2.3 THE ACTORS IN WHO REALLY PAYS FOR URBAN 
INFRASTRUCTURE? 
The premise for any price impact argument is based on the concept of who 
ends up bearing the cost of the infrastructure charge (Huffman, Nelson, Smith and 
Stegman, 1988).  Infrastructure charges were originally intended to transfer the 
burden of infrastructure provision in high growth areas from the public purse and 
existing owners on to developers (Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 2003).  However, the 
literature indicates there are a number of parties that may be potentially liable for the 
ultimate payment of these fees.  Apart from the developer, these include:  the original 
landowner, the new homeowner (Huffman, et al., 1988), or the existing community 
(Brueckner, 1997; Singell and Lillydahl, 1990) or even other parties such as the 
providers of capital (Ellickson and Been, 2005).  This concept is illustrated in Figure 
2.1 below: 
Figure 2.1  
The actors in who really pays for urban infrastructure? 
 
Source:  Author  
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There has been much debate since Huffman et al.’s seminal work on the on-
passing, back passing, shifting, back shifting  (Huffman, et al., 1988), over-shifting  
(Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004), capitalisation, backward capitalisation (Burge, 
2006) etcetera of these fees between the various parties to new development.  The 
following examines the theory of who really pays for urban infrastructure.  
2.3.1 The Property Developer   
Consider first the original intended payer of infrastructure charges:  the 
property developer.  Infrastructure charges are levied on the property developer as a 
cost of production in the property development process.  Basic economic theory tells 
us that if the cost of production of a good goes up, so too must the cost of the good to 
the consumer.  
The alternative scenario is that if the market is price sensitive and will not pay 
extra (inelastic), it becomes uneconomical to produce that good, so supply ceases 
until equilibrium returns to the market.  Equilibrium can return to the market by one 
of two methods:  firstly when pent up demand pushes prices up to where production 
becomes economical again, or secondly if the costs of production are reduced so 
product can be produced at a price the market is willing and able to pay (Layton, 
Robinson and Tucker, 2012).  A combination of these affects may well be the final 
outcome.  In any case the community in general suffers in the interim through the 
knock-on effects of interruptions to supply and associated economic activity, 
business failures and unemployment in the construction and associated sectors and 
ultimately rising house prices.  
Now consider infrastructure charges as a housing supply chain input as 
discussed in Section 2.2.  Upon introduction of infrastructure charges (or the increase 
of existing charges), consistent with  Huffman et al.’s (1988) theory, developers are 
faced with the dilemma of either increasing sales prices to recoup the additional costs 
(that is to “pass on” or “shift” the costs), absorb the fees by way of lower profit 
margins, or pay the land owners less for the englobo land in the first place (that is to 
“pass back” or “back shift”).  This premise is examined widely in the literature.  
Huffman et al.,(1988) argue that developers do not absorb the costs by way of lower 
profit margins, as their capital is mobile, and developers will instead choose to invest 
in locations (or projects) where their benchmark profit margins can be achieved.  
Yinger (1998, p37) confirms the pass on or pass back effect stating that “to the extent 
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housing construction is competitive, development fees do not place any burden on 
developers”.  Evans-Cowley and Lawhon (2003) also suggest that developers do not 
absorb these costs by way of lower profits, as the market (through the land 
acquisition process) has already set the cost structure at which development is 
encouraged (passing back).  Other research also confirms the premise that developers 
are likely to make investment decisions based on profitability and if that profitability 
is reduced in one area, it will move its operations to another to maximize profits 
(Burge, 2006; Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 2003; Mathur,Waddell and Blanco, 
2004).  Watkins (1999) offers the only perverse theory, suggesting that exactly half 
of any charge is absorbed by the developer by way of reduced profits, with the other 
half either passed on or passed back.  Unfortunately, Watkins does not provide an 
intuitive explanation for his surprising conclusion, and his findings have been largely 
ignored by the literature (Been, 2005).  Others have tried to argue that if developers 
can achieve higher sales prices due to market conditions, then they will already be 
doing so.  However as countered by Huffman et al.,(1988), in a competitive market 
profits are already at levels of return consistent with the opportunity cost.   
The literature thus indicates that developers are the least likely party to carry 
this cost burden despite the fact they are the ones the charge is levied upon.  The 
exception to this is if the actual infrastructure charges imposed are greater than 
anticipated by the developer at the time of acquisition (the only opportunity to pass 
back) and market inelasticities prevent full passing on (Huffman et al.,1988).  Weak 
market conditions may result in developers accepting lower profits in the short term 
due to high holding costs, financier demands to repay debt or to maintain consistency 
of workflow to retain key staff.  However, even in these instances, in the longer term 
the developer will still seek to recoup the difference between the forecast and actual 
charge by redesigning the project and/or cutting costs to obtain the desired profit 
margins.  Alternatively the fees result in lower (and unacceptable) profits and not 
only will the developer elect not to proceed with the project (or stage) but financiers 
would not extend credit (Bryant, 2012) and this will have the further knock-on effect 
of halting the supply chain of housing (Ruming et al., 2011). 
In the case of property developers therefore, given the above and consistent 
with Been’s (2005) findings, the assumption is that in the medium and long term 
developers bear none of the charge because if their profit margins were high enough 
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to absorb the fee in the first place, then competition would already have either 
reduced the price of housing to the new home buyer or increased the price paid to the 
original landowner.  These other two parties are now discussed.  
2.3.2 The Original Landowner 
Consider next the original landowner who sells his/her undeveloped land to the 
developer.  When the infrastructure charge is anticipated, and the developer cannot 
pass those additional supply chain costs on to home buyers due to market conditions, 
the developer will seek to pay less for the undeveloped land and thus keep total 
development costs at an economically sustainable level.   
Huffman et al.,(1988) argues that this passing back or “back shifting” is 
unlikely in many instances due to land owner behaviour.  Long term land owners 
have a reservation price below which they will not sell and their holding costs are 
relatively low.  The time value of money and alternative investments are not part of 
their decision making process Snyder and Stegman (1986).  Evans (2004a, 2004b) 
confirms this phenomenon citing the introduction of a 100% betterment levy in the 
UK in 1947 which resulted in a freeze of the land market, as there was no incentive 
for land owners to sell, and the levy was repealed only three years later.  Subsequent 
attempts of betterment taxing in the UK had similar supply constraining impacts and 
were abolished in 1985 (Evans, 2004b).   
Whilst it is outside the scope of this thesis to discuss the various mechanisms 
for recoupment of the cost of providing urban infrastructure, the concept of a 
“betterment tax” does have a place in this discussion as it relates to the passing back 
of infrastructure costs to the land owner and supports the argument for a consequent 
reduction in supply.  The UK has a long history dating back to the 1940s, of taxing 
land owners for any “betterment” as a result of increases in value subsequent to the 
provision of infrastructure or from receiving favourable planning approvals.  It was 
thought unfair that the owners of land should be the beneficiaries of increased capital 
value purely through economic and/or population growth or the provision of public 
infrastructure (Evans, 2004b).  Hence, where this value uplift was due to 
infrastructure expenditure, this betterment levy or tax was essentially a full passing 
back of the benefit or the cost of the infrastructure provision.   
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The Barker Review of Housing Supply (Barker, 2003; Barker, 2004) 
recommended that the UK government again pursue means to share in windfall 
profits (ie betterment) that arise as a result of planning approval, suggesting that: 
“this Planning-gain supplement would fall largely on landowners, with little impact 
on house prices” (Barker, 2004, p. 8).  This recommendation is a clear 
acknowledgement that the system of developer paid infrastructure charges increases 
house prices and that the government wishes to reverse that impact back to 
landowners, and have a mechanism to tax any such betterment. 
Passing back of charges to landowners is theoretically possible at the time of 
acquisition when the amount of the charge to be levied is known, the system is 
transparent and landowners are well informed about the infrastructure charging 
regime.  In this environment, both parties are negotiating from a knowledgeable 
position and understand the costs involved in subdivision.  Unfortunately this is 
rarely the case with infrastructure charges often subject to frequent and large 
increases.  Ruming et al., (2011) confirms that back passing is not possible, 
particularly in an environment of volatility in infrastructure charging regimes.  In 
Australia, the taxing of any capital gain upon disposal of real property assets may be 
interpreted as a form of betterment taxing, particularly if the capital gain is due to an 
increase in value subsequent to a planning approval.  However, due to the nature of 
the taxation system with capital gains tax being a federal tax, there is no direct 
mechanism for any monies collected in this manner to be directed towards the cost of 
any required local infrastructure. Thus the concept of betterment taxing in Australia 
is theoretical only.  
Whilst the pass-back effect will stall sales in developable land in the short 
term, Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy (2004) argue that over the longer term back 
shifting can be possible.  They suggest this can be due to either “general inflationary 
price increases” resulting in the reservation price being achievable (i.e. demand 
driven return to equilibrium), and/or weaker market conditions resulting in lowering 
of vendor expectations.  Whilst the latter does represent true back passing in weak 
market conditions, surely the former scenario is evidence of forward passing and 
supports the theory of increasing house prices due to reduced supply (as a direct 
response to infrastructure charges) as discussed previously assuming at least constant 
demand, rather than “inflationary pressures”.    
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Therefore in theory, to the extent that homeowners’ willingness and ability to 
pay is less than the infrastructure charge itself, the difference should shift backwards 
to the vendor of the englobo land since developers are mobile and bear no burden in 
the long run (Yinger, 1998).  Whilst this is theoretically sound, in practice this rarely 
occurs.  The literature indicates that passing back does not generally occur at least in 
the short term as landowners have no compulsion to sell if not for profit (Evans, 
2004b) and attempts at back passing instead stymie supply to the detriment of house 
prices.   
2.3.3 The New Home Buyer 
We consider next the passing on of the infrastructure charge to the consumer or 
new home buyer.  As discussed above, if neither the developer nor land owner is 
willing to bear the cost of these additional supply chain costs, then the burden must 
fall to the home buyer by way of higher house prices.  This concept is consistently 
captured by a vast number of  academics, particularly in the US over the past three 
decades (see Ellickson (1977), Snyder and Stegman (1986), Downing and McCaleb 
(1987), Huffman, et al. (1988), Delaney and Smith (1989a, 1989b), Singell and 
Lillydahl (1990), Skaburskis and Qadeer (1992), Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez 
(1993), Dresch and Sheffrin (1997), Brueckner (1997), Skidmore and Peddle (1998), 
Yinger (1998), Baden and Coursey (1999), Mayer and Sommerville (2000), Evans-
Cowley and Lawhon (2003), Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessey (2004), Mathur, Waddell 
and Blanco (2004), Campbell (2004), Been (2005), Evans-Cowley, Forgey and 
Rutherford (2005), Burge and Ihlanfeldt (2006) and Evans-Cowley, Lockwood, 
Rutherford and Springer, (2009)). 
It is difficult to select just one quote to capture such a weight of evidence and 
argument.  Mathur et al., (2004) chose earlier work by Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez 
from 1993 in stating that “under tight market conditions … we would expect the fees 
to be passed on principally to consumers, while developers and land-owners would 
absorb most of the cost of the fees in the form of lower profits under soft market 
conditions”.  This is the overwhelming conclusion of the majority of the 
contemporary literature.  Ruming et al.’s (2011) recent Australian research confirms 
this premise, as does the Australian Productivity Commission’s 2011 report.  Nelson 
et al. (2008) note that most studies assume a relatively normal price elasticity of 
demand, that is consumers will bear marginal increased prices with no dip in 
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demand, in the absence of suitable substitutes, such as existing housing.  This is 
deemed reasonable given infrastructure charges are generally used in growing areas, 
which are characterised by a competitive housing market, further supporting the 
proposition of a passing on of infrastructure costs to new home buyers.   
With such a abundance of supporting literature on this topic, tested and 
developed over a number of decades, it is little wonder that in current literature it is a 
given that in a competitive market with elastic housing demand, whilst infrastructure 
charges in some instances may be borne by the developer and/or land owner in the 
short run, in the long run these costs are borne by the home owner by way of higher 
house prices (3iNetwork, 2009; Productivity Commission, 2011; Infrastructure 
Charges Taskforce, 2011).  Therefore, with supporting theoretical literature dating 
back to the 1970s current international literature now largely assumes it as a given 
that in the long run, infrastructure charges are passed on to home buyers, thus 
increasing the price of new housing.   
2.3.4 Other Parties 
Other parties have been reported to carry the burden of the cost of 
infrastructure charges as well.  US research suggests that existing home owners also 
share the burden by way of the increased cost of existing housing (Brueckner, 1997; 
Singell and Lillydahl, 1990; Yinger, 1998).  Existing housing generally forms the 
bulk of a market and plays a central role in price setting.  Existing housing may be a 
close substitute to new housing and if the price of new housing is increasing due to 
cost pressures and strong market conditions, then the price of existing housing will 
be drawn up as sellers capitalise on profit taking opportunities.   Hence buyers of 
existing housing are paying for the house price impacts of infrastructure charges in 
new development areas, for which they receive no benefit.  
More recently, it has been acknowledged that if the infrastructure charge does 
not fully pay for the actual cost of the infrastructure, the gap is paid for by both new 
and existing home owners by way of increased local jurisdictional rates and taxes 
(Infrastructure Charges Taskforce, 2011; Chan et al., 2009; Productivity 
Commission, 2011).   
Further, Ellickson and Been (2005) suggests that the burden of infrastructure 
charge costs in the US may fall on the providers of capital.  They argue that if 
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developers are subject to high infrastructure charges, they will have a lesser 
propensity to proceed with projects and as a result lenders would have to charge 
lower interest rates to induce developers to proceed with new projects.  
In summary, the theoretical work is consistent in its conclusions that despite 
market conditions (i.e. relative market elasticities) infrastructure charges in virtually 
all scenarios are passed onto home buyers if not in the short run, then in the long run 
and will thus lead to increased housing prices.   
 
2.4 AUSTRALIA 
If the international literature is largely consistent in its conclusions that 
infrastructure charges lead to increased housing prices and by inference reduce 
housing affordability, the next question that follows is:  how much do infrastructure 
charges increase house prices by?  The first research objective of this dissertation is 
to find evidence of any Australian empirical studies which can provide evidence on 
this important public policy item.  This is the purpose of this section:  firstly 
background on the infrastructure charging regime in Australia and particularly 
Queensland is provided for context, followed by a summary of the scant empirical 
evidence.  
2.4.1 Infrastructure Charging Regime 
In Australia, each state and territory has enabling legislation for its respective 
infrastructure charging regime.  This legislation is generally administered at a local 
authority level, with individual local authorities determining the amount charged.  
The amount charged generally relates to formal development contribution plans put 
in place by the local authority that is to “meet standards of reasonableness and 
accountability.” (Chan, et al., 2009, p. 120)   
The 2011 Productivity Commission report found “there is little consistency 
across jurisdictions in either the type or the quantum of contributions that developers 
may be called on to fund” (Productivity Commission, 2011, p. 185).  Therefore it is 
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difficult to compare one local authority to the next7.  By way of example, refer to 
Table 2.1 which indicates the infrastructure charges applicable to selected greenfield 
projects across Australia.   
Table 2.1   
Infrastructure Charges for Greenfield Developments ($,000 per lot in 2010) 
City Indicative Cost(a) Range 
Sydney 44 15-70 
Melbourne 12 12-17 
Brisbane 26 15-40 
Perth 21 na 
Adelaide 7 na 
(a) Selected regions are Kellyville (Sydney), Wollert (Melbourne), Redbank Plains/Springfield (Brisbane), Wellard 
(Perth) and Salisbury (Adelaide) 
Source:  Reserve Bank of Australia, 2012.    
The cost indicated above is difficult to predict the time of land acquisition as it 
varies considerably across developments, is subject to frequently changing policy 
and is often subject to negotiation on a case-by-case basis (Reserve Bank of 
Australia, 2012; Productivity Commission, 2011).   
 
2.4.2 Queensland 
Given this research is based on Queensland data only, it is appropriate to 
provide an overview on the infrastructure charging regime in this State.  Local 
governments in Queensland have had the legislative power to levy infrastructure 
charges since 2003 when the Integrated Planning Act 1997 was amended by the 
Integrated Planning and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2003.  The 2003 Act 
defines development infrastructure as the “land or work-in-kind, or both land and 
work-in-kind, that provide hydraulic (including water supply, sewerage, drainage, 
water quality), transport and local community services, predominantly in the local 
area” (Chan, et al., 2009, p. 119).  Local governments were required to establish 
                                                            
 
7 For a detailed description of each state’s infrastructure charging legislation as at early 2011, see Productivity 
Commission, 2011, Chapter 6, as well as its preceding report Chan et al., 2009, Chapter 7.  Note however that the 
Queensland enabling legislation changed in July 2011.  See also Infrastructure Charges Taskforce Final Report 
2011 - Appendix 3 
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Priority Infrastructure Plans (“PIPs”) and Infrastructure Charging Schedules 
(“ICSs”), against which development applications would be assessed.  However the 
complexities of these PIPs and ICSs meant that local governments struggled with 
their introduction and continued to operate under their existing planning scheme 
policies rather than PIPs and ICSs, with the only exception being the Gold Coast City 
Council which commenced issuing Infrastructure Charges Notices for drainage, 
parks and local roads in 2007  (Nicholls, 2011). 
The Integrated Planning Act 1997 was replaced by the Sustainable Planning 
Act 2009, which commenced in December 2009 (see Queensland Government, 
2009b).  That legislation further broadened the scope of charges that could be levied 
on developers including not only site related trunk infrastructure, but also Regional 
and State based infrastructure.  Public infrastructure that was eligible for mandatory 
contributions (excluding basic infrastructure) included community centres and 
libraries (cost of land and associated cost of clearing), public transport (land for 
public transport corridors and associated infrastructure), parks, sports grounds and 
recreational facilities (including areas of open space) and trunk roads (Productivity 
Commission, 2011).   
This lead to rapidly escalating infrastructure charges resulting in general 
confusion and uncertainty in the wider development industry around forecast project 
costs (Nicholls, 2011).   
Table 2.2   
Local Authority Infrastructure Charges (as at June 2010) 
Local Authority Charge 
Redland City $40,319 
Gold Coast City $32,146 
Sunshine Coast Region $26,089 
Brisbane City $25,798 
Moreton Bay Region $24,818 
Townsville City $24,511 
Cairns Region $24,158 
Toowoomba Region $23,952 
Ipswich City $22,095 
Logan City $15,271 
Scenic Rim Region $14,983 
Source:  Productivity Commission, 2011. Available under a Creative Commons  
Attribution 3.0 Australia licence.  
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In May 2010, the State Government responded to growing pressure from the 
development and housing industries establishing a new agency, Growth Management 
Queensland to lead the delivery of infrastructure and affordable housing (amongst 
other things) as well as independent Infrastructure Charges Taskforce with a mandate 
to examine how local governments deliver infrastructure for new development in 
Queensland, including identifying opportunities for simplified charges and greater 
certainty as well as considering alternative funding arrangements for trunk 
infrastructure  (Infrastructure Charges Taskforce, 2011). 
The Infrastructure Charges Taskforce delivered its final report to the State 
Government in March 2011.  This report contained recommendations on reform of 
local government development infrastructure charging arrangements within the 
overriding principles of:  certainty, transparency and accountability, equity and 
reasonableness, simplicity and consistency, as well as efficiency and economic 
impacts.  It recommended that a maximum standard charges framework be 
introduced (Infrastructure Charges Taskforce, 2011). 
Government responded with the Sustainable Planning (Housing Affordability 
and Infrastructure Charges Reform) Amendment Act 2011 being introduced into 
Parliament in May 2011, and commencing on 1 July 2011 (Persign, 2011; see 
Queensland Government, 2011).  This legislation enabled local governments to set 
an “adopted infrastructure charge” for residential development which cannot exceed 
the “maximum adopted standard charge” specified at: 
 $20,000 per 1 or 2 bedroom dwelling 
 $28,000 for a dwelling of 3 or more bedrooms and 
 $28,000 per lot for greenfield subdivisions. 
This maximum fee regime was an interim measure, to be in place for three 
years only.  Further reform is underway at the time of writing, including the reversal 
of exclusions for non-trunk infrastructure such as State controlled roads.  Hence, 
charges at this level are a short term feature only, and are forecast to change again 
within three years (Nicholls, 2011; Nicholls, Persign and Lamb, 2011).  The 
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temporary nature of this maximum fee regime is one of the reasons why this research 
ceases prior to the introduction of the adopted infrastructure charges in 20118. 
2.4.3 Search for Empirical Evidence 
The debate on the responsibility for funding new urban infrastructure and the 
impact of infrastructure charges on new house prices and housing development in 
general started with the industry bodies in Australia from as early as the 1970s and 
has more recently been fuelled by federal government bodies such as Ken Henry’s 
2009 report into Australia’s Future Tax System (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009) 
(see Recommendation 70, and Table 101), two Productivity Commission reports 
(Chan et al., 2009; Productivity Commission, 2011), a 2012 report to Council of 
Australian Government (“COAG”) on Housing Supply and Affordability Reform, 
and biennial reports from the National Housing Supply Council (2008, 2010 and 
2013).   
On one hand, industry bodies and developers suggest that these increases in 
their supply chain costs are being added directly to housing prices, pushing prices to 
a level that is unattainable by the market (Residential Development Council of 
Australia, 2006, 2007; Urban Development Institute of Australia, 2007).  Ruming, 
Gurran and Randolph (2011) provide a useful summary of industry claims, 
suggesting all planning related costs can contribute between A$100,000 and 
A$139,000 per lot/house.  However they note these claims are difficult to 
substantiate due to difficulties accessing data.  The Reserve Bank of Australia (2012) 
utilises Urbis JHD (2010) information to suggest all government charges on 
developers add between five and fifteen percent to the price of greenfield housing, 
and two and a half and five percent to new infill housing (refer Table 2.3). 
  
                                                            
 
8 Refer Chapter 5 Methodology and Data 
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Table 2.3   
House Cost Increases Due to Government Charges  2010 (a) 
City New Greenfield Housing(a) (%) New Infill Housing (%) 
Sydney 15 5 
Melbourne 5 2.5 
Brisbane 10 5 
Perth 10 2.5 
Adelaide na Na 
(a) Infrastructure charges plus other government charges on housing development (excluding GST) 
(b) Selected regions are Kellyville (Sydney), Wollert (Melbourne), Redbank Plains/Springfield (Brisbane), Wellard 
(Perth) and Salisbury (Adelaide).   
Source:  Reserve Bank of Australia, 2012.    
On the other hand, local government maintains it cannot be responsible for 
increased costs associated with growth and that a user-pays infrastructure charging 
system helps housing affordability by ensuring essential infrastructure can be funded 
and thus support greater housing supply (Hoffman, 2011). Further local governments 
suggests that infrastructure charges comprise only a small proportion of the total 
house cost and that the developer’s argument is one of self interest and profit taking 
(Ruming et al., 2011).  Abelson and Joteux9 (2010) also contend that price increases 
are small with taxes on new housing only shifting the supply curve marginally, with 
such taxes being passed back to land owners rather than forwards to home buyers.  
The supposition that infrastructure charges are readily passed back to land owners is 
commonplace (See AEC Group, 2009) however this argument does not hold when 
charges are opaque, negotiable and change during the approval process.  
Until now, this debate has gone largely unanswered in Australia by the 
academic community.  Recently Gurran and colleagues considered the issue of 
planning costs and housing affordability from a broader qualitative perspective using 
case studies (Gurran, Ruming and Randolph, 2008, Gurran, et al., 2009; Gurran, et 
al., 2010; Ruming et al., 2011).  These examine the impact of all government charges 
and planning regulations on housing costs in each of the three eastern seaboard 
States.  Amongst other findings, this research limits its findings on the impact of 
infrastructure charges to concluding that all planning charges have increased at a 
                                                            
 
9 In Housing and Tax Policy edited by Miranda Stewart, 2010 
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greater and disproportionate rate to median house prices, however no empirical 
evidence of the direct impact of infrastructure charges on house price increases is 
provided. 
Watkins (1999) provides the only empirical study into the impact of 
infrastructure charges on house prices in Australia.  He concluded that exactly 50% 
of infrastructure charges are paid by the developer, with the remaining 50% paid by 
either the home buyer by way of higher house prices, or the original land owner by 
way of lower price paid the for undeveloped land.  Unfortunately Watkins’ work did 
not provide any explanation for this finding and no subsequent works were 
published.  Consequently, these findings have been ignored by subsequent authors 
(Been, 2005).   
So whilst there is evidence of Australian house prices increasing, and planning 
related charges increasing at a greater rate, the extent of this dis-proportionality, and 
the specific impact of infrastructure charges as a subset of all planning related 
charges, remains yet to be tested.   
It can therefore be concluded that the Australian literature provides scant 
empirical evidence on the on-passing effect of infrastructure charges to house prices.  
This finding therefore provides negative evidence in response to the first research 
question of this dissertation: 
1. Is there empirical evidence in Australia that the imposition of 
infrastructure charges by governments increases the price of housing?   
 
The absence of empirical data on this house price effect is fuelling the debate 
in Australia as to whether infrastructure charges do get passed on to home buyers or 
not.  This is a significant gap in the Australian research, and this dissertation seeks to 
provide the first empirical study of its kind in Australia to address this gap.   
The research thus now turns to the next research objective which seeks to find 
international literature on house price effects due to the imposition of infrastructure 
charges, or their equivalent.  The UK and US have been selected for comparison with 
Australia for a number of reasons including:  well established and transparent 
planning regulatory environments and taxation systems, stable governments, 
similarities in housing market structures and housing types, widespread and well 
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established use of infrastructure charges to fund urban growth, as well as access to 
scholarly works.   
 
2.5 UNITED KINGDOM 
This section looks to the UK for empirical evidence of the impact of 
infrastructure charges on house prices.  First, an overview of the infrastructure 
charging regime in the UK is given to provide context against the Australian system.  
The empirical evidence is then provided.  
2.5.1 Infrastructure Charging Regime 
As indicated previously, the UK has had a long history dating back to the 
1940’s of taxing land owners for any “betterment” as a result of increases in value 
subsequent to the provision of infrastructure or later, from receiving favourable 
planning approvals.  It was thought unfair that the owners of land should be the 
beneficiaries of increased capital value purely through economic and/or population 
growth or the provision of public infrastructure (Evans, 2004b).  Hence, where this 
value uplift was due to infrastructure expenditure, this betterment levy was 
essentially a full passing back of the benefit of the infrastructure.  Note, by taxing a 
proportion of any capital value uplift on certain properties, there is at best an indirect 
impact due to the provision of this infrastructure, with no correlation to the actual 
cost of providing it.   
Evans (2004b) reports that the initial 100% betterment levy of 1947 resulted in 
a freeze of the land market, as there was no incentive for land owners to sell.  Under 
this scheme, the land owner retained none of any capital value uplift, and the levy 
was repealed just three years later.  A similar tax was re-introduced in the late 1960’s 
at 40% (where the land owners retained 60% of any capital value uplift), and was 
replaced by a “development land tax” at 80% in the mid 1970’s (where the land 
owners retained only 20% of any capital value uplift) (Evans, 2004b).  The literature 
provides conflicting signals as to whether this tax/levy remains in force today.  
Gurran et al.’s (2009) discussion on “betterment tax” implies it is a current 
phenomenon, however this discussion is unreferenced.  Evans (2004b) reports the 
Development Land Tax, which then applied a betterment levy of 70% was abolished 
in 1985.  Barker (2004) recommends its re-introduction as does Chamberlin (2009).   
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In any case, “Planning obligation”, “planning gain” or “Section 106 
agreements” are all terms used today to describe the equivalent to an infrastructure 
charging system in the UK (Evans, 2004a).  What is important to note, is that it is a 
process based solely on negotiation between developer and local government to 
“deliver sustainable development, through which key government, social, 
environment and economic objectives are achieved” (Bailey, 2005).  Chan et al., 
(2009) suggest a key advantage of this negotiation process is greater flexibility in 
negotiating outcomes that best suit the specific project and its inherent 
characteristics.  Gurran et al., (2009) suggest that this negotiated approach reduces 
risks for developers.  However, this seems counter intuitive, with any unknown in the 
costing process adding uncertainty for developers.  This uncertainty is further 
compounded by the unpredictable delays (and costs) incurred in the negotiation 
process (Bramley and Leishman, 2005; Buitelaar, 2007; Chan et al., 2009).  Reliance 
on negotiated outcomes is also argued to disadvantage smaller developers by virtue 
of factors such as influence, knowledge, cost and negotiating power (Evans, 2004a).  
In any case, a fully negotiated outcome with no reference to the actual cost of 
providing the required urban infrastructure is open to any number of potential 
imperfections, not the least of which being lack of transparency, potential inequity, 
or even corruption via political influence.   
In summary, Chan et al.(2009) observe that despite claims otherwise, the UK 
system for payment of urban infrastructure appears to be more focused on capturing 
betterment or windfall gains for the land owner than on a user-pays cost recovery 
system.  This trend could certainly be interpreted as having roots in the historical 
evolution of betterment taxation in the UK.  Confirmation of this trend is inferred 
from the Callcut Review’s (Department for Communities and Local Government, 
2007) recommendation that an attribution model “similar to that used in Australia” 
be adopted whereby “the whole or part of the cost of new infrastructure … is met by 
proportional contributions by developers”  (Department for Communities and Local 
Government, 2007, p. 61).   
2.5.2 Search for Empirical Evidence 
This review of the literature has been unable to identify any empirical research 
from the UK on whether its infrastructure charges regime over or under passes the 
cost of infrastructure provision, whether that be on passed to the home buyer, or back 
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passed to the land seller.  Bramley (2007) provides anecdotal evidence only of a 
study suggesting required contributions to infrastructure would add £38,000 per 
dwelling.   
Due to the fully negotiated nature of infrastructure charging in the UK, 
researchers are unlikely to be able to access the requisite data for empirical research.  
Further, it is possible that the charges applicable on one project might not be 
reflective of similar charges on another project.    
 
2.6 UNITED STATES  
The remainder of this chapter now looks to the US for empirical evidence of 
the impact of infrastructure charges on house prices.  Firstly, background on the 
infrastructure charging regime in the US is provided for context, followed by a 
summary of the empirical evidence. 
2.6.1 Infrastructure Charging Regime 
In the US, infrastructure charges are known as Impact Fees.  These fees are “... 
are one-time levies, predetermined through a formula adopted by the local 
government unit, that are assessed on property developers during the permit approval 
process” (Burge, 2005 p2).  Whilst there are some that might argue that the 
definitions of infrastructure charges and impact fees differ, for the majority of 
jurisdictions they are sufficiently similar to be thought of as interchangeable terms 
and are used as such within this thesis.  When discussing the US literature herein, the 
term “infrastructure charge” will be used. 10  
The responsibility of funding new growth related infrastructure has been 
shifted from the government to the development industry in many parts of the US 
since the 1970’s (Evans-Cowley and Lawhon, 2003; Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 
2004; Mathur, et al., 2004).  Up until 1987 when Texas first introduced its enabling 
legislation, these charges were based solely on local jurisdictional revenue raising 
powers, which generated significant appeals in the courts.  Near the peak of the US 
                                                            
 
10 For further information on definition of terms, please refer to Chapter 1.  
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housing boom in 2007, about 60% of all cities with over 25,000 residents along with 
40% of metropolitan counties across 27 States used infrastructure charges on new 
residential developments for public services or infrastructure.  In some states such as 
Florida, 90% of communities used infrastructure charges (Mullen, 2010). The use of 
fees exploded in 2000’s increasing by 75% between 2004 and 2008 in line with the 
housing boom, having since contracted in line with housing market conditions.  By 
2012, 271 jurisdictions within the US plus ten counties in Florida had suspended the 
use of all infrastructure charges (Mullen, 2012).   
The scope for the charging of fees in the US is wider than in Australia and UK, 
and has its roots in the responsibility for the provision of various infrastructure.  In 
addition to the usual the provision by the local government of infrastructure such as 
roads, water and parks, fees can also be levied for other community services such as 
library services, and fires and police protection for the additional population that is 
caused by the development.  Table 2.4 below illustrates the considerable variation in 
infrastructure charges payable in different US States, remembering that jurisdictional 
variances exist within states at both the city and county level.   
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Table 2.4   
Infrastructure Charges Payable in US States 
State Roads Water Sewer Storm 
Water 
Parks Fire Police Library Solid 
Waste 
School 
Arizona (cities) • • • • • • • •
Arizona • • • • • •   
Arkansas (cities) • • • • • • • •   
California • • • • • • • • • • 
Colorado • • • • • • • • •  
Florida • • • • • • • • • • 
Georgia • • • • • • • •   
Hawaii • • • • • • • • • • 
Idaho • • • • • • •   
Illinois •     
Indiana • • • • •   
Maine • • • • • •  
Montana • • • • * • • * * * 
Nevada • • • • • • •  ** 
New Hampshire • • • • • • • • • • 
New Jersey • • • •   
New Mexico • • • • • • •   
Oregon • • • • •  *** 
Pennsylvania •     
Rhode Island • • • • • • • • • • 
South Carolina • • • • • • •   
Texas (cities) • • • •   
Utah • • • • • • •   
Vermont • • • • • • • • • • 
Virginia**** •     
Washington •   • •  • 
West Virginia • • • • • • •  • 
Wisconsin • • • • • • • • •  
* can be imposed by super‐majority vote of city council or unanimous vote of county commission 
** school construction  tax up to $1,600 per unit authorized in districts with populations up to 50,000 (NRS 387.331) 
*** development  tax of up to $1.00/sq. ft.  for residential and $0.50/sq. ft.  for non‐residential may be imposed by school 
districts 
**** impact  fees may be  imposed  on by‐right residential subdivision of agriculturally‐zoned parcels for a broad array of 
facilities under certain circumstances              
Source:  (Mullen, 2012)  Reproduced with permission 
 
The key variance to the Australian system is the inclusion of funding for fire, 
police and school services in their charges.  The dollar amount of average 
infrastructure charges also varies significantly by State.  The average total non-utility 
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fee (i.e. fees for services other than water, sewer, roads and storm water) for a single 
detached dwelling is indicated below11. 
Figure 2.2  
Average Non-Utility Fees by US State for a Single Detached Dwelling 
 
Source:  (Mullen, 2012). Reproduced with permission 
 
State based legislation essentially follows principles established through a long 
history of case law in that country which established that for impact fees to be 
constitutionally valid, a dual rational nexus test must be satisfied.  This test deems 
that for a fee to be charged it must a) be proven that the new development has an 
impact on the community and b) the fee charged reflects the cost of that impact 
(Chan et al., 2009).  
2.6.2 Search for Empirical Research 
In the US, there is a well established body of empirical research that has 
evolved around the cost impact of infrastructure charges on new housing.    In excess 
of a dozen separate US studies on the price impacts of infrastructure charges on new 
housing, existing housing and vacant residential lots have been published since 1989.  
The mid 2000s was a time of high growth in many US residential markets as well as 
in the infrastructure charges programs (by number and dollar amount).  This activity, 
                                                            
 
11 Data for utility fees is difficult to capture reliably due to the multitude of names used by various 
jurisdictions (Mullen, 2012). 
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together with advances in econometric techniques and improved data availability 
fuelled fresh academic interest in the topic resulting in a number of new research and 
publications from 2004 – 200912.  Each of these studies used various forms of 
econometric modelling techniques for multiple regression analysis.  The standard 
hedonic house price model is the basis for such studies and has evolved from 
Rosen’s 1974 multiple regression technique (Boymal, de Silva and Liu, 2012) that 
seeks to separate out the individual contributory effects of any one variable from the 
aggregate house price of heterogeneous housing stock (Malpezzi, 2002). The 
published literature includes studies on a range of issues associated with the shifting 
of impact fees including:   
 the price impacts of infrastructure charges on new housing by Delaney and Smith 
(1989a, 1989b), Singell and Lillydahl (1990), Lawhon (2004), Dresch and 
Sheffrin (1997), Baden and Coursey (1999), Mathur, Waddell, and Blanco (2004), 
Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy (2004), Burge and Ihlanfeldt (2006); Evans-Cowley, 
Lockwood, Rutherford and Springer (2009);  
 the price impacts of infrastructure charges on existing housing (Mathur 2007); 
Delaney and Smith (1989a, 1989b), Singell and Lillydahl (1990), Lawhon (2004), 
Dresch and Sheffrin (1997), Baden and Coursey (1999), Mathur, Waddell, and 
Blanco (2004), Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy (2004), Burge and Ihlanfeldt (2006); 
Evans-Cowley, Lockwood, Rutherford and Springer (2009);  
 the price impacts of infrastructure charges on vacant developed residential lots 
(see Skaburskis and Qadeer, 1992; Evans-Cowley,Forgey and Rutherford, 2005);   
 the price of undeveloped land (See Nelson, Frank, Lillydahl and Nicholas, 1992; 
Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004; Campbel,l 2004; Evans-Cowley,Forgey and 
Rutherford, 2005);  and 
 the supply of new housing (see Skidmore and Peddle, 1998; Mayer and 
Somerville, 2000).   
                                                            
 
12 The Global Financial Crisis and residential market crash in the US halted further research into this 
effect.   
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The findings and conclusions of each of each of these studies are presented 
herein.   Details and analysis of the econometric modelling techniques employed are 
provided in Chapter 3.  
2.6.2.1 House Price Impacts (On-Passing) 
Review of the existing empirical works reveal it is a danger to assume that 
passing or shifting of infrastructure charges are at parity (that is $1.00 extra for 
infrastructure charges equals $1.00 passed on or back).  Consistent with theory, the 
empirical research to date is consistent in providing evidence of on-passing and 
indeed “over passing” or “over shifting” of infrastructure charges to new (and 
existing) house buyers.   In studies of the new housing market as a whole, a $1.00 
infrastructure charge is attributed to a price increase of as little as a $0.25 increase in 
new house price (Dresch and Sheffrin,1997) and up to $3.2113 increase in new house 
price (Singell and Lillydahl, 1990).  Singell and Lillydahl (1990) suggest one of the 
reasons for such high over passing is that builders shift to higher quality homes as 
fees are easier to shift at the upper end of the market where greater price elasticity 
exists.  Mathur et al., (2004) and Burge and Ihlandfeldt (2006) seek to test this theory 
by introducing market stratification into their models.  Both were able to provide 
evidence that greater over shifting occurs at the upper end of the market ($3.58 and 
$1.57 respectively), and under shifting occurs for more affordable homes ($0.60 and 
$0.38 respectively).  Mathur et al., (2004) stratified their market by house quality and 
Burge and Ihlandfeldt (2006) by house size, both implying that lower quality or 
smaller housing is more affordable.  Their findings are consistent with the hypothesis 
that there is less price elasticity at the affordable end of the housing market and such 
impact fees are under shifted, whereas impact fees are over shifted to the higher end 
of the housing market where there is greater price elasticity.   
Details of the various methods employed and findings of each study into the 
price effects on all houses are summarised in Table 2.5, new houses in Table 2.6 and 
                                                            
 
13 $3.21 is the midpoint between the $3.80 initial impact ($4,500/$1,182) and the $2.79 impact 
reported nine months later ($3,300/$1,182) 
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existing houses in Table 2.714.  A cursory glance will conclude that the 
methodologies used vary greatly, as do the study areas, sample sets and results.  This 
is perhaps typical of housing price models for which there are a variety of 
approaches and considerable diversity in both theory and outcomes (Meen, 2001).  
Consistent across each model is that the study areas all experienced rapid growth 
during the study period15, and the introduction and/or increases in impact fees.  Each 
uses a form of econometric modelling, but with differing methodologies, variables 
and inputs16.   
For all houses (new and existing pooled), empirical research from the US is 
varied.  Burge and Ihlanfeldt find $1.00 of infrastructure charge is under-passed to 
small and average homes, but is slightly overpassed to larger homes throughout 
Florida.  Evans-Cowley et al.’s study in the greater Dallas-Fort Worth area revealed 
significant overpassing to all homes in the order of $5.37 for every $1.00 of 
infrastructure charge. 
  
                                                            
 
14 For detailed critiques of models refer to Been (2005), Nelson et al., (2008) and Evans‐Cowley and 
Lawhon (2003). 
15 The exception to this was Dresch and Sheffrin, 1997 where prices were declining sharply. 
16 Details of econometric modelling techniques employed are provided in Chapter 3. 
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Table 2.5   
US Empirical Research Models and Findings – All Home Impacts  
Year/Author Methodology/Study Area Findings 
 
2006 
Burge and 
Ihlanfeldt 
Semi-log fixed effects and random effects 
regression analysis for all homes in 41 
counties segmented by house size (by 
square footage) and utility and non-utility 
fees, 1993-2003, Florida (State-wide) 
Utility fees non statistically significant. 
$1.00 increase in non utility fees: 
Small home  +$0.38 
Mid size  +$0.82 
Large home +$1.27 
2009 
Evans-
Cowley, 
Lockwood, 
Rutherford, 
and Springer  
 
Semi log treatment effects model for 
46,420 new and existing houses in 63 
cities the greater Dallas- Fort Worth area, 
Texas, 1999.  
Price multiplier per $1.00 fees: 
All homes +$5.37 
 
Source:  Author 
 
When the research is separated for new and existing homes, the results differ.  
For new houses, empirical research from the US indicates that for every $1.00 
increase in infrastructure charges, new housing costs increase on average by around 
$1.60 (Nelson et al., 2008).  That is 160% of the infrastructure charge is passed on to 
the home buyer.  This concept of “over shifting” for new housing is consistent across 
all of the empirical research dating back to the 1980s.  What is also evident is that 
this price impact is passed on at varying rates depending on the characteristics of the 
housing, with the implication that more affordable homes bear less of this burden 
than arguably those who can afford to pay more (and may be less price sensitive) at 
the other end of the house price spectrum.  This is evident in the works by Mathur et 
al. (2004), Burge and Ihlanfeldt (2006) and Mathur (2007). 
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Table 2.6   
US Empirical Research Models and Findings – New Home Impacts  
Year/Author Methodology/Study Area Findings 
1989a 
Delaney and 
Smith  
General linear regressions on 5,839 new 
houses, Dunedin (fee) and three (no fee) 
cities, Florida 1971-1982 
$1,150 fee increased new house prices 
by $3,737 
1989b 
Delaney and 
Smith  
General linear regressions on 1,055 new 
and 3,135 existing houses in Dunedin 
(fee) and 7,292 existing houses in 
Clearwater (no fee), Florida1971-1982 
$1,150 fee increased new house prices 
by $2,633 and existing house prices by 
$1,643 
1990 
Singell and 
Lillydahl 
OLS model, using 226 new and 203 
existing house sales, Loveland and Fort 
Collins, Colarado, 1983-1985 
$1,182 fee increased new house prices 
by $3,800 and existing houses by $7,000 
1997 
Dresch and 
Sheffrin  
 
New and existing houses, Contra Cost 
County, California, 1992-1996 
East (less wealthy, weak market)+ $0.25 
West (wealthy, strong market) +$1.88 
1999 
Baden and 
Coursey 
 
Double log model on 14,997 new and 
existing, eight Chicago suburbs, Illinois 
1995–1997  
Results for eight suburbs provided 
indicating passing on of 70%-210% of 
the fee for new housing and 100% for 
existing housing (with limitations) 
2004 
Lawhon 
General linear hedonic model, Loveland 
(fee) and Fort Collins (no fee), Colarado, 
380 new and 380 existing house sales, 
1983-1986  
$1,661 increase to house price per 
$1,500 fee increase, however not 
statistically significant  
2004 
Mathur, 
Waddell and 
Blanco 
Semi log hedonic model based on new 
homes in three quality categories across 
38 cities and towns 1991-2000, King 
County (Seattle), Washington 
Low quality  +$0.60 (however not 
statistically significant) 
Mid quality +$1.66  
High quality  +$3.58 
2004 
Ihlanfeldt and 
Shaughnessey 
General linear hedonic and double log 
repeat sales regressions for 39,792 new 
homes, 107,376 existing homes and 1,000 
land sales, Dade County (Miami), Florida 
$1.00 of fee increased both new and 
existing housing by about $1.60 and 
reduces land by about $1.00. 
 
2009 
Evans-
Cowley, et al. 
 
Semi log treatment effects model for 
46,420 new and existing houses in 63 
cities the greater Dallas- Fort Worth area, 
Texas, 1999.  
Price multiplier per $1.00 fees: 
New +$1.76 
Source:  Author 
 
Table 2.7 below indicates the findings of models on the house price effects of 
infrastructure charges on existing houses.  Similar observations can be made about 
the diversity of methodology, study area, sample sets and results.  Findings confirm 
the theory that existing housing is a close substitute for new housing and as the price 
of new housing increases, so too does existing housing, with the existing 
homeowners enjoying a windfall gain and the buyers of existing homes sharing in the 
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cost burden of new infrastructure for which they arguably receive no benefit.  
Infrastructure charges levied on new homes have been found to be overpassed to 
existing house prices from between 142% and 592%  in older studies (Delaney and 
Smith, 1989b; Singell and Lillydahl, 1990) and between 83% (under passed) and 
603% in more recent studies (Mathur, 2007; Evans-Cowley et al, 2009).  
Table 2.7   
US Empirical Research Models and Findings – Existing Home Impacts  
Year/Author Methodology Findings  
1989b 
Delaney & 
Smith  
Hedonic regressions on existing  
houses 1971-1982, Dunedin, Florida 
$1,150 fee increases existing house 
prices by $1,643 
1990 
Singell and 
Lillydahl 
General linear model, Loveland and 
Fort Collins, Colorado, using 203 
existing house sales in 1983-1985 
$1,182 fee increases existing house 
prices by $7,000 
1997 
Dresch and 
Sheffrin  
New and existing houses, Contra Cost 
County, California, 1992-1996 
East (less wealthy, weak market)+ $0.23 
West (wealthy, strong market) not sig 
1999 
Baden and 
Coursey  
 
Double log model on 14,997 new and 
existing, eight Chicago suburbs, Illinois 
1995–1997 
Results for eight suburbs provided 
indicating passing on of 100% for 
existing housing (with limitations) 
2007 
Mathur 
Semi log hedonic model of existing 
homes in three quality categories across 
38 cities and towns 1991-2000, King 
County (Seattle), Washington 
Low quality  +$0.18 (however not 
statistically significant) 
Average quality +$0.83 (all homes) 
High quality  +$1.03 
 
2004 
Ihlanfeldt and 
Shaughnessey 
General linear hedonic and double log 
repeat sales regressions for 39,792 new 
homes, 107,376 existing homes and 
1,000 land sales, Dade County 
(Miami), Florida 
$1.00 of fee increased both new and 
existing housing by about $1.60 and 
reduces land by about $1.00. 
 
2009 
Evans-Cowley, 
et al 
Semi log treatment effects model for 
46,420 new and existing houses in 63 
cities the greater Dallas- Fort Worth 
area, Texas, 1999.  
Price multiplier per $1.00 fees: 
Existing +$6.03 
Source:  Author 
 
In summary, there is a deep and varied body of evidence on the price impacts 
of impact fees on all homes as well as segmented by new and existing houses in the 
US.  The purpose of this thesis is to produce a similar model in Australia to assess 
the associated impacts of infrastructure charges.   
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2.6.2.2 Lot Price Impacts (On-passing) 
Evans-Cowley et al.’s 2005 work took an alternative approach to the majority 
of the US studies, examining the pass on price effect on the developed lot (that is the 
vacant subdivided lot, prior to house construction).  This work follows on from 
Skaburskis and Qadeer (1992) in Canada and Nelson, Frank and Nicholas  (1992) in 
US who had previously examined price impacts on vacant lots (as compared to built 
houses as discussed in the previous section).   
The evidence on price impacts for vacant residential lots is thin.  Skaburskis 
and Qadeer (1992) suggested evidence of on-passing of 120% of the impact fee to 
house prices, whilst Evans-Cowley et al., (2005) provided weak evidence that a 
$1.00 infrastructure charge is attributed to a price increase of as little as a $0.13 for 
the developed lot only (Evans-Cowley et al., (2005).  This significantly lower 
passing on result could be interpreted as evidence of profiteering by house builders.  
This would be a troubling finding as house builders (as opposed to land developers 
when these are two separate suppliers) are not subject to any infrastructure charges.  
No discussion on this finding is provided in the literature.  
Table 2.8   
US Empirical Research Models and Findings – Lot Price Impacts 
Year/Author Methodology Findings 
1992 
Skaburskis and 
Qadeer 
General linear hedonic model of three 
suburban municipalities in  Toronto, Canada 
1977-86 
+1.2 x size of fee  
(+$1.20 on passing) 
1992 
Nelson, Frank and 
Nicholas 
Double log hedonic model of 62 lots 
Saratosa County, Florida, 1981–1987 
unstated 
2005 
Evans-Cowley, 
Forgey and 
Rutherford 
Pooled cross-sectional OLS + fixed and 
random effects models. 1999 data.  43 cities 
in Austin, Fort Worth, Dallas and Houston, 
Texas 
+ 1.3% (10% significance) 
(+ $0.13 on passing) 
 
Source:  Author 
 
2.6.2.3 Undeveloped Land Price Impacts (Back Passing) 
The pass back price impact to the original land owner has been examined by 
Nelson and Lillydahl et al., (1991) and Nelson and Frank et al., (1992), Ihlanfeldt 
and Shaughnessy (2004), Campbell (2004) and Evans-Cowley et al.(2005).  Burge 
(2014) also examines this issue, but appears not to differentiate lot and land parcels 
 Chapter 2: Theory and Literature Review 61 
in his data set.  Refer to Table 2.9 below.  Their results were mixed from findings of 
no statistical significance (Nelson and Lillydahl et al., 1992), to land prices 
increasing (Nelson and Frank et al., 1992), to a slight back-passing of $0.04 (Evans-
Cowley et al., 2005) and a full back-passing of $1.00 (Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 
2004).  Burge’s (2014) findings support partial back-passing of around $0.65.  These 
models suffered from a range of specification deficiencies including very small data 
sets in early studies, and the extreme heterogeneity of undeveloped land in all 
studies.  It would appear that the extent of back shifting of infrastructure charges is 
still open to debate with the empirical research being inconsistent and inconclusive 
(Evans-Cowley et al., 2005).   
Table 2.9   
US Empirical Research Models and Findings – Undeveloped Land Price Impacts (Back Passing) 
Year/Author Methodology Findings 
1992 
Nelson and 
Lillydahl et al. 
Double log hedonic regression of vacant 
land sales in Lovedale, Colarado 
Findings not statistically 
significant 
1992 
Nelson, Frank, 
Lillydahl and 
Nicholas 
Double log hedonic regression of 40 
vacant land sales in Sarasota County, 
Florida, 1981 - 1987 
Land prices increased.  Amount 
unspecified.  
2004 
Ihlanfeldt and 
Shaughnessy 
Double log repeat sales regression for 
1,000 land sale pairs, Dade County 
(Miami), Florida 
-$1.00 undeveloped land 
2005 
Evans-Cowley, 
Forgey and 
Rutherford  
Pooled cross-sectional OLS + fixed and 
random effects models. 1999 data.  43 
cities in Austin, Fort Worth, Dallas and 
Houston, Texas 
-0.042% (- $0.04) undeveloped 
land 
 
2014 
Burge 
Two stage, hedonic and fixed effect 
panel regressions on 1,547,711 
residential sales in 61 counties, 1994 - 
2009, Florida 
School fees:  -0.26% 
Water and Sewer:  -0.83% 
Roads, police, fire:  not sig. 
Source:  Author 
 
2.6.2.4 Housing Supply Impacts 
The effect of infrastructure charges on housing supply has also been the subject 
of much theoretical discussion and some US empirical research, with findings and 
conclusions varying.  Nelson et al., (2008) provide a theoretical model that concludes 
“(housing supply) effects are ambiguous rather than definitively positive or 
negative.” (Nelson et al., 2008, p96).  The empirical evidence is similarly mixed. 
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Skidmore and Peddle’s (1998) model examined the construction rate of new 
houses from 1977 to 1992 in Dupage County, Illinois (near Chicago).  This model 
provided evidence of a 30% decrease in new housing supply as a result of 
infrastructure charges being introduced.  Taking a different approach, Mayer and 
Somerville (2000) found the presence of impact fees (fixed, known amounts) had 
little effect on housing supply in comparison to other regulatory changes that create 
uncertainty for the developer, such as delays in the approval process.  Recent 
Australian research by Gurran et al., (2009) on the impact of regulatory processes on 
housing supply draws similar conclusions.  Burge and Ihlanfeldt (2006) found 
infrastructure charges increased supply in certain housing sub-sectors in certain 
locations, concluding infrastructure charges make housing more desirable due to the 
capitalisation of future perceived benefits.  They also suggest that the existence of 
infrastructure charges regimes creates certainty for developers and communities, 
promoting the rezoning of land for development in the knowledge that growth will be 
suitably funded, thus reducing approval periods and uncertainty.     
Table 2.10   
US Empirical Research Models and Findings – Housing Supply Impacts 
Year/Author Methodology Findings 
1998 
Skidmore and 
Peddle 
Double log hedonic model for all new 
residential development in Dupage 
County, Illinois, 1977-1992 
Approximately 30% decrease in new 
house supply due to impact fee 
introduction 
2000 
Mayer and 
Somerville 
Numerous regressions on new single 
family building permits 44 US 
metropolitan areas 1985-1996 
Little effect (amongst other growth 
management measures that 
exacerbated uncertainty) 
2006 
Burge and 
Ihlanfeldt 
General linear random trend regression 
analysis for all homes in 41 counties 
segmented by house size (by square 
footage) and utility and non-utility fees, 
1993-2003, Florida (State-wide) 
Utility fees not statistically 
significant.  Non utility fees: 
+ 82% small homes and 24% large 
homes in inner suburbs 
+ 36% medium homes and 26% 
large homes in outer suburbs 
Source:  Author 
Been (2005) observes that if price effects of infrastructure charges exist in 
situations in which housing supply is increasing, this is likely to be due to demand 
driven factors and capitalisation of the benefit created, rather than (over) shifting of a 
tax-like fee for which no benefit is perceived.  On the other hand, if price effects of 
impact fees exist when housing supply is decreasing, models should include 
variables to account for any other growth controls or other supply limiting factors.  
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This recommendation appears consistent with the variance in findings and 
conclusions noted above.  
2.6.3 Over-Passing:  Benefit or Burden 
With the concept of on-passing and indeed over-passing of impact fees onto 
house buyers well established, let us turn to the various potential reasons behind this 
phenomenon.  The conclusions drawn in the literature generally fall into one of two 
camps:   the “old view” versus the “new view”, phrases first coined by Yinger (1998) 
(See also Nelson and Moody, 2003; Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004; Burge and 
Ihlanfeldt, 2006  and Nelson et al., (2008)17).  These two theories are based around 
the proposition of whether infrastructure charges are a benefit or burden to the home 
buyer.  
The old view considers infrastructure charges as a traditional “excise tax on 
developers” (Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004) which is a cost burden passed on to 
new home buyers.  In contrast under the new view, the increase in housing prices as 
a result of infrastructure charges is due to the home buyer’s willingness to capitalise 
into the cost of the home the benefit they derive from that infrastructure and/or 
perceived future rates savings.  The difference in these two explanations for over-
shifting is explored further herein. 
2.6.3.1 Old View - Burden 
Let us first discuss the burden effect.  This is consistent with the urban 
economic model whereby any additional costs to the supply chain shift the supply 
curve to the left thus increasing house prices.  Under the old view, infrastructure 
charges are a “form of taxation that is hidden from housing consumers” (Baden and 
Coursey, 1999, p1). 
A common proposition for the over shifting phenomenon is the suggestion that 
infrastructure charges add additional uncertainties and delay costs in the approval 
process, resulting in developers recouping more than the cost of the fees alone as 
developers seek compensation for the additional risk taken and return on costs 
                                                            
 
17 See Nelson et al., (2008) for a comprehensive overview of the “old” and “new” views. 
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(Singell and Lillydahl, 1990; Baden and Coursey, 1999; Campbell, 2004; Mathur, 
2003).  This over-shifting  can also be combined with back passing to land owners 
(Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004), with developers requiring higher profit margins 
to compensate them for the additional uncertainty associated with a rapidly changing 
regulatory environment.  Further, any additional development costs are increased by 
construction period interest and other development costs determined as a percentage 
of the sale price (Singell and Lillydahl, 1990; Crowe, 2007).  So not only are impact 
fees passed directly onto homeowners, there is an over-shifting  effect to compensate 
developers firstly for the additional uncertainty (risk) and secondly a return of funds 
invested component, either for the developer, or its financier over the development 
period (Ellickson and Been, 2005). 
Whilst this explanation appears intuitive and in line with common thinking, 
there are others who argue the opposite, suggesting that infrastructure charges 
increase certainty.  Nelson et al. (1992) supported by Nelson et al. (2008) contend 
that infrastructure charges reduce uncertainty by virtue of timely provision of public 
infrastructure, that may expand the supply of buildable land.  This argument may 
hold in an environment where a transparent infrastructure charging regime is in place 
compared to a fully negotiated system.  However, Gurran et al. (2009) suggest that 
the negotiated approach to infrastructure charges in the UK reduces risks for 
developers.  This seems counter intuitive, with any unknown in the costing process 
adding uncertainty for developers.  This is further compounded by the unpredictable 
delays (and costs) incurred in the negotiation process (Bramley and Leishman, 2005; 
Buitelaar, 2007; Chan et al., 2009).  The UK infrastructure charges system differs to 
that in the US and parts of Australia as it is a process based solely on negotiation 
between developer and the local authority, rather than being based on either future 
infrastructure construction cost estimates as is the case in much of the US and parts 
of Australia, or pre-set rates per dwelling (as is the now the case in Queensland, 
Australia) or scheduled fees (as in the US).  Reliance on negotiated outcomes is also 
argued to disadvantage smaller developers by virtue of factors such as influence, 
knowledge, cost and negotiating power (Evans, 2004a) and this can be interpolated 
to further disadvantage the home buyers in those smaller estates who may then be 
subject to not only higher charges, but also greater over-shifting .  
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Shifting of developer capital into higher quality homes is another suggested 
factor under the old view, with the implication being that there is greater price 
elasticity at the upper end of the market and hence developers can recoup better their 
direct costs, holding costs and return for additional uncertainty (Huffman et al., 1988, 
Singell and Lillydahl 1990, Baden and Coursey 1999).  Research that stratifies the 
market confirms this effect with under passing evident in the more affordable 
housing and over passing evident in the more expensive housing (see Burge and 
Ihlanfeldt, 2006, Mathur et al., 2004).  This perhaps suggests that the provision of 
infrastructure to the poor is subsidised by the wealthy, a finding that is unlikely to be 
politically aceptable.  
These arguements of cost and risk shifting hold for new housing, however they 
do not explain the observed inflationary effects infrastructure charges have on 
existing housing.  Very little conclusions on this are drawn in the literature apart 
from the drag up effect associated with the close substitutability of new and existing 
housing, resulting in a windfall gain to existing home owners (Huffman et al., 1988, 
Yinger, 1998, Baden and Coursey, 1999).   
As indicated previously, a number of studies consider the supply constraining 
effects of infrastructure charges.  Economic theory explains how any drop in supply 
without a corresponding drop in demand will lead to increased prices, thus creating 
an indirect burden in the longer run to home buyers.  The evidence of this effect is 
still ambiguous in the literature and is ripe for futher research (Nelson et al., 2008). 
Clearly infrastructure charging as a cost shifting concept is a complex issue, 
and further analysis of the actual policy implementation mechanism is required to 
ensure comparisons (and assumptions) made are appropriate.  In any case, it can be 
concluded that if over-shifting is due to developers recouping their direct costs, 
holding costs and return for additional uncertainty associated with the local 
infrastructure charges regime, then new homebuyers are bearing this additional cost 
burden by the amount of the over-shifting and existing homeowners are pocketing 
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the windfall gain of increased house values18.  This is a critical concept for policy 
makers to be aware of when designing infrastructure charging regimes.   
2.6.3.2 New View - Benefit 
An alternate proposition is the concept of whether the increase in house prices 
due to infrastructure charges is a one off excise tax payable by the home owner for 
no net benefit, or capitalisation of expected future benefits arising from the provision 
of said infrastructure.  This is the concept of the “old view” versus the “new view” in 
infrastructure charge price effects, phrases first coined by Yinger (1998) further to 
Ellickson’s (1977) suggestion that any assessment of infrastructure charge impacts 
must consider if those infrastructure charges resulted in improved services or 
amenities.  (See also Nelson and Lillydahl et al., 1992; Nelson and Frank et al., 1992; 
Dresch and Sheffrin, 1997b; Nelson and Moody, 2003; Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 
2004; Burge and Ihlanfeldt, 2006; and Nelson et al., 200819) 
The old view considers infrastructure charges as a traditional excise tax on 
developers and does not take into consideration any value attributed by the 
homeowner to the amenity received from the infrastructure provided (Ihlanfeldt and 
Shaughnessy, 2004).  The suggested reasons for house price increases as presented in 
the prior section could be considered as the old view.  The new view assumes a 
number of key differences.  Firstly it incorporates the added amenity of the new 
infrastructure provided by those funds levied.  Secondly it assumes capitalisation of 
future local jurisdictional rates/taxes savings due to the pre-payment of new 
infrastructure by way of infrastructure charges. Thirdly it assumes new homebuyers 
are mobile (that is, they will move to an area that does not levy such fees if they do 
not wish to pay them/value the additional amenity) (Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 
2004).  Fourthly, it assumes competition in the property development sector and 
lastly it assumes infrastructure investments meet a benefit-cost test (Yinger, 1998).   
Under the new view, the increase in housing prices as a result of infrastructure 
charges is due to the home buyer’s willingness to capitalise into the cost of the home 
                                                            
 
18 For a discussion on the issues of efficiency and equity of infrastructure charges see Evans 2000 
19 See Nelson et al., (2008) for a comprehensive overview of the “new” view. 
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the value they derive from that infrastructure and/or perceived future rates savings.  
These costs will be overshifted to the extent that home buyers value more highly 
those benefits over the cost of providing them.  Given the home buyer receives a 
benefit which it has paid for (by way of addition house price) there is no burden.   
In essence this rationale is based around an increase in demand for housing 
associated with home buyers willingly and knowingly paying more for housing with 
the expectation of enhanced amenity and/or lower future rates/property taxes (Burge 
and Ihlandfeldt, 2006).  This is in contrast to the old view, which is an increase in the 
supply chain costs that are passed onto home buyers.  
 
2.7 OTHER 
A thorough search of the literature has been unable to identify any empirical 
studies on this topic outside of the US and Canada.  This is despite the wide spread 
usage of user-pays urban infrastructure systems throughout the world.  It is suggested 
that this dearth of research has been due to a lack of publicly available data as 
experience in the UK and Australian research efforts to date.  
Nevertheless, in the preceding discussion, it has been established that the 
international evidence is conclusive that infrastructure charges increase house prices.  
How much house prices are increased by has been the subject of considerable study 
only in the US and Canada where the empirical models confirm not only passing on 
of infrastructure costs to home buyers, but significant “over shifting” of these costs.   
Whilst these studies remain inconclusive, not only in range of findings, but also 
in their explanation of why this over shifting occurs, a mean range of $1.50 to $1.70 
for each $1.00 of infrastructure charge is apparent for new houses.  However widely 
varying results prevail for existing houses ($0.83 to $6.03) where reasons for this 
effect are even more confounding and perhaps concerning when the impact on 
housing affordability for the wider community (for which they may receive no 
benefit) is considered.  This finding therefore provides evidence in response to the 
second research question of this dissertation: 
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2. Is there international empirical evidence that the imposition of 
infrastructure charges by governments increases the price of housing?   
This research now turns to the next research objective which seeks to 
determine if this US literature provides an established methodology that has external 
validity and is suitable to use in the Australian context.   
 
2.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter has been to review the extant literature on the 
question of “who pays for urban infrastructure?”  There is a long established 
international research base concluding and verifying that infrastructure charges 
contribute to increased house prices.  However a significant gap remains in 
Australian research in quantifying the contributory effects a user-pays infrastructure 
policy objective has on housing affordability policy objectives.  This chapter has 
presented both the theoretical and empirical evidence from a number of key 
international studies providing evidence that infrastructure charges are a contributor 
to increasing house prices.  Various econometric modelling methodologies have been 
employed by researchers in the US to quantify the extent of over passing to new 
home buyers.   
Specifically, this chapter has addressed the first two research questions, with 
the first being answered in the negative, and the second in the affirmative: 
 
1. Is there empirical evidence in Australia that the imposition of 
infrastructure charges by governments increases the price of housing?   
2. Is there empirical evidence internationally that the imposition of 
infrastructure charges by governments increases the price of housing?    
 
In addressing these questions, a rich body of academic literature was identified.  
The Australian academic literature is surprisingly scant; however, government and 
industry documents discussing infrastructure charges are in plentiful supply with 
numerous publications dating up to present day, reflecting the contemporary and 
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evolving nature of infrastructure charging policy in this country.  In the UK, 
literature in the form of scholarly articles, government commissioned reports, and 
text books on the topic are available on wider structural planning issues affecting its 
housing prices, however no direct research on the impact of infrastructure charges on 
house prices is evident.    
A number of empirical studies from US and Canada were identified that 
confirmed significant over-shifting, with house prices consistently increasing by 
greater than the amount of the infrastructure charge.  This extensive body of work is 
reflective of the maturity of the infrastructure charging regime in North America 
which has been in effect for over three decades.  Clearly, it is not only possible, but 
also likely that the US models are not directly applicable to the Australian situation.  
However, they do provide some context, and the only empirical evidence available to 
date.  What is required is the development of an Australian model that can quantify 
the impact of infrastructure charges on new housing costs, so that governments can 
develop consistent and evidence based policy to support Australian cities’ continuing 
growth, whilst retaining a sustainable level of housing affordability.  For “… those 
who craft public policy are just as good as the tools and knowledge available to them 
in creating and legislating such policies” (Wardner 2011).   
In the next chapter, the archival research into the relevant econometric models 
is presented.  The various methodologies that underlie the extant empirical works are 
analysed, as are the findings.  This data is an important component in the Stage 1 
(qualitative) component of this research.  Together with the literature review and 
semi-structured interviews, this data will form the basis for the remainder of this 
thesis which will be the first empirical work of its kind in Australia to estimate the 
effect of infrastructure charges on house prices.  
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Chapter 3: Econometric Model Analysis 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
As identified in the previous chapters, there have been numerous empirical 
studies into the effect of infrastructure charges on housing prices over previous 
decades, almost exclusively from the US.  These studies have each employed various 
econometric techniques.  There was a proliferation of these models around the early 
to mid-2000’s from six US author groups, with each author group taking a different 
approach to estimate the house price effects of infrastructure charges as predicted in 
the theory.    
The purpose of this chapter is to examine each of the US studies on this topic 
since the early to mid-2000’s in detail to find evidence of external validity as well as 
any methodological evolution.  Further to the literature review, this is the second 
phase of Stage 1 of this research project.  It comprises the archival research 
component of this exploratory sequential instrument development mixed method 
research project.  The archival research will unpack the econometric techniques 
employed, identify the contribution of each model, examine the variables employed, 
and hence form the basis for specification of the first model of its kind in Australia to 
estimate the impact of infrastructure charges on house prices.  This chapter is 
designed to inform the third research question of this thesis, considering whether 
international empirical models can be used to assess the impact of infrastructure 
charges on the price of housing in Australia.    
This chapter starts by outlining the theory of hedonic models for house price 
estimation in section 3.2 as hedonic models form the basis for the various 
econometric techniques employed throughout this chapter.  Variables that affect 
house prices are discussed in section 3.3.  Section 3.4 introduces the archival 
research methodology that forms the basis for the remainder of this chapter.  Sections 
3.5 to 3.10 analyse the extant US hedonic house price models from the past decade, 
focusing on the model specification, independent variable selection, findings and 
limitations, with a view to identifying an evolution in methodology and an approach 
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which might be most appropriate for use in the Australian context. Section 3.11 
concludes.   
 
3.2 WHAT IS A HEDONIC HOUSE PRICE MODEL? 
Theories on house and land pricing models have been pondered since Ricardo 
in 1817 (DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1996).  Various models have since evolved based 
on the assumption that housing is more expensive when it comprises more utility 
bearing attributes or characteristics, and that the sum of this bundle of attributes is 
reflected in the housing price.  The marriage of the disciplines of urban economics 
and econometrics since the 1970’s has led to “a proliferation of empirical studies” 
that have progressively sought to predict and explain residential property values and 
the impacts of these various attributes on house prices (Limsombunchai, Grant and 
Lee, 2004 p193).  This proliferation has been due to the increased availability of 
multiple data sets, improvements in modelling techniques and software, and the 
subsequent expansion in business applications (Cho, 1996).   
Hedonic price models based on multiple regression theory dates back to 
Waugh in 1928 with other early contributions by Court in 1939 and Stone in 1954 
(Hill, 2012).  However, it is since the seminal work of Griliches in 1971 and Rosen 
in 1974 (Meese and Wallace, 2003) that hedonic methods started to receive attention.   
In any house price model, it is important to incorporate influences that 
determine both the willingness of consumers to pay for housing (demand factors) and 
the factors that determine the costs of development  (supply factors) (Singell and 
Lillydahl,1990).  The models of Griliches  and Rosen provide for differentiation of 
individual supply and demand attributes (vectors of characteristics whose prices are 
not independently observed) whilst controlling for heterogeneous characteristics that 
are commonly thought to contribute to house price such as location, neighbourhood, 
age, number of bedrooms and the like (Dougherty, 2011; Hill, 2012).   
Malpezzi (2002) describes the simplified hedonic model form as indicated 
below: 
௜ܲ,௧ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚଶܮ௜ ൅ ߚଷܬ௜ ൅ ݑ௜,௧ 3.1 
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Where:   
Pi,t =  sale price of house i in time period t 
Si =  Structural attributes of the house that impact price e.g. house and lot 
area, number of bedrooms and bathrooms, age of the house etc  
Li =  Locational features that might affect the price of the house such as 
view, water frontage, traffic noise, distance to employment centres, 
public transport accessibility, distance to amenities etc 
Ji = Jurisdictional or regional factors that might affect the price of a house 
such as household income levels, local crime rates, population growth, 
housing supply,  labour force,  unemployment rate,  construction cost 
index,  mortgage rate,  occupancy costs,  infrastructure charges etc 
 ݑ௜,௧ =  error term or noise in the model for the ith observation at time t. 
 
The hedonic method is popular as it separates the price of a house into bundles 
of measurable attributes associated with the house.  It uses information generally 
from sales data, making estimation of individual price series for smaller housing 
markets possible (Burge, 2005).  However, hedonic regression techniques are not 
without their limitations.  Mathur (2003) cites a major limitation to be the inability to 
separate the impacts of supply and demand side factors that affect house prices as 
both are included in the equation.  The issue of contemporaneous endogeneity is a 
further complication.  An underlying assumption of the hedonic methodology is that 
the price of housing is determined by the demand and supply conditions of the 
housing market; that is exogenous.  However microeconomic theory indicates that 
demand and supply factors are endogenous to the price of housing, hence the 
contemporaneous conundrum (Mathur, 2003).   
A further challenge to the use of the hedonic technique is the multitude of 
functional forms that it can take.  Delaney and Smith (1989a) contend that it is 
possible for several functional forms to perform equally well in predicting price 
when fitted to a set a data.  Messe and Wallace (2003) observe that specification of 
the model will depend on the type of data available.  Limsombunchai et al.(2004) 
conclude that economic theory provides no guidance with respect to this matter, and 
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as a result each study may pursue its own form in an attempt to overcome the 
potential errors identified above.  Hansen (2006) confirms this finding in a 
comparison of hedonic and repeat sales techniques, concluding that “theoretical 
issues associated with choosing an appropriate specification may be less important 
for price measurement in practice” (Hansen, 2006 p3).   
Hedonic models generally take one of three forms:  time series, cross sectional 
or panel data, the latter which has characteristics of the first two (Brooks and 
Tsolacos, 2010).  A time series model is commonly a two stage process, with the first 
stage comprising the construction of a constant quality repeat sales house price 
index.  This index is then introduced as a dependent variable in the second stage 
hedonic analysis (Meese and Wallace, 2003).  Whilst being a widely used and 
accepted method for accommodating housing heterogeneity and the separate price 
contribution of various attributes, such models must be specified and interpreted with 
caution (Malpezzi, 2002).  Firstly, care must be taken to ensure any first stage 
estimation error is adjusted for when used in the second stage equation.  Also, the 
results do not account for any trend in average house prices over time (Meese and 
Wallace, 2003).  Further, Shonkwiler and Reynolds (1986) suggest that stringent 
assumptions on the preferences of market participants is necessary and 
Limsombunchai et al.(2004) identify hedonic modelling issues are common such as:  
heteroskedasticity, model specification errors, mulitcollinearity, independent variable 
interactions, non-linearity and outlier data points.  Cho (1996) also identifies 
autocorrelation and up to five types of bias that may jeopardise the correct 
interpretation of these hedonic outputs.  However, despite its many apparent 
challenges, the conventional two-step time series hedonic pricing model remains a 
relatively simple and popular estimation process.   
In contrast, cross-sectional studies are carried out at one time point or over a 
short period, a snapshot of a market with no account taken of effects over time 
(Brooks and Tsolacos, 2010).  Such static studies may be useful when long time 
series data is not available or when the dependent variable is constant over time 
(Meen, 2001). 
Panel (or pooled) data models differ from the prior methods by explicitly 
incorporating linkages in variables over time (DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1996) and 
may be considered more dynamic in comparison to the prior static methodologies.  
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Similar to its static counterparts, methodological progressions exploded since the 
1970’s (Gujarati and Porter, 2009) with enhanced computational capacity and 
availability of larger data sets based on cross sections of house sales observed over 
time (Washington et al., 2011).  This is in contrast to the static methods which focus 
only on movements in specific variables rather than large data sets, hence requiring 
significantly fewer data inputs.  Dougherty (2011) reports that this theoretical shift 
divided practitioners into two camps of static and dynamic methodologies, a 
differentiation that is evident in this research.  Whilst dynamic models assist in the 
understanding and forecasting of housing price trends over time, they bring with 
them a separate range of issues to be considered by the analyst such as: stationarity, 
multicollinearity and noncontemporaneous variables just to name a few (Gujarati and 
Porter, 2009) 20.   
Various econometric modelling techniques have evolved in the past few 
decades in an attempt to overcome measurement problems associated with: firstly 
housing’s heterogeneous nature, secondly the infrequency of trades, thirdly the 
negotiated pricing system and finally the nature and availability of data.  The 
rationale behind various model selection is rarely explicit and may only have its roots 
in data type and availability (Meen, 2002b).  Time series, cross-sectional, 
pooled/panel data will lend themselves to varying theoretical bases and hence model 
specifications (Gujarati and Porter, 2009).  As will be seen throughout this chapter, 
no single econometric technique has evolved as the preferred house price model 
other than the basic hedonic form, with more complex model specification being a 
function of the type of data available and the skill of the researcher in seeking to 
identify and eradicate potential errors and bias in the models. 
 
3.3 VARIABLES THAT EFFECT HOUSE PRICES 
If model specification is reliant upon the type of data available, then it follows 
that the researcher must consider what variables impact house prices and hence the 
                                                            
 
20 Meen (2001) provides a survey of the literature on measurement errors associated with different house price 
index methodologies. 
 76 Chapter 3: Econometric Model Analysis 
availability of that data.  Figure 3.1 shows the complex set of factors that underpin 
the relationship between housing supply and demand, with house prices and housing 
affordability being the net outcome of the interaction of those various factors. 
Figure 3.1 
Factors that influence house prices  
 
Source: National Housing Supply Council, 2008 . Available under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Australia licence 
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Malpezzi (2002) suggests that a full dataset of independent variables for house 
price models would include the following:   
 Number of bedrooms and bathrooms 
 Floor area 
 Structure type (attached, detached etc) 
 Type of heating and cooling 
 Building age 
 Other relevant structural features eg. basements, fireplaces, garages etc 
 The building’s structural fabric and quality of finish 
 Neighbourhood variables including quality of neighbourhood, quality 
of schools, socioeconomic characteristics and 
 Distance to central business districts and other employment centres.  
Distance/access to shopping, schools and other amenities  
However, this list in itself is regional in nature, with a number of the items 
noted only relevant in certain regions.  For example, homes in subtropical climates 
often operate without heating and cooling; basements and fireplaces are not a 
common feature in many housing markets.  Other housing characteristics may 
instead be important such as the presence of a pool in a tropical or sub tropical 
climate.  Hence knowledge of the characteristics of the housing market under 
examination is required for a practical approach to be taken to independent variable 
selection and care needs to be taken in adopting a model from one market and 
applying it in another market without consideration of the underlying market 
fundamentals (Sirmans, Macpherson and Zietz, 2005).   
Still, this “full dataset” of Malpezzi’s includes only characteristics of the home 
itself and its relative location with respect to various amenities.  This factor is 
particularly important when considering the influence government policies have on 
house prices, as illustrated in Figure 3.1.  Other exogenous demand impacts that 
effect house price are omitted from Malpezzi’s list such as the availability of finance 
and mortgage interest rates, population growth, government housing policies such as 
First Home Owners Grant (Australia), let alone any discussion on the supply drivers.  
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Meen (2001) raises issues associated with modelling housing markets at different 
spatial scales, with care needed in the specification and interpretation of models at a 
national, regional or urban level or even sub-market level where consumer behaviour 
is not determined by arbitrary administrative boundaries.   
In designing an econometric model, the researcher must therefore attempt to 
take account of all significant demand and supply factors from a practical perspective 
that contribute to house prices across the study area market place in order to 
construct an accurate and representative model that can track and forecast the change 
in house prices over time and estimate individual component contributions. This 
must be balanced against data availability, as at the end of the day “(t)he choice of 
explanatory characteristics is often determined largely by data availability” (Hill, 
2012, p24).   
A further challenges associated with hedonic pricing models is the lack of 
comparability of findings between models.  This is due to two factors.  Firstly, as can 
be inferred from the prior discussion on independent variables, the results of such 
models are location specific and may therefore be inappropriate to generalise 
findings across different geographic locations (Sirmans et al., 2005).  Secondly, 
comparability becomes even more complicated when different functional forms are 
adopted (that is linear or semi-logarithmic models) (Sirmans et al., 2005).   
The archival research phase of this thesis analyses prior studies on the house 
price impact of infrastructure charges, with a focus on the issues of econometric 
technique, interpretation of functional forms and independent variable selection.  
Issues associated with the different empirical specifications are analysed in the 
remainder of this chapter.  Issues associated with the selection and interpretation of 
functional form and treatment of independent variables, are analysed in Chapter 4.  It 
is important for this research to gather and analyse this data from the rich body of 
evidence that exists in the US.  In this way, the most appropriate model can be 
adopted for use in Stage 2 of this research, which is the first of this kind to be 
undertaken in Australia.   
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3.4 ANALYSIS OF EXTANT MODELS TO ESTIMATE 
INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGE EFFECTS 
As outlined in the previous chapter, well over a dozen empirical models 
utilising various hedonic and related econometric techniques have been published in 
the US since 1989 that seek to estimate the effect of infrastructure charges on house 
prices.  Early models suffered from methodological errors and in-appropriateness of 
data (Nelson et al., 2008) which the later studies in the 2000’s sought to overcome.  
The remainder of this chapter is focused on analysing these later more advanced 
extant models in order to select the most appropriate approach to adopt for an 
Australian model.  
Archival research carried out as part of this project uncovered five doctoral 
theses from the US which specifically examined the effects of infrastructure charges 
on house prices.  These works were carried out between 1996 and 2004, with 
subsequent journal articles published by a number of the authors21.  Each of these 
works is consistent in their theory, hypothesis and findings that infrastructure charges 
do increase house prices.  As indicated in the previous chapter, various hedonic and 
related techniques are employed to test the price impacts on a range of house price 
research problems including: the effect of infrastructure charges on both new and 
existing house prices as well as on developed vacant lots.  A number also look at the 
price impact on developable land to assess back-passing, and some also run supply 
models to assess the effect infrastructure charges have on housing supply 
(construction) rates.  In order to remain focused on the topic of this thesis, the 
following analysis will address the house price and lot models only.   
The attractiveness of using theses for archival research purposes is the level of 
detail provided.  In contrast, journal publications provide an annotated version of the 
research design, background, theory, methodology and findings.  A full thesis 
outlines explicitly all of the researcher’s objectives and assumptions, background 
information, theoretical bases, all model outputs and details of trials and errors.  A 
further feature of gathering data from prior theses is to gain the benefit of lessons 
                                                            
 
21 For a detailed critique of models predating 1996 see Campbell (2004), Mathur (2004) and Been 
(2005). 
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learnt by prior researchers, and to build off the existing knowledge on the topic.  The 
findings of all but one of the theses examined as part of this research was later 
published in an academic journal, providing validity to the research and its findings.  
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to analysis of these five doctoral 
theses which provide a deep resource of archival data, as well as a strong 
methodological basis for estimating the effects of infrastructure charges on house 
prices.  Where published works have followed from the thesis, these subsequent 
works are analysed as well.  Journal publications are useful as they are usually 
refereed and therefore subject to peer review and external ratification, however they 
provide less level of detail on assumptions and rationale for the approach adopted.   
The authors of the five prior doctoral theses on this topic from the US that are 
utilised for this archival research are (in chronological order of prior works): 
 Dr Larry L Lawhon, Associate Professor Landscape Architecture/Regional 
and Community Planning, Kansas State University 
 Dr Tim Shaughnessy, Associate Professor, Economics/Finance Department, 
Louisiana State University Shreveport 
 Dr Shishir Mathur, Associate Professor, Urban and Regional Planning, San 
Jose State University 
 Dr Doug Campbell, Instructor, Department of Economics, University of 
Memphis 
 Dr Greg Burge, Assistant Professor, Economics, University of Oklahoma 
 
Analyses of Dr Jennifer Evans-Cowley’s (Associate Dean of Academic Affairs 
and Administration, College of Engineering, The Ohio State University) post 
doctoral publications on this topic are also included in this chapter, despite her thesis 
not including an infrastructure charge based house price model (see Evans, 2000).  
Prof Evans-Cowley’s post-doctoral work is considered relevant to this analysis as it 
provides the most recent contribution to the literature and is an example of a cross-
sectional model in this field of research.  
Firstly, the study area for each model is described together with the 
methodological approach. The purpose of this step is to identify the key study area 
selection criteria, size and nature of the sample set, and to evaluate each author’s 
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contribution in the evolution of this topic of research.  Secondly the specification of 
each econometric model is evaluated.  This is an important step as it examines the 
various econometric techniques and functional forms of the existing models and the 
independent variables included in each analysis.  Thirdly, the findings of each model 
are evaluated. This step tests validity and robustness of assumptions made, 
interpretation of outputs, conclusions drawn and the appropriateness of data utilised 
in the context of external validity22.  Finally, the limitations of each study are 
evaluated in light of conclusions from the previous steps.  The key outcome from this 
process is to identify the strengths and limitations of the existing models and the 
conclusions made give an indication as to the appropriate methodology to employ for 
this study.  Issues associated with the selection and interpretation of functional form 
and treatment of independent variables, are analysed in Chapter 4.   
The term “impact fee” is used in the analysis of the US models to retain 
consistency with the original data sources, remembering however that for the 
purposes of this study the terms “impact fee” and “infrastructure charge” are deemed 
interchangeable.  The term “infrastructure charge” returns in the analysis in the 
following chapter.  
3.5 LAWHON 
Dr Larry Lawhon authored two studies on the effects of infrastructure charges 
on house prices.  The first was his 1996 doctoral thesis submitted to the Texas A&M 
University in the department of landscape architecture and urban planning, The 
second was a 2004 journal article published in the Journal of Architectural and 
Planning Research.  
3.5.1 PhD 1996 
Lawhon’s (1996) thesis employs a quasi-experimental, cross sectional hedonic 
model to estimate the house price effects of both impact fees and growth as separate 
variables.  He uses Loveland, Colorado as the impact fee community and Fort 
Collins as the control community (no fee).  The study period is from 1983 – 1986 
                                                            
 
22 It is inappropriate to directly compare the findings of each study due to differences in their 
functional forms.  Refer to Chapter 4 for further details.  
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using a random sample of 95 homes sold during each of the four years studied for 
each community (760 sales). Whether the sample set is of new and/or existing homes 
is not specified.   Lawhon’s contribution is to further investigate Singell and 
Lillydahl’s (1990) earlier findings for Loveland, Colorado over the same study 
period.  Singell and Lillydahl (1990) found that the July 1984 introduction of $1,182 
impact fees increased the price of new housing by $3,800 and existing housing by 
between $5,000 and $7,000.   
Lawhon’s contribution is the introduction of the Fort Collins control group, the 
separate assessment of the impact of growth on house prices as well as a theoretical 
discussion on the inequity of impact fees falling disproportionately on the poor.  This 
later point was an objective of the research, but not specifically addressed in the 
findings.  
Model and Variables 
Lawhons’ initial general linear model comprised nine variables as indicated 
below:  
ܲ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵ ଵܺ …	ߚଽܺଽ				23 3.2 
Where  
P  =  Price of housing between 1983 - 1986 
Bo  =  Constant 
X1  =  Number of bedrooms 
X2  =  Number of bathrooms 
X3 =  Square feet of the house 
X4 =  Dummy variable for impact fee:   1=impact fee imposed, 0=no 
impact fee  
X5 =  Parkland per 1000 residents 
                                                            
 
23 The equations throughout this chapter have been standardised by the author in accordance with 
Malpezzi’s (2002) equation for ease of comparison. 
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X6   =  Growth index: an indicator of growth pressure in the community, 
consisting of increase in population over previous year divided by 
number of residential permits issued in year  
X7 =  Crime index:  violent crimes per year per 1000 residents  
X8   =  School quality index:  the local school performance score divided 
by the state level school performance score for each year 
X9   =  City difference variable:  dummy to account for difference in the 
price of housing in the two communities:  0=Loveland, 1=Fort 
Collins 
 
Following Malpezzi’s (2002) protocols, variables X1, X2 and X3 could be 
termed structural having relevance to the house; only the city difference variable X9 
would fall into the locational category, whilst the remainder are jurisdictional.  To 
test the impact of these jurisdictional variables on the price of housing in the sample 
communities, a “Backwards Stepwise” procedure was applied, which removed the 
parkland, crime, school quality and city difference variables one at a time.  As would 
be expected, the results indicated the community attributes were meaningless unless 
the city difference variable was re-introduced, which became the final model:  
ܲ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵ ଵܺ …	ߚସܺସ ൅ ߚ଺ܺ଺ ൅ ߚଽܺଽ    3.3 
The variables found not to contribute to the model were the Parkland index 
(X5), the Crime index (X7) and the School Quality index (X8). 
Findings 
From his final model, Lawhon concludes that the $1,182 impact fee increase in 
July 1984 added $1,661 to house prices in Lovedale, with the growth index 
contributing $2,652.  His sample set pooled new and existing houses so the 
differential effect was not able to be determined. Unfortunately, an omission from 
Lawhon’s analysis is his failure to highlight that impact fees are not statistically 
significant in his model outputs.  If the fee effects are not statistically significant, 
then one cannot draw the conclusion that impact fees increase house prices. 
 
 
 84 Chapter 3: Econometric Model Analysis 
Limitations and Observations 
Despite the introduction of a control group and methodological refinements his 
model suffers from the same limitations of Singell and Lillydahl’s being:  the 
exclusion of neighbourhood characteristics and the short time period of observation 
(18 months) either side of impact fee introduction (Been, 2005).  Neither models use 
error terms. Lawhon states Fort Collins and Lovedale are close substitutes despite 
being 35 miles (over 56 kilometres) apart, having an average house price difference 
of $8,000 and Fort Collins having a population two to three times the size of 
Lovedale; whilst Singell and Lillydahl identify Lovedale as being a unique market, 
not having substitutable housing markets.  No average house price or other housing 
characteristics are provided in evidence of substitutability, other than inclusion of 
dummy to differentiate between the two communities.  The rationale for the small 
sample size is unexplained.  The random selection of homes for this study is 
presumed to incorporate both new and existing homes, and hence provides no 
separation of the effect, despite impact fees only being applicable to new homes.  
This is despite Singell and Lillydahl’s earlier model providing this differentiation. 
Both communities studied reported declining residential permits after 1984, despite 
Fort Collins not having impact fees; no other external shocks were identified that 
might have impacted housing demand at this time, for example general economic 
conditions, mortgage interest rates, government policy changes etc.  
Whilst the apparent misinterpretation of the model outputs raises doubt as to 
the validity of Lawhon’s conclusions, the contribution of the work remains valid 
albeit with the potential for omitted variable bias.  On the other hand, variables that 
might have been thought to contribute to house prices were found in this instance to 
be either not significant, or to have sufficient colinearity with other variables as to 
not add additional predictive qualities to the model being:  parkland, crime and 
school indexes.  
3.5.2 Journal Paper 2004 
Lawhon’s (2004) journal paper presents a modified version of his PhD model, 
correcting for his PhD’s error in interpretation of model outputs.  The sample used is 
the same as for the PhD being a random selection of 95 sales in each of the study 
years for each community totalling 760 observations per community.  He clarifies 
that these are a selection of new and existing homes, however no dummy variable is 
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incorporated to test the differential effects.  His PhD final model is used which 
regresses:  the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, square feet of the house, a 
growth index, city difference dummy and an impact fee dummy against house price.  
The model outputs are identical to the PhD and Lawhon identifies that as the 
impact fee test is not significant, no conclusions can be drawn about their price 
impacts.  Perhaps it is these errors that have resulted in Lawhon’s work being 
ignored by the subsequent literature. However, this work provides evidence of a step 
in the evolution of the use of hedonic house price models to estimate the effect of 
impact fees. 
 
3.6 SHAUGHNESSY 
Dr Tim Shaughnessy authored two studies on the effects of impact fees on 
house prices.  The first was his doctoral thesis submitted to the Florida State 
University, Department of Economics.  The second was a journal article authored 
with his supervisor Professor Keith Ihlanfeldt.    
3.6.1 PhD 2003 
Shaughnessy’s dissertation examined the price incidence of impact fees on new 
and existing housing, as well as vacant undeveloped residential land.  He also used 
this data set to estimate the impacts on house construction due to impact fees (supply 
effects).  His data set comprises sales of 39,792 new homes and 107,376 existing 
homes and land in Dade County Florida, from 1985 to 2000, where impact fees were 
introduced from 1989.   
His theory relies on Yinger’s (1998) concept of a “new view” wherein buyers 
knowingly and willingly pay more for housing subject to impact fees, in the 
expectation of lower property taxes in the future i.e. a prepayment of an expected 
future benefit.  This is in comparison to the “old view” whereby buyers bear the 
higher cost of housing unwillingly due to the passing, or overpassing of impact fees 
which is a cost burden to the new home owner.   
Shaughnessy’s contribution is to introduce analysis on the topic of on-passing 
of impact fees to home owners consistent with the new view.  His research seeks to 
address shortcomings of prior research including: outcomes inconsistent with 
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economic theory (old view), sparsely specified hedonic price models and omission of 
correlated variables such as neighbourhood and locational variables.    
Model and Variables 
Shaughnessy’s modelling approach is a standard two-step time series model.  
In the first step, monthly indexes of the price of new and existing houses and 
undeveloped residential land are constructed utilising both hedonic and repeat sales 
approaches.  For new and existing houses, predictions from a hedonic model in 
which dummy variables are used to account for both time and location, are used to 
construct a time series index.  For existing houses and vacant undeveloped residential 
land, a repeat sales model is used to form the index.  In the second step, the indices 
are then used in a time series regression from which the marginal effects of impact 
fees are obtained.   
Stage 1  
The hedonic estimation takes the usual form, with Shaughnessy including a 
number of new variables that are additional to prior models: 
௜ܲ,௧ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܰ,௧ ൅ ߚଷܮ௜ ൅ ߚସܬ௜ ൅ ߚହ ௧ܶ ൅ ݑ௜,௧		  3.4 
Where  
Pi,t  =  sale price of parcel i in time period t 
Si  =  structural characteristics for house sales (house and lot size, 
number of bedrooms and bathrooms, age of the house, if zoned low 
residential density) else nil for vacant land apart from land size, and 
age excluded for new housing.  Note the square of each structural 
characteristic is modelled also. 
Ni,t  =  neighbourhood demographic characteristics (percentage ethnic 
groups, median per capita income, percentage renters) each to 
census block group level 
Li  =  distance (and distance squared) to major employment centres, 
(eight centres used) using GIS data 
Ji  =  jurisdictional dummy (32 cities within Dade County) 
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Tt  =  time dummies to account for time sold (month and year) (relates to 
other time related variables such as increases in fees, change in 
population, economic activity, seasonal fluctuations, other time 
related dummies) 
u =  error term 
Shaughnessy then estimates a repeat sales index as it is suggested to overcome 
the potential of omitted variable bias of hedonic methods.  Clearly, it can not apply to 
new houses, as once a new house is sold it becomes an existing house.  A negative 
feature of this methodology is that it relies on the assumption that significant 
structural changes do not occur between sales, and that houses that resell multiple 
times in the study period are representative of the sample.  On the other hand, an 
attraction of this technique is that the only data required is the sale price and sale date 
from two sales of any house or lot.  The last two sales for properties were included 
with all sales adjusted for inflation.  
 
Stage 2 Stock Flow Model 
Once a monthly index of constant quality house price movements over time 
was established, the second stage model was used to estimate the effect of impact 
fees on those prices movements of new and existing homes and vacant undeveloped 
residential land.  DiPasquale and Weaton’s 1996 stock flow model is used as 
indicated below, with the dependent variables of new and existing house price 
indexes being those constructed in Stage 1: 
௧ܲ∗ ൌ 	 ଵఈమ ቂ
ௌ೟
ு೟ െ ߙଵ ௧ܷ ൅ ߙଷܴ௧ ൅ ߙସ ௧ܻቃ 3.5 
Where:  
St/Ht =  housing stock as a percentage of households 
Ut   =  annual cost of purchasing housing (30 year average mortgage rate, 
property tax rate, expected house price appreciation, impact fees, 
marginal income tax rate) 
Rt  =  housing rent 
Yt = average income per household 
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All items are adjusted for inflation.  The other adjustment made is a lag in all 
variables by two months to account for the time between contract signing and 
settlement.  Interestingly, the only variables not lagged are impact fees and property 
tax rates.  Shaughnessy argues that announcements as to impact fee and property tax 
rates are made prior to their effective dates, so buyers should know what any new 
amounts would be at time of settlement and will have priced any changes into their 
purchase amount.  See the section on limitations for discussion on this assumption.  
Findings, Limitations and Observations 
Shaughnessy’s results indicate that for every additional $1.00 of impact fee, the 
price of both new and existing housing increases by $1.64 and $1.68 respectively24 
using both hedonic and repeat sales methods, and that vacant undeveloped residential 
land decreases by $1.00 (100% back passing).  He argues his case for the new view 
theory in relation to new and existing housing, maintaining that home owners have 
the capacity to price in expected future property tax savings.  Under this theory, no 
“over passing” occurs (developers seeking to recoup the additional costs of supply) 
rather the price increase is reflective of the buyer’s knowledge of the services paid 
for by the fee, ability to price in the expected benefit of that service as a form of pre-
payment and increased house prices are the measure of their willingness to do so.  
This argument appears inconsistent, particularly when combined with Shaughnessy’s 
acknowledgement of fees being levied at the time of planning approval which by his 
own admission may be many months or years prior to the time a buyer actually 
purchases a home.  That is, if a fee is levied, say two years prior to the home being 
sold due to subdivision works and construction time frames, then the relevance of the 
scheduled fee (or any announced increases and the services it provides for) at the 
time of purchase is questionable.  The use of lags could have addressed this issue, 
and yet this opportunity was missed with questionable rationales focused purely on 
the “new view” theories rather than acknowledgement of property market 
                                                            
 
24 Shaughnessy rounds both of these outputs down to $1.60 in his conclusions. 
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fundamentals.  Refer to Section 2.6.3.2 for the requisite assumptions required for the 
new view to hold. 
The propensity of home buyers to capitalise expected future property tax 
savings is questionable.  This assumption is based on highly educated and financially 
fluent home buyers existing in a transparent impact fee and property tax regime.  
Such a community would be the exception rather than the norm and if so, it would 
have been appropriate to explain Dade County’s unique features. Been (2005) was 
highly critical of this theoretical basis for the new view and Shaughnessy’s 
conclusions.  
In his focus on the new view, Shaughnessy fails to identify that his results 
suggest evidence of both on-passing and back passing occurring contemporaneously.  
This back passing is attributed to developer uncertainty regarding future increase in 
fees and yet the new view assumes fee certainty and ability of buyers to forecast 
future fees and property taxes.  If a developer is able to contemporaneously pass 
backwards and forwards a cost of supply, then the developer’s profit would increase 
by the amount of the impact fee (plus any overpassing less any fee increases).  This 
is an important finding that may have lead to quite differing conclusions.   
Inconsistent terminology in relation to the nature of the “land” in this research 
creates confusion.  Clarity is required around whether unsubdivided (englobo) land 
or subdivided (and serviced) vacant lots is being examined.  This clarification does 
not become apparent until late in this study.   
3.6.2 Ihlandfeldt and Shaughnessy 2004 
Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy (2004) published Shaughnessy’s thesis findings 
with similar theories and conclusions to those reported above.  The argument posed 
for the new view may be convincing at a theoretical level, however it is inconsistent 
with the practical function of the property development process and time frames 
involved, and thus mix long and short run effects in its justifications.  The findings 
note that impact fee increases create uncertainty for the developer (and hence the 
propensity to bid down land prices) and yet the model assumes sufficient certainty in 
relation to expected property tax increases for home buyers to efficiently capitalise 
impact fees and future property tax increases into house prices.  The present value of 
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future property tax savings is estimated to be $1.20 for each additional $1.00 of 
impact fee, however the notes to this calculation are scant and lack external validity.   
Despite criticism of the new view conclusions, Shaughnessy’s work is an 
important addition in the evolution of models that estimate the impact of impact fees 
on house prices.  The model findings are significant and the model specification 
overcomes earlier omissions with a wider range of house price variables 
incorporated.  A full list of the independent variables utilised by Shaughnessy and a 
comparison with other authors is included in Chapter 4. 
3.7 MATHUR 
Dr Shishir Mathur has authored a number studies on the effects of impact fees 
on house prices.  The first was his doctoral thesis (2003), the second was a journal 
article authored with his supervisor Professor Paul Waddell and Professor Hilda 
Blanco in 2004, and a third article was published in 2007.  Mathur’s 2008 and 2013 
publications are derivations of his original data set and address sub-issues not 
directly associated with house prices and hence are not examined here in detail.  
3.7.1 PhD 2003 
Mathur’s doctoral thesis was based on research comprising a dataset of 14,103 
new and 148,700 existing house sales, across 38 jurisdictions in King County, 
Washington which had a strong real estate market over the study period and 
Snohomish County, Washington which had a soft real estate market over the study 
period.  The study duration was 1991 – 2000 (10 years) and findings include those 
for existing housing as well as new housing.  It examines the whole new home data 
set via a hedonic price regression model, as well as segmentation into low and high 
quality housing.  This thesis was submitted to the University of Washington in the 
department of Urban Design and Planning.  
Mathur’s theoretical framework is based around microeconomic demand and 
supply theory, with a strong focus on market conditions as a primary driver of house 
prices.  His theory includes a discussion on the national, regional and country level 
trends that affect housing markets, factors overlooked in much of the other literature.   
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Contribution 
Mathur’s contribution is two-fold:  firstly he tests for the differential price 
affects of impact fees on new housing categorised as either of high or low quality, 
with his hypothesis being that impact fees may have differing effects on house prices 
as price elasticity increases with increased quality.  Secondly, he tests this theory that 
in a strong real estate market any increase in the supply costs of housing is borne by 
the buyer.  
Mathur’s view is that hedonic methods, whilst well established, fail to resolve 
into component parts the demand and supply factors that affect house prices.  His 
expanded data set and revised methodology seeks to correct for this omission of prior 
works.  
The study area is selected as it represents a highly urbanised region of the state 
with a large and diverse housing market.  It supports the primary population base and 
economic centre for the state and both counties have similar impact fee regimes.   
His model is designed to take into account many regional and jurisdictional level 
housing demand and supply factors omitted in earlier studies and hence is claimed to 
provide more accurate information about the house price effect of impact fees to 
policy makers.  
Model and Variables 
This study incorporates both a hedonic regression and an instrumental variable 
regression method to examine the effect of impact fees on a) new and existing 
housing and b) the differential effect across different quality of housing c) in varying 
market conditions.   
This study differs to others by virtue of its attention to variables associated 
with house price drivers and its explicit attempt to include factors of both housing 
demand and supply.  This study was the first to introduce the spatial effects of 
transportation accessibility factors, distance to urban growth boundaries as well as a 
measure of the quality of the view from the house.   This research had the benefit of 
data of thirteen housing quality categories as captured by the King County valuation 
office, and nine categories for Snohomish County.   
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Mathur firstly utilised the standard form linear hedonic model in the usual 
form: 
௜ܲ,௧ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚଶܮ௜ ൅ ߚସܬ௜ ൅ ݑ௜,௧		  3.6 
Where  
Pi,t  =  natural log sale price of parcel i in time period t 
Si  =  Structural attributes:  log of house size, lot area, number of 
bathrooms and age of the house; number of bedrooms and 
fireplaces; building quality grade and associated high/low quality 
dummy 
Li  =  Locational attributes:  quality of view over mountain and lake, 
traffic noise, log of travel time to CBD, accessibility to non-
retail/retail jobs by car, log of auto accessibility, log of transit 
accessibility; inverse of distance to urban centres, inverse of 
distance to urban growth boundary 
Ji  =  Jurisdictional/Regional demand side attributes that affect the rate of 
change of the population of in town or city j, at time period t:  per 
capita municipal expenditure; school expenditure per pupil, 
property tax rate, property and violent crime rates, increase in 
median household income, annual population change for the city 
and county, number of new building permits in city and county, 
labour force, unemployment rate, construction cost index, mortgage 
rate and impact fees 
u =  error term 
 
Mathur then employed a two-step instrumental variable regression method to 
correct for the endogeniety of aggregate demand and supply factors, a limitation of 
hedonic regressions.  First, two sets of aggregate supply and demand variables are 
estimated together with exogenous variables.  The estimations from this first step are 
then regressed in the hedonic equation to estimate the affect of aggregate demand 
and supply on house prices.  
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The demand equation form is: 
ܦ௝,௧ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅	ߚଵܬ௝,௧ ൅ ߚଶ ௗܶ ൅ ߚଷܬௗ ൅ ݑ௜,௧  3.7 
Where   
Dj,t =  the rate of change of population of in town or city j, at time period t 
Jj,t = Jurisdictional/Regional demand side attributes that affect the rate of 
change of the population of in town or city j, at time period t,  
property tax rate, property and violent crime rates, per capita 
municipal expenditure, school expenditure per pupil and mortgage 
rate 
Td =  time (year) dummies 
Jd =  jurisdiction dummies 
 
The supply equation form is: 
௝ܵ,௧ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅	ߚଵܬ௝,௧ ൅ ߚଶ ௗܶ ൅ ߚଷܬௗ ൅ ݑ௜,௧  3.8 
Where   
Sj,t =  the number of new house approvals in town or city j, at time period t 
Jj,t = Jurisdictional/Regional supply side attributes that affect the rate of 
change of the population of in town or city j, at time period t,  
construction cost index, property tax rate, impact fees 
Td =  time (year) dummies 
Jd =  jurisdiction dummies 
 
The final multiple regression model takes the usual form: 
௜ܲ,௝ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚଶܮ௜ ൅ ߚଷܬ௜ ൅ ݑ௜,௧  3.9 
Where   
Pi,j  =  natural log of the sale price of house i in city or town t 
S =  Structural attributes:  log of house size, lot area, number of 
bathrooms and age of the house; number of bedrooms and 
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fireplaces, building quality grade and associated high/low quality 
dummy 
L  =  Locational attributes:  quality of view over mountain and lake, 
traffic noise, log of travel time to CBD, accessibility to non-
retail/retail jobs by car, log of auto accessibility, log of transit 
accessibility, inverse of distance to urban centres, inverse of 
distance to urban growth boundary 
J  = Jurisdictional/Regional attributes:  per capita municipal 
expenditure, expenditure per pupil, property and violent crime rate, 
increase in median household income, labour force; unemployment 
rate, construction cost index,  mortgage interest rate, impact fees, 
rate of change in population (aggregate demand derived from IV 
approach), and building approvals (aggregate supply derived from 
IV approach)  
A semi-log specification is used for the final model estimation, with the log of 
sale price of the house as the dependent variable.   A full analysis of the data set 
inputs for this model, and comparison with other authors is included in the following 
chapter.   
Findings 
Mathur provides the first evidence of differential impact fee driven price 
effects across housing quality types.  Overall he finds impact fees increase house 
prices with the amount of shifting and over shifting dependent upon the house quality 
(and inferred affordability level).  His findings provide evidence of impact fees 
adding $0.75 to low quality new houses (however with weak statistical significance t 
= 1.48), $1.35 to $1.38 to all new houses (average of all pooled) using the hedonic 
and instrumental variable regression methods respectively, and $2.46 to high quality 
new houses in King County.  The findings for Snohomish County where the real 
estate market was soft, were not statistically significant. 
For existing housing, he found evidence of impact fees adding $0.82 to low 
quality new houses, $1.47 to $1.28 to all new houses (average of all quality levels 
pooled) using hedonic and instrumental variable regression methods respectively, 
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and $1.70 to high quality new houses in King County.  The findings for Snohomish 
County were not statistically significant. 
This study’s contribution was twofold finding that:   
 In a strong real estate market (King County), impact fees have an 
inflationary effect on both new and existing house prices, with no 
observed effect in periods of soft market conditions (Snohomish 
County); and  
 This increase is significant and elastic with mid to high quality housing 
(both new and existing) increasing in excess of the fee respectively 
(over passing), with evidence of under-passing to low quality housing 
(existing and new).  
Limitations and Observations 
Mathur’s theoretical framework is sound and well articulated.  He spends 
considerable time considering market drivers of house prices, and takes care to 
include associated independent variables.  His data set is somewhat unique however 
in its level of detail.  Firstly, the local government assessment office collected 
detailed data on each house, rating its quality into one of thirteen house quality 
categories, as well as rating the quality of any view or locational feature.  Secondly, 
Mathur’s supervisor’s expertise was in transport studies and thus enabled access to 
data set/s on distance to freeway on-ramps, public transport and employment centres.  
Whilst it might be desirable to include such variables in future studies, the 
compilation of such datasets on either of these factors if not already available, is 
likely to be prohibitive.  
Mathur claims that his detailed dataset provides more accurate information 
about the house price effect of impact fees to policy makers.  When considering the 
complexity of this model compared to the relative simplicity of others, it is 
interesting that Mathur’s findings remain consistent with the other literature on such 
price effects.  This could be interpreted as evidence that a more complex model does 
not necessarily add additional accuracy in its estimations.  Conversely, it could be 
argued that with an R2 = 0.861, after dropping out more common variables such as 
unemployment rate, income rate and a number of other jurisdictional/policy level 
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attributes, perhaps Mathur’s control for less common variables such as house quality 
and accessibility reveal the true drivers of house prices.  
Mathur explicitly assumes the ready availability of zoned land suitable for 
subdivision in his supply equation.  This is an important assumption that other 
authors are silent on.  It is assumed they make this assumption also.  However it 
raises the question of the impact of planning constraints on supply and thus house 
prices.  The Australian development community and other Australian research outlets 
often cite the lack of suitably zoned land for subdivision as a significant market 
imperfection and a contributor to the housing affordability debate (See Urban 
Development Institute of Australia, 2006; National Housing Supply Council, 2010).  
However in the absence of a suitable independent variable to reflect potential land 
availability, it appears that this assumption is a necessary evil and perhaps a 
limitation of each study.  
3.7.2 Mathur, Waddell and Blanco 2004 
Mathur together with his supervisor Waddell and Blanco published part of 
Mathur’s thesis findings, including results only King County.  Snohomish County 
may have been excluded given its results in the earlier analysis were statistically 
insignificant.  New house sales results only are presented.  Existing homes in King 
County are not included in this paper.  
Additional descriptive statistics for the continuous variables for new homes are 
provided with the resultant impact fee coefficient applied against a mean house price 
of $246,000, rather than $200,000 as utilised in the thesis version.  Findings indicate 
impact fees increase the price of all new housing (that is the average of all quality 
levels pooled) by $1.66, with the effect being more pronounced with high quality 
homes at $3.58 and a marginally statistically significant (t = 1.5) finding for low 
quality new homes of $0.37.  Mathur et al.’s rationale for these findings are generally 
consistent with the old view, being in compensation for additional holding costs and 
the presence of an elastic market due to high demand pressures.  The one new view 
conclusion was attributed to editor contribution (ie. Capitalisation of perceived future 
benefits).   
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3.7.3 Mathur, 2007 
This subsequent hedonic price regression model examines the effect of impact 
fees on existing houses in King County over the same study period as above, 
similarly segregated by high and low quality ranges.  Some descriptive variables 
have been omitted from the model.  The findings again support the hypothesis of 
overpassing to high quality homes at $1.03, $0.83 for all existing homes, and 
statistically insignificant for low quality existing homes.  
Mathur’s work is an important addition in the evolution of models that estimate 
the impact of impact fees on house prices.  The model findings are significant and 
the model specification overcomes earlier omissions with a much wider range of 
house price variables incorporated, including spatial elements that detailed data for 
which had previously been available.  A full list of the independent variables utilised 
by Mathur are included in the analysis in the following chapter. 
 
3.8 CAMPBELL 
Dr Doug Campbell authored one study on the effects of impact fees on house 
prices, his doctoral thesis which was completed at Georgia State University’s 
economic department.  No publications have been forthcoming from this work.   
3.8.1 PhD 2004 
Campbell’s research investigates the effects of impact fees on house prices 
within the Orlando statistical area in Florida which consists of six counties and 70 
cities and town. He employed hedonic models to measure the price effect on 103,444 
new and 175,877 existing house sales over a five year study period (1997 – 2001).  
The population of the study area was 2.5 million people in 1997. 
Contribution 
Campbell sought to overcome the “paucity of data as well as insufficient 
methodological rigor” (Campbell, 2004, pxi) of earlier models25.  Specifically 
                                                            
 
25 Campbell incorporated early work by Shaughnessy which was presented in a 2002 conference 
paper.  
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Campbell sought to address the issues of endogenous impact fees, spatial 
relationships in housing markets and heteroskedasticity by incorporating more 
descriptive structural variables and limited locational (spatial) variables over a large 
and diverse data set.  These issues were identified to be a function of the dynamics of 
the impact fee usage by local jurisdictions, the nature of the housing market studied 
and the type of data examined.  Campbell sets out to achieve this goal by expanding 
the data sets of previous studies including numerous structural variables accessed 
from over 100 data sources applied to nearly 280,000 individual house sales.  This 
approach was designed to overcome criticisms of repeat sales models that assume:  a 
constant-quality home may mis-represent the true underlying market values and 
violate the assumption of random selection of observations. This data was collated 
and regressed at the city/town, county and statistical division level and included GIS 
data where available. 
Model and Variables 
Campbell went to great lengths to gather very detailed data sets for each of the 
70 cities and townships in his study area.  This enabled three main sets of regression 
models to run for all housing in: the Orlando statistical area, in each of the six 
counties and in each of the 70 cities and townships.  This totalled 75 sets of hedonic 
housing model regressions.  For each of these sets, linear and semi-log models were 
run for all housing, new housing and existing housing in the form:   
௉೔
ு௉ூ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚଶܫܨ௜ ൅ ߚଷܯ௜ ൅ ߚସܩ௜ ൅ ߚହܫ௜ ൅ ߚ଺ ௜ܻ ൅ ߚ଻ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚ଼ܥ௜ ൅ ߚଽܮ௜ ൅ ݑ௜		   3.10 
and 
݈݊ ௉೔ு௉ூ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚଶܫܨ௜ ൅ ߚଷܯ௜ ൅ ߚସܩ௜ ൅ ߚହܫ௜ ൅ ߚ଺ ௜ܻ ൅ ߚ଻ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚ଼ܥ௜ ൅ ߚଽܮ௜ ൅ ݑ௜		  3.11 
 
Where:   
Pi,  =  sale price of house i 
HPI =  appropriate housing price index for each sample year (changes in 
housing costs for the national housing market)  
S  =  structural characteristics of the house 
IF  =  impact fee 
M  =  millage rate (property tax) 
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G =  population growth rate 
I  =  percentage change in median income  
Y  =  year of sale dummy 
T  =  township dummy 
C  =  county dummy 
L = weighted spatial matrix (counties with GIS data only) 
u  =  error term 
 
Within many of the independent (right hand side) variables listed above sit a 
number of sub-data sets, particularly within the structural characteristics variable.  
For a full analysis of the data set inputs for this model, refer to Table 4.1, Table 4.2 
and Table 4.3 in the next chapter.  
Non arms-length transactions were excluded from the data, as were outliers. 
Houses were considered “new” if sold within one year of the date of construction.  
GIS data was collected for each parcel (for the two counties with GIS data available) 
and the weighted spatial matrix was created that incorporated the distance of each 
house sold to major roads and thoroughfares, lakes, rivers and other waterways and 
jurisdictional boundaries.  Property taxes were lagged one year to control for 
potential endogeneity with impact fees, however this rationale is not explained and is 
counter intuitive.  Theoretical arguments tend to support lagging impact fees not 
property taxes, this is a potential specification error.  
Findings 
Campbell’s findings are difficult to draw conclusions from at the town/city and 
county level because the house price effects vary so considerably across 
jurisdictions, fluctuating from very large amounts in the positive (house price 
increases) to equally large amounts in the negative (house price reductions).  In 
saying that, findings for more than half of the individual towns/cities are consistent 
with the theory that impact fees increase house prices for both new and existing 
houses.    
However, overall for the Orlando statistical division, Campbell found for every 
$1.00 of impact fee, new house prices increase by $1.44 whilst for existing houses, 
prices increase $1.07 (on passing, with little over passing).   These are the findings 
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for the linear models, with the semi-log models findings not reported due to wide 
variances.  Campbell provided rationale for the unexpected variations in his findings, 
however no conclusions were drawn on the reasons for overpassing of these fees 
onto home buyers.  
Limitations and Observations 
Campbell’s findings have received criticism in later literature due to the vastly 
varying and contradictory results at the city/township and county level. By way of 
example his results indicate in one county, new house prices increase $14.87 for each 
$1.00 of impact fees, whilst in other county new house prices decrease by $16.72 for 
each $1.00 of impact fee.  Over the entire study area his findings average out to be 
consistent with the findings of prior literature, however it is apparent that despite 
Campbell’s efforts to incorporate all independent variables possible, effects are 
occurring which are not observed.  Omitted variable bias appears to remain, which is 
recognised by Campbell in relation to his spatial analysis.  
The weighted spatial matrix attempts to correct for spatial autogregression in 
the model, which is the differential effect location to local amenities/features has on 
house prices, or in other words, house prices are driven by “location, location, 
location”.  His approach was reported to take into consideration each house’s 
distance to major roads and thoroughfares, lakes, rivers and other waterways and 
jurisdictional boundaries “and so on” (p72).  However no account was taken of other 
house price drivers associated with location such as proximity to schools, shops, 
employment centres, CBD, public transport, beaches etc.  Campbell acknowledges 
this deficiency himself in his conclusions.  It is a shame in collation of such a 
detailed data set he focused on the features of the individual houses, rather than their 
relative location to amenities as the key value driver.   
An observation of Campbell’s data set is the high proportion of new house 
sales in comparison to existing house sales in the study period. Of the 280,000 or so 
house sales in the five year study, approximately 37% of these were for new houses, 
with an average house price for the full data set of $72,000.  This is suggestive of a 
unique market, undergoing extremely high growth, that may not meet usual 
methodological assumptions and warrants further consideration when considering the 
external validity of this model.  Campbell did not provide comment on this feature of 
the Orlando housing market.  
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Despite the limitations of this work, the overarching observation from 
Campbell’s research is the final consistency of its findings to earlier work, the 
shortcomings of which he sought to overcome.  His consistency in average results for 
the full study area is obtained despite a different and more significantly detailed 
methodology.  This finding could be interpreted as lending weight to Meen’s (2001) 
and Malpezzi’s (2002) assertion that data availability is what drives econometric 
house price model specification rather than theory. 
 
3.9 BURGE 
Dr Greg Burge has authored a number of works on the topic of the effects of 
infrastructure charges on house prices.  The first was his doctoral thesis in 2005 
submitted to the Florida State University, Department of Economics.  The findings of 
his thesis were published in 2006 co-authored with his thesis supervisor Professor 
Keith Ihlanfeldt.  In 2007 Burge collaborated with Professor Arthur (Chris) Nelson 
and John Matthews to publish on the effects of proportional-share impact fees, and in 
again 2008 contributing a chapter in Chris Nelson et al.’s 2008 book “A Guide to 
Impact Fees and Housing Affordability” (see Burge, Nelson and Matthews, 2007 and 
Nelson et al., 2008).  This section will focus on Burge’s thesis model that estimates 
the impact of impact fees on house prices (single family homes only).  
It is noteworthy that Shaughnessy’s, Mathur’s and Campbell’s works were 
carried out in isolation of each other, occurring virtually contemporaneously in three 
different states around the US.  Burge had the benefit of their prior contributions to 
consider when developing his theories and methodologies, as well as sharing a 
supervisor with Shaughnessy.  Evans-Cowley et al.’s 2005 work had also been 
published prior to completion of Burge’s thesis and is included in his review of the 
literature.  
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3.9.1 PhD 2005 
Burge’s doctoral thesis sought to measure the price effects of impact fees on 
starter homes26.  To do this, Burge examines a panel of houses in 41 counties 
throughout all of Florida over 11 years (1993-2003) that utilise impact fees.  His 
theory is based on an extension of the standard urban model, whereby all 
development occurs on the urban edge, with the price of housing diminishing as the 
cost of commuting increases.   
Contribution 
Burge’s contribution is to assess the price effects of impact fees on the price of 
housing as estimated across three different segments of the housing market, being 
small, medium and large homes as defined by house size.  Burge further categorises 
this effect by testing separately for the price effect of utility fees (water and 
sewerage) and community services fees (non-water and sewerage) on each house 
size.  The implication in this work is that smaller houses are more affordable, and 
larger houses less affordable.  By testing the differentiated price effects of impact 
fees across the housing market, evidence is gathered as to the relative effect impact 
fees have on housing affordability and the differential effect of utility versus non-
utility fees. .   
Model 
Burge employs a two-stage time series process, firstly estimating a constant 
quality house price index using all home sales for each of the three tiers of the 
housing market (i.e. small, medium and large homes) as well as all homes on an 
annual basis.  The data set was not segmented by new and existing homes.  Similarly 
to Shaughnessy, this annual index is then employed in the second step where both 
fixed effects and random effects models are run for both utility fees (water and 
sewerage) and community services fees (non-water and sewerage) on each house 
size.  The house size categories were selected to divide the data approximately into 
thirds across the whole state of Florida.  Impact fees are charged by house size in 
                                                            
 
26 A starter home is the first which a person or family can afford to purchase.  It commonly refers to a 
small one‐ or two‐bedroom home in low‐cost new developments (Burge, 2014b). 
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Florida, with the house size implying the number of bedrooms in the home.  As a 
matter of interest and for comparison with the Australian housing market, Burge’s 
housing categories have the following characteristics: 
Table 3.1   
Burge (2005) Sample Set Characteristics 
Item Small Medium Large 
House size 600-1500sqft 
(56-140sqm) 
 
1501-2200sqft 
(141-204sqm) 
2201-5000sqft 
(205-465sqm) 
Number of bedrooms 1-2 bedroom 
 
3 bedroom 4 bedroom 
2002 average house 
price (Florida) 
$106,185 $139,384 $228,189 
Source:  Burge (2005) and author 
Stage 1 – Repeat Sales Model  
The repeat sales method for construction of a house price index for the study 
period is selected over a hedonic approach due to the limited data on structural 
characteristics in Burge’s data set.  Given structural, neighbourhood and locational 
variables are assumed to remain constant between each repeat sale, they drop out of 
the model:  
൬ ௉೔,೟௉೔,೟ష೙൰ ൌ 	∑ ܤ௞ܦ௜,௞ ൅ ݑ௜,௧,௧ି௡௞்ୀଵ    3.12 
Where 
Pi,t  =  most recent selling price of property i at time t 
Pi,t-n  =  previous selling price of property i at time t-n 
Bk  =  log of cumulative price index in time period t 
Di,k  =  dummy -1 at initial sale, +1 at second sale, else 0 
u  =  error term 
Burge chose annual increments for the repeat sale model specification.  His 
justification being that annual indices allow smaller sample communities to 
contribute to the estimation procedure, by virtue of allowing more sales to enter each 
time period and thus increasing the accuracy of the repeat sales estimator. A 
minimum of 100 pairs of sales per county over the study period was adopted.  
Cumulative nominal price appreciation rates were generated for each size category, 
as well as all categories.  Using 2003 average house price data for each category in 
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each county (valuation assessments) as the benchmark, a series of annual constant 
quality nominal prices was constructed for each segment.  Nominal prices were then 
transformed into real prices using inflation to create a real constant quality price 
index per county for the study period 1993-2003.  Separate indexes for each county 
were generated in an attempt to ensure estimated price impacts on housing took 
county-specific housing market variables into consideration.  Burge’s stratification of 
house prices by size and county identifies variation not only between counties, but 
also between categories within counties.  
Stage 2 – Fixed and random effects models 
The natural log of each estimated price index from Stage 1 was used as the 
dependant variable in the second stage, which regressed separately for the price 
effect of utility fees (water and sewerage) and community services fees (non-water 
and sewerage) on each house size.  Note, community service fees are those for 
services traditionally funded by property taxes such as schools, law enforcement, fire 
protection, libraries and other community facilities.  Both fixed effects and random 
trend models were run to deal with potential sources of endogeneity bias.   Impact 
fees were lagged by one year given the fee levels used are those applicable at the end 
of the previous year.  
The two way fixed effect model (county and time) provides for impact fees to 
differ depending on the level of constant quality house prices across counties: 
௜ܲ,௧ ൌ 	ߙ௜ ൅	 ௧ܶ ൅ ߚ଴ܹܵܫܨ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵܹܰܵܫܨ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ݑ௜௧ 3.13 
Where 
Pi,t  =  constant quality real price of housing for county in i in year t 
a  =  fixed effect for area, accounts for unobserved heterogeneity 
T            =  fixed effect for time, controlling for factors uniformly effecting 
all counties over time (ie. interest rates, policy changes, 
growth) 
WSIF  =  water and sewer impact fee 
NWSIF  =  non water and sewer impact fee 
u  =  error term 
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The random effect model (county specific price level and trends) provided for 
impact fees to differ based on both county-specific price levels and county-specific 
trends in house price appreciation.  By adding a county specific time trend (gi) to the 
fixed effect equation, each county was allowed to have its own time trend in house 
prices, thus further mitigating the potential for endogeneity bias27: 
௜ܲ,௧ ൌ 	ߙ௜ ൅	ߛ௧ ൅ ݃௜ݐ ൅ 	ߚ଴ܹܵܫܨ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵܹܰܵܫܨ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ݑ௜௧ 3.14 
Where all variables are as per the previous equation but for: 
gi t =  county specific time trend 
 
Findings 
Burge’s models provide evidence that impact fees increase the price of small, 
medium and large sized homes by $0.39, $0.82 and $1.27 respectively.  This implies 
that impact fees are not passed on at the same rate for affordable homes and more 
expensive homes.  Indeed, under-passing occurs for smaller (and by inference more 
affordable) homes, which is consistent with Mathur’s findings using house quality as 
a proxy for affordability.  The degree of on-passing appears to be approximately 
proportional to the price of the home and thus by inference, the ability to pay.  This 
finding could lead to the somewhat contentious conclusion that the rich subsidise the 
provision of infrastructure for the poor.  Neither Burge nor Mathur draw this 
conclusion.   
Burge further finds that utility fees (water and sewerage) add little to house 
prices, whereas the community fees (non-water and sewerage) fees are highly 
correlated with increases in house prices the following year.  Whilst Burge’s 
conclusions don’t go as far as Shaughnessy is extolling the virtues of the “new 
view”, he does conclude from his findings that increased community fees raise 
demand for housing (due to the expectation of future property tax savings) and thus 
have a positive effect on house prices.  An alternative and more plausible proposition 
                                                            
 
27 All models are first differenced equations 
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could be that an increase in expected or actual services could drive demand for 
housing in an area, however this conclusion was not drawn.  
Limitations 
A strength of Burge’s model is its simplicity and restricted data set.  Keeping 
in mind the only data inputs to Burge’s model are repeat sales data (sale price and 
date over a ten year period), size of the houses re-sold, county, impact fees applicable 
per county and inflation, there is the potential for omitted variable bias, with the 
model not relying on any other structural, locational or jurisdictional data.  The even 
stratification of the housing data within each county, together with the cut off limit of 
a minimum of 100 paired sales per annum does appear to overcome these concerns 
by virtue of the sample size.  Burge does not record his sample size however it is 
noteworthy that the population of Florida in 2003 was over 17 million people (US 
Census Bureau, 2014).  By inference, to replicate this model in Australia with a 
similar sized data set, virtually the whole country would need to form the study area.  
Burge implicitly assumes that house size equates to affordability, and that 
smaller houses are more affordable and larger houses are more expensive.  Whilst 
this assumption may hold in some instances, it takes no account of other house price 
drivers such as quality, or intra-county locational variables, such as inner city versus 
urban fringe housing.  Further, the affordability for moderate income households was 
not tested nor any data provided.  It is possible that this market segmentation may be 
a nuance of the Florida market that may not have external validity.   
The sample group provides evidence of a highly segregated market, with small 
(two bedroom), medium (three bedroom) and large (four bedroom) homes being 
almost evenly represented by number and the state wide average price for a large 
house being more than double that for a small house.  This may be representative of a 
previously unidentified cultural difference between US and Australian planning 
systems and development patterns.  Australian planning systems and development 
patterns generally seek to promote a range of housing choice within communities.  
Modern Australian master planned communities take a “salt and pepper” approach to 
house size to encourage community diversity.  However despite calls for greater 
housing affordability, a predominance of three and four bedroom housing remains.  
A survey of houses listed for sale in the greater Brisbane area at the time of writing 
indicate only 3% of houses with two bedrooms or less, 22% of houses with three 
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bedrooms, 41% of houses with four bedrooms and 33% of houses with five or more 
bedrooms (realestate.com.au, 2014)28.   
Other conclusions of Burge’s can be identified as  differences between the US 
and Australian housing markets that may flag a lack of external validity in his 
assumptions.  One such counter-intuitive conclusion is that the introduction of 
impact fees may actually increase supply due to a) reduced project approval costs 
payable by developers and b) by relaxing implicit limits on the percentage of 
development applications that are approved.  For the introduction of impact fees to 
have positive effects on supply, it can be inferred that in the absence of impact fees 
(which are set out in public schedules in the US) that developers suffer greater 
uncertainty in the approval process, which is likely to be priced in by way of higher 
profit and risk factors such as uncertainty driven house price increases, which 
supports the Australian developer’s arguments in relation to infrastructure charges 
increasing house prices (See Urban Development Institute of Australia, 2007).  The 
second part of Burge’s supply enhancing conclusion implies that a large proportion 
of development applications in Florida are refused, due to some unstated growth 
control limitations.  Growth limiting policies are not a feature of the vast majority of 
housing markets in Australia29.  The other key conclusion that cannot be transferrable 
to Australia is Burge’s (and Shaughnessy’s) assertion that impact fees increase the 
demand for housing because they reduce home buyer’s expected future property tax 
liabilities.  As Australia does not have an equivalent property tax regime, any house 
price impact in Australia due to infrastructure charges that is identified by this study 
would be in evidence against this “new view”.  
These comments are not a limitation of Burge’s work as such nor does it take 
anything away from Burge’s findings.  Rather it highlights differentiating features of 
the Florida and Australian markets that should be taken into consideration when 
analysing Burge’s conclusions and considering the external validity of this model. 
                                                            
 
28 Houses for sale in the Greater Brisbane region as at February, 2014 as listed on 
www.realestate.com.au 
29 Noosa in Queensland is one notable exception.  
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3.9.2 Burge and Ihlanfeldt  2006 
In this publication, Burge and Ihlanfeldt refine Burge’s thesis model by adding 
further suburb level stratification to his panel, whilst also estimating the effects of 
impact fees on house construction (supply).  The panel of small, medium and large 
homes across Florida is further categorised into:  central cities, inner suburbs, outer 
suburbs and rural area.  This addition overcomes some of the limitations of the 
earlier model.  The 41 counties that comprise the panel are identified as: 19 central 
counties (which contained a city centre), 15 suburban counties or “outer suburbs” 
and 7 rural areas. The 19 central counties were further refined into “central cities” 
and “inner suburbs”.  
The house price model remains unchanged but for the additional stratification, 
with the same reported house price effect findings as the thesis model.  
In both his thesis and journal publication, Burge also runs a supply model 
estimating the effect impact fees have on housing supply.  The results indicate that 
community fees increase supply of all house sizes within inner suburbs (where the 
majority of Florida’s population resides) with the greatest increase in small houses;  
and increase the supply of medium and large homes in outer suburbs. This increase 
in supply is concluded to be due to these community impact fees:  increasing the 
demand for housing in those areas, increasing the number of projects obtaining 
development approval and reducing approval costs, despite increasing the total fees 
payable by the developer.  As with the thesis, population growth and income 
variables per county were added to the model but not found to have significant 
effects.  It still appears possible that an omitted variable such as change of policy (eg 
urban consolidation), change of buyer preferences (inner city gentrification), 
increased land releases in inner areas (in fill development), increased demand for 
affordable home ownership (facilitated by the predatory lending practices rife in the 
US prior to the global financial crisis) or other demand shifts could explain these 
observations.  
In their own words, from a supply perspective together these models “strongly 
contradict conventional wisdom as well as prior empirical evidence” (Burge and 
Ihlanfeldt, 2006, p304).  If this study can generate evidence of on passing of impact 
fees in Australia where no property taxes exist, then this may refute the “new view” 
conclusions of Shaughnessy and Burge.  
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3.10 EVANS-COWLEY AND RUTHERFORD 
Professors Jennifer Evans-Cowley and Ron Rutherford have published two 
empirical studies on the effects of infrastructure charges on house prices.  The first 
was with Fred Forgey in 2005 and the second was with Tom Springer and Larry 
Lockwood in 2009.  The data from both of these works was sourced from Evans-
Cowley’s 2000 thesis30.   As both of these works are journal articles, less detailed 
archival evidence is available from which to base analysis.  These are however valid 
contributions to the evolution of impact fee based house price models.  
3.10.1 Evans-Cowley, Forgey and Rutherford 2005 
In this research Evans-Cowley, Forgey and Rutherford (2005) seek to provide 
evidence of the price effect of impact fees on vacant residential lots as well as 
undeveloped land31.  They use a pooled cross-sectional panel of 43 Texas cities with 
impact fees, across the metropolitan areas of Dallas, Fort Worth, Austin and 
Houston.  1999 valuation assessment data is used for a sample set from which was 
derived 48,805 vacant residential lots and 5,425 vacant land parcels.   
This study is included for its contribution to the literature in relation to 
developed residential lots, given it is the subdivision of englobo land into individual 
lots that triggers the impact fee liability.  Works on this topic tend to focus on the end 
house price, as the actual house price is the final cost of the good (shelter) to the 
consumer (home owner) and is the link to the housing affordability debate.   
Contribution 
As indicated above, Evans-Cowley et al.’s (2005) contribution is to evaluate 
empirically the relationship between impact fees and the value of land (both 
subdivided and englobo) across cities while controlling for property characteristics 
and market conditions.  Given this thesis is focused on the passing-on effects to 
house prices, only the lot effects will be included in this analysis. 
                                                            
 
30 Evans‐Cowley’s thesis titled:  “Evaluating the equity, efficiency and effectiveness of development 
impact fees” did not seek to measure the price effects on housing.  It was supervised by Larry L. 
Lawhon.  (See Evans, 2000).    
31 Refer to Chapter 1 Definitions for clarification on use of the terms Lot and Land within this thesis.  
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Model and Variables 
Four models are estimated: a hedonic model, a fixed effects model and two 
random effects models, one with and one without latitude and longitude controls.  
The hedonic model takes the usual form and incorporates the following variables: 
	 ௜ܸ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵܣ௜ ൅ ߚଶܣ௜ଶ ൅ ߚଷܫܨ௜ ൅ ߚସܩ௜ ൅ ߚହ ௜ܲ ൅ ߚ଺ܥ௜ ൅ ߚ଻ܯ௜ ൅ ߚ଼ܫ௜ ൅ ߚଽܮ௜ ൅ ݑ௜		      3.15 
Where   
Vi,  =  natural log of the assessed market value of lot i 
A  =  area of the lot (square feet/1000) 
A2  =  area of the lot (square feet/1000) squared 
IF  =  impact fee in thousands of dollars per typical lot 
G =  city population annual growth rate 
P = average city housing price per square foot 
C = housing construction cost estimate per square foot 
M  =  city property tax rate 
I  =  mean city income  
L = latitude and longitude in thousands 
u  =  error term 
 
Given the annotated form of published works, little explanatory information is 
provided in relation to the study area and its selection, the nature of its market 
conditions and these independent variables.  Information on the derivation of vacant 
lots and the applicable impact fee is provided and is commented on further under 
Limitations and Observations.  Notably this regression was run without city 
dummies.  
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The fixed effect model took the form: 
௜ܸ௝ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵܣ௜௧ ൅ ൅ݑ௜௝		  3.16 
Where   
Vi,  =  natural log of the assessed market value of lot i in city group j 
Fit  =  a vector of attributes describing lot i in city j:  area of the lot 
(square feet/1000), area of the lot (square feet/1000) squared 
and impact fee in thousands of dollars per typical lot 
u  =  error term 
 
The random effects model took the following form, using the generalised least 
squares (GLS) approach over the traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) method.  
As this method is deemed to overcome the multi-collinearity of the city-invariant 
variables dropped from the fixed effect model, these re-enter the model: 
௜ܸ௝ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵܣ௜௧ ൅ ൅ݑ௜௝		  3.17 
Where   
Vi,  =  natural log of the assessed market value of lot i in city group j 
Fit  =  a vector of attributes describing lot i in city j:  area of the lot 
(square feet/1000), area of the lot (square feet/1000) squared 
and impact fee in thousands of dollars per typical lot, city 
population annual growth rate, average city housing price per 
square foot, housing construction cost estimate per square foot, 
city property tax rate and mean city income. (Latitude and 
longitude included for model 3 and excluded for model 4)   
u  =  error term 
 
Findings 
Evans-Cowley et al. (2005) provide regression results for all for models, but 
present the findings only for model 4.  The price effect of impact fees on developed 
vacant lots is statistically significant and positive at 0.01297 indicating that for every 
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$1,000 in impact fees (dollar amount used in model), lot values increase by 
approximately 1.3%.   
Evans-Cowley et al.’s conclusions in relation to lot value increases appear to 
be consistent with Yinger’s (1998), Shaughnessy’s (2003) and Burge’s (2005) new 
view. They conclude that increases in lot prices are not due to increased demand, but 
rather the expectation of lower future property taxes than would have been possible 
without the impact fees.   
Limitations and Observations 
Some of the observations made about this model are a function of not having 
the benefit of a full description of the study area, data and methodology as with the 
full theses associated with prior analysis.  
The assumptions made about vacant lot data set and the calculation of impact 
fees for inclusion in the model is confounding.  The data set includes any vacant lot 
within city limits smaller than three acres (approximately 1.2 hectares).  Given the 
relevant city impact fee is applicable for lots under half an acre (approximately 2,000 
sqm), the authors estimate the applicable fee based on the number of lots these larger 
lots could be subdivided into.  A ratio of 3.5 lots to the acre is used.  Given that these 
larger lots were yet to be subdivided and hence no impact fees yet levied upon them, 
the question remains as to why they were not classified in the other sub-set as land, 
to which a developer may seek to pass the fee back to.   No information is provided 
as to how many observations in the lot sub-set this methodology was applied to.  
This might be an explanation for why the findings from this research were so low in 
comparison to earlier works.  
Evans-Cowley et al. (2005) provide regression results for all for models, but 
present the findings only for model 4.  Examination of the regression results for the 
hedonic model (model 1) indicates it had similar predictive qualities to model 4.  
Indeed, each of the four models produced similar results:  positive fee impact (1.1% - 
1.5%), t-statistics (4.5 to 7.4) and adjusted R2 (0.2156 - 0.3065).  This suggests 
evidence of the value of the hedonic technique despite its reported limitations.  
The final model (model 4) excluded any locational variables.  Given this was a 
study of four major metropolitan areas within Texas, being Dallas, Fort Worth, 
Austin and Houston, this study could have been enhanced by considering the effects 
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of impact fees on lot prices in each of these markets.  The inclusion of city and/or 
country dummies would have enabled stratification of the findings to determine if 
differential effects exist between these diverse housing markets. Latitude and 
longitude variables were included in model 3, however these seem somewhat 
inappropriate as they are continuous variables, thereby bearing inherent order among 
them.  By using a coordinate system, they assess values that can be meaningfully 
ordered (this is a continuous variable), when a priori we have no assumption of how 
the cities of Dallas, Fort Worth, Austin and Houston are ordered with respect to 
pricing of houses.  An alternate approach could code each city as dummy variables, 
and see if there are any differences between prices in these cities.  In their present 
form, the authors assume that moving from north to south will change the house 
prices in the same linear fashion regardless of whether we move from Dallas to 
Austin or Dallas to Houston. Similarly, under the current specifications, moving 
from Houston to Dallas will have the same impact on house prices as moving from 
Dallas to Austin.  
The authors utilise a cross-sectional methodology which captures only data 
from one year (1999 in this instance).  Such cross-sectional models run the risk of 
returning biased results due to omitted variables and factors unobservable in a static 
model.  The much lower adjusted R2 for the models in this work compared to the 
earlier models could be a reflection of this methodology.  
3.10.2 Evans-Cowley, Lockwood, Rutherford and Springer 2009 
In this study Evans-Cowley, Lockwood, Rutherford and Springer (2009) 
examine the price effect of impact fees on new and existing houses in 63 cities in the 
Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area (Texas), 38 of which use impact fees and 25 of 
which do not.  A cross-sectional two-step treatment effects model is employed on a 
data set of 5,572 new and 40,848 existing house sales in 1999.  
Contribution  
Evans-Cowley et al. (2009) extend the standard hedonic pricing model in two 
ways.  First, they include cities that have no impact fee system in place as a control.  
Second, they introduce a latent choice variable, which is related to several variables 
presumed to affect the decision of a city to set up an impact fee.  The theoretical 
basis for this evolution is implied at best.  This two-step treatment-effect approach 
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accounts for the endogeneity of the choice of a given city to impose impact fees, 
suggesting it produces more reliable estimates of the impact fee effect.   
Model and Variables 
A cross-sectional hedonic pricing model with a two-step treatment effects is 
employed.   The first step comprises a number of stages to generate the appropriate 
inputs into the final model.  The initial step is in the usual hedonic form: 
௜ܲ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚଶܬ௜ ൅ ߚଷܮ௜ ൅ ߚସܦ௜ ൅ ݑ௜,௧  3.18 
Where 
Pi  =  the natural log of the house sale price i  
S  =  Structural characteristics of the house:  days on the market; 
size of house (square feet divided by 100),  number of 
bedrooms, bathrooms and fireplaces, pool and garage dummies 
(1 yes, 0 no), occupancy dummy (1 vacant, else 0), rental 
dummy (1 rental, else 0), lot size dummy (1 if lot is greater 
than half an acre, else 0), age of home, age dummy (0-2 years 
for new homes, 3-5 years for existing homes), seasonal dummy 
L = Locational characteristics of the house:  county dummy 
J  = Jurisdictional/Regional attributes:  job growth rate, number 
of years since fees introduced, impact fee ($’000), city tax 
rate 
Di  =  Treatment effect dummy:  1 for houses in impact fee cities, 
else 0 plus jurisdictional other price driver dummy’s (see next 
equation) 
u  =  error term 
 
As with their previous works, nominal explanation is provided regarding the 
selection of variables.   No locational variables are included other than at a county 
level. 
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Next, controls are introduced for any self-selection bias and endogeneity of the 
decision to impose impact fee, variable D.  This variable is introduced to 
accommodate sales price differences between houses located in cities with and 
without impact fees not captured by the prior step hedonic variables. This process 
adds the following treatment effect variables to the regression:    
ܦ௜∗ 	ൌ 	ߚସ ௜ܶ ൅ 	ݑ௜ 3.19 
Where: 
Di  =  treatment effect dummy used in the initial hedonic model   
Ti =  treatment effect variable: all jurisdictional variables from the 
initial equation plus other jurisdictional price driver 
dummies:  city population (divided by 10,000), average 
population growth rate (past five years times 100), labour 
force (divided by 10,000), property tax revenue per person, 
municipal debt per person  
u  =  error term 
 
The final part of this first step is to use the coefficient output from these earlier 
two models to estimate the inverse Mills ratio for each observation32.   The second 
step utilises GLS estimates (correcting for heteroskedasticity) to regress the 
following final model: 
௜ܲ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚଶܬ௜ ൅ ߚଷܦ௜ ൅ ߚସܫܯܴ௜ ൅	ݑ௜   3.20 
Where 
Pi  =  the natural log of the house sale price i  
S  =  Structural characteristics of the house 
J  = Jurisdictional/Regional attributes  
Di  =  treatment effect dummy 
                                                            
 
32 Evans‐Cowley et al., (2009) cite Heckman’s 1979 two‐step approach. 
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IMR = inverse Mills ratio 
u  =  error term 
 
Findings 
Regression results for All houses, New houses and Existing houses are 
presented.  For all houses (pooled) the results indicate that every $1,000 increase in 
impact fee lead to a price increase of 3.728%, or $7,893 for an average house price of 
$144,033, or a price multiplier of 5.37 when the impact fee lag is incorporated (as 
measured by the years since fee variable is introduced).  The results for new and 
existing homes differ when examined separately with a price multiplier for new 
homes of 1.76 compared to 6.03 for existing homes.  The authors state the reported 
results are statistically significant, however it is difficult to gauge if results are weak 
or strong as no t-values or p-values are provided. 
The authors make an important observation on the nature of impact fee on 
passing and house price growth.  They observe that in a rising market, the on or over 
passing of impact fees is masked by the general appreciation of house prices, and yet 
will compound the negative wealth effects in a falling market.  They conclude that 
“even though impact fees are a viable public financing alternative, they are best 
associated with a growing market” (Evans-Cowley et al., 2009, p188).  This is the 
first such conclusion to appear in the literature.  This may be due in part to the post 
GFC climate in which this research was written, and is supported by recent 
reductions in impact fee schemes throughout the US as evidenced in Mullen (2012) 
and in various Australian jurisdictions.   
Limitations and Observations 
This research explores more advanced econometric techniques to earlier 
studies, and its findings are consistent with the theory of on and over passing, 
however the presentation of the model is unclear and the rationale for selection of 
variables is unknown with little explanation provided.  For example, the theoretical 
basis for inclusion of variables such as the number of years since fee introduced, 
occupancy dummy, days on the market etc are not explained.  The model states it 
controls both for the unique characteristics of houses and contrasting growth features 
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of cities, however and with no locational variables incorporated, any spatial 
differences within counties are not adjusted for.   
A further limitation of this work is its use of only one year of house sales data.  
The authors acknowledge that this is sub-optimal, however they suggest that 1999 
was “a typical year” (Evans-Cowley et al., 2009, p191).    Growth in the Texas 
median house price for the period 1991 – 2007 was cited in evidence of this, being 
4.5% for that full 16 year period and 4.9% in 1999 the median year.  The years either 
side of the study period however displayed higher than average growth, being 5.8%, 
5.0% and 6.2% in 1996, 1997 and 1998 respectively and 11.1% in 2000.  State wide 
house price growth dropped to below the long term average in 2002 – 2004.  An 
alternate interpretation of these statistics is that the years 1996-2000 were a period of 
high growth, or boom conditions.  Further if price growth of 4.9% was evident in the 
study period, this was not controlled unless through use of the seasonal dummy, 
however this was not disclosed.  
This paper is another example of how one must take care with interpretation of 
results.  The authors note that non-impact fee cities have a much higher average 
house price for the full sample.  On closer examination, this holds true for existing 
homes, but not new homes.  The authors suppose this to be is due to sufficiently high 
tax bases in those localities.  An alternate and perhaps more intuitive reason could be 
that existing homes predominate in mature established suburbs in inner ring locations 
that are well serviced, whist new homes tend to develop in newer suburbs on the city 
fringes away from employment centres where land is cheaper and community 
building lags house construction.  Stratification of the data set through inclusion of 
distance variables (such as those Mathur employed) may have enabled this effect to 
be better explained and perhaps provided further explanation for the high price effect 
findings for existing housing in this study. 
In summary, the work by Evans-Cowley et al.(2005 and 2009) add to the 
literature on the use of hedonic (and other) house price models to estimate the effect 
of impact fees on house prices in the US.  Variations on the usual variables are 
incorporated particularly in the later work, but unfortunately the theoretical basis for 
which is not provided.  
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3.11 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter has been to detail the archival research component 
of this exploratory sequential instrument development mixed method research 
project.  In doing so it examined each of the US studies since the early to mid-2000’s 
on the topic of house price effects of infrastructure charges.  The purpose of this 
phase of research has been to find evidence of external validity of these prior studies 
as well as any methodological evolution.  This analysis has been performed to assess 
the methodological suitability of such extant models to estimate the impact of 
infrastructure charges on house prices in Australia.  In doing so it has provided a 
systematic review of the relevant international econometric house pricing models 
concerned with infrastructure charges. 
This archival research has unpacked the econometric techniques employed, 
identified the contribution of each model, and hence informs specification of the first 
model of its kind in Australia to estimate the impact of infrastructure charges on 
house prices.  This chapter has informed the third research question of this thesis, 
considering whether international empirical models can be used to assess the impact 
of infrastructure charges on the price of housing in Australia.  Data gathered in this 
archival process is further analysed in the following chapter, and supplemented with 
data gathered in the final phase of this qualitative Stage 1 research.     
Specifically, this chapter documented the findings from the archival research 
component of this research and was designed to inform the third research question of 
this thesis:  
3. Can international empirical models be used to assess the impact of 
infrastructure charges on the cost of housing in Australia? 
Further analysis of data is required in responding to this research question and 
this is provided in Chapter 4.  
A number of US empirical studies on the house price effects of infrastructure 
charges were sourced and analysed with a view to identifying the strengths and 
limitations of each model, and hence form the basis for specification of the first 
model of its kind in Australia.  This analysis included examination of the 
specification and functional form of model, the study area, its contribution, the 
assumptions made, findings and conclusions.  
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This archival research examined key works from six author groups that 
researched the impact of infrastructure charges on house prices in the US. The 
complexity of econometric housing price models evidences itself in these studies by 
the range of different theories adopted, variables utilised and their role as to how they 
explain or relate to housing price.  An observation of these models is that they 
appeared to have developed contemporaneously, with the various methodologies 
having evolved in isolation of the other studies of the day. The rationale behind 
various model selection is rarely explicit and one can infer it may only have its roots 
in data type and availability.   
It was found that whilst each author group utilised the established hedonic 
house price model theory, there is little consistency between the models employed or 
the data sets utilised.  Specification appears dependent upon data availability rather 
than sound theoretical grounding.  However, as noted in the literature, this is a 
characteristic and limitation of econometric modelling.  Hedonic methodology 
formed the basis for each of the models and alternate econometric techniques were 
also tested and resulted in comparable findings.  Often the alternative and more 
complex techniques did not result in findings of significance and only the basic 
hedonic results were reported and analysed.  
This systematic review of the extant models therefore suggests there is limited 
evidence of the evolution of a preferred model.   They also suggest that the 
comparatively simple form of the standard hedonic regression remains effective for 
estimations of the house price effects of infrastructure charges.    
The following chapter presents the findings from Stage 1 of this research and 
further addresses the third research question as to whether international models may 
be suitable to assess the impact of infrastructure charges on the cost of housing in 
Australia.  It triangulates the findings from the literature review, this systematic 
analysis of the extant models as well as the results of the semi-structured interviews 
that are detailed further therein.   
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Chapter 4: Stage 1 Findings 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Further to the literature review in Chapter 2 and the archival research in 
Chapter 3, this chapter forms the final phase of Stage 1 of this research project.  This 
chapter synthesises the findings from the archival research phase, details the semi-
structured interview phase and findings, and triangulates these to conclude the 
qualitative component of this thesis and provide detail on the key themes that have 
emerged.  In doing so, it sets the framework for the Stage 2 component which seeks 
to specify, test and apply an econometric model that will estimate the house price 
impacts of infrastructure charges in Australia for the first time.  
The preceding chapter detailed the findings from archival research into extant 
econometric models that estimate the house price effects of infrastructure charges.  
Whilst the findings from these studies demonstrated a consistency in outcomes to 
support the hypothesis of over-passing, the approaches and rationales varied 
significantly.  The purpose of that analysis was to seek to uncover a preferred 
methodological approach for use in the Australian context.  Whilst that analysis lead 
to the conclusion that a hedonic approach may be suitable, other questions remained 
unanswered such as:  availability of data and appropriateness of variables employed;  
study area selection; the underlying characteristics of the US housing market in 
comparison with the Australian market mechanisms; and other institutional impacts 
such as the effects of property and personal taxation regimes.    
This chapter further analyses these extant studies.  It also incorporates the data 
from the semi-structured interview process that was designed to complement the 
archival research component, and thus fill the gaps in the analysis.  In doing so it 
draws together the findings of Stage 1 of this mixed method research focusing on 
five key areas:  independent variable analysis; study area selection; model 
specification; on-passing ratio calculation and comparative features of US and 
Australian housing markets.  These findings complete Stage 1 and are a contribution 
to knowledge in themselves.  These findings are then used to inform the remainder of 
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this work, wherein the methodology for empirical study into the house price effects 
of infrastructure charges in Australia will be designed, tested and applied.  
 
4.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLE ANALYSIS 
This section provides further analysis of the choice of independent variables 
and thus data requirements of each of the models examined in the previous chapter, 
grouping these under the hedonic approach headings of Structural, Locational and 
Jurisdictional factors.  The purpose of this analysis is to provide an audit of the range 
of independent variables utilised and thus potential data requirements for any 
Australian study.  This analysis will demonstrate the vast extent of data collected for 
some of these models, and conversely how little is required for others.  The outcome 
of this analysis is a key theme associated with independent variable selection.  This 
theme provides a basis for the selection of independent variables for use in the Stage 
2 instrument design and quantitative data analysis.  
4.2.1 Structural Characteristics  
Table 4.1 indicates the structural data on housing used by each author group 
analysed as part of the archival research component.  Only variables included in the 
final model are included.  Surprisingly, house size, house age and a time dummy are 
the only data field consistent across each model.  Campbell sits at one end of the 
spectrum, having collected data on a very wide range of housing structure 
characteristics, Mathur is at the other end of the spectrum with very few housing 
structure data requirements, with the remainder somewhere in the middle.   
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Table 4.1   
Structural Characteristics Data   
Structural Lawhon Shaughnessy Mathur Campbell Burge Evans- 
Cowley et 
al.2009 
Sale price x x x x x x 
Sale date x x x x x x 
Sale type (arms length)  x  x x  
Lot size x x x x  x 
House size x x x x x x 
Year house built/age x x  x x x 
Bedrooms x x x  x x 
Bathrooms x x x   x 
Fireplaces Y/N   x x  x 
Basement Y/N    x   
Pool Y/N    x  x 
Garage Y/N      x 
No. Storeys    x   
Building Quality   x x   
Prior sales  x   x  
Time dummy x x x x x x 
Days on Market      x 
Zoning  x   x  
Land Use  x   x  
Vacant Y/N      x 
Tenanted Y/N      x 
Irregular property 
f t
 x  x   
House configuration    x   
No type of fixtures    x   
Exterior  construction, 
Heating method, Fuel 
Type, Roof Material, 
Estimated lifespan 
remaining, Flooring 
material, Foundation 
method, Interior walls, 
Roof structure, 
Building Frame, Air 
conditioning 
   x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
  
Source:  Author 
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4.2.2 Locational Characteristics  
The locational characteristics data incorporated by each author are indicated 
below in Table 2.  Again there is significant divergence between models and the 
locational factors the authors consider to impact house prices.  This time it is Mathur 
that captures the most locational data and Evans-Cowley et al. again the least.  This 
may be due to a number of factors other than omitted variable bias.  It may be an 
indication of a highly segmented market in Mathur’s study area where house prices 
are highly variable due to accessibility issues.  Evans-Cowley et al.’s study area may 
be more homogenous from an accessibility perspective.  Care must be taken not to 
introduce multicollinearity into the model through the introduction of superfluous 
variables.  The other three authors all captured “Suburb” data, which may be 
adequate to capture the locational characteristics at a macro level.  A number of 
studies incorporated GIS data which is deemed superior to the latitude/longitude 
coordinate system (as in Evans-Cowley et al.) in that it allows for the distance 
between two points to be computed and thus addresses spatial autoregression. 
Table 4.2   
Locational Characteristics Data   
Locational Lawhon Shaughnessy Mathur Campbell Burge Evans- 
Cowley et 
al.2009 
GIS data  x x x   
Street Address  x x x x  
Suburb  x x x x x 
Post code  x x x x  
County  x x x x  
Location dummy  x  x x x 
Unique identifier  x  x x  
View Quality   x    
Traffic Noise   x    
Travel time to CBD   x    
Accessibility/ distance to 
nonretail and retail jobs by car 
  x    
Auto Accessibility   x    
Transit Accessibility   x    
Distance to Urban centres  x x x   
Distance to urban growth 
boundary 
  x    
 Chapter 4: Stage 1 Findings 125 
Locational Lawhon Shaughnessy Mathur Campbell Burge Evans- 
Cowley et 
al.2009 
Road Zones    x   
Proximity to Amenities    x   
Miles of country roads, School 
Enrolments, Acreage of parks, 
Library services, No Police and 
fire stations, No. Fire hydrants 
   x 
x  
x 
x 
x 
  
Source:  Author 
 
4.2.3 Jurisdictional Characteristics  
The jurisdictional or demographic characteristic data used for each of the study 
areas is indicated in Table 4.3 below and again there is a wide variance in data 
collected.  This table is somewhat confusing when incorporating the two and three 
stage models of Burge and Shaughnessy respectively.  Despite this, it can be seen 
how different authors attempted to incorporate the supply and demand features of the 
study area in to the house pricing equation.  Supply is incorporated in data such as 
building approvals and house completions, whilst demand factors are captured in 
data such as population growth and income and so forth.  Infrastructure charge data 
is incorporated in this group, and it is interesting that only Mathur matches this with 
data on municipal expenditure.  The only other consistent data set across all studies is 
the construction cost index.  Shaughnessy and Campbell are the only author to 
consider lag effects, however both theories appear flawed.  It would seem 
appropriate to lag infrastructure charges given they are levied at the time of planning 
approval, many months if not years before the house is completed and sold.  
Shaughnessy lags a number of variables by the two months between contract signing 
and settlement, however his new view theory contends that buyers are aware of the 
relevant infrastructure charge at the time of contract signing and knowingly price this 
into their purchase price.  This assumption is inconsistent with the fundamental basis 
of infrastructure charges being levied at the time of planning approval, not house 
completion.  Campbell lags property tax (millage) rates by one year “in order to 
control for potential endogeneity between infrastructure charges and millage rates.” 
(Campbell, 2004, p74)  It is unclear whether this is an attempt to allow for the time 
between infrastructure charges being levied and the completed house being sold.  
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Table 4.3   
Jurisdictional Characteristics Data   
Jurisdictional Lawhon Shaughnessy Mathur Campbell Burge Evans- 
Cowley et 
al.2009 
Increase in median house hold 
income 
  x x   
Per capita income  x   x  
Census block group  x     
Population      x 
Population change of city   x x  x 
Population change of county   x x x  
Building approvals in City   x    
Building approvals in County   x    
House completions  x   x  
House removals  x     
Number of households  x     
Unemployment rate   x    
Labour Force   x   x 
Job growth rate      x 
Property and violent crime rate   x    
Construction cost index x x x x x  
Short term interest rate  x     
30 year mortgage rate x x x    
Total Infrastructure charges x x x x x x 
Other Infrastructure charges   x x   
Water and Sewer infrastructure 
charges 
    x  
Non Water and Sewer 
infrastructure charges 
    x  
Years since fee introduced      x 
Fee charged Y/N      x 
Property taxes  x x x  x 
Debt per person      x 
Municipal expenditure per 
capita 
  x    
Expenditure per pupil   x    
Inflation  x   x  
Expected rate of future house 
price appreciation 
 x     
Median selling price in region x      
Housing price index  x  x   
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Jurisdictional Lawhon Shaughnessy Mathur Campbell Burge Evans- 
Cowley et 
al.2009 
Rent of primary residence  x     
% Black, % Hispanic  x     
% Rental  x     
Lag  2 months for 
most. 1 year 
for prop tax 
 1 year 
for prop 
tax 
1 year 
for IF 
 
Source:  Author 
 
4.2.4 Thematic Conclusions 
The purpose of the above has been to critically analyse the independent 
variables selected for use in the various extant models.  This has been necessary 
because the decision making for selecting of independent variables for inclusion or 
exclusion is rarely made explicit.  Often, the reader must infer what the study area 
house price drivers are by examining the independent variable list.  For example, 
Shaughnessy’s model includes a variable for percentage of Black and Hispanic 
residents.  It could be inferred that this feature is a factor in house prices in his study 
area.  Conversely, readers are also left to infer why other variables that are 
commonly linked with house prices are omitted, for example only Mathur’s model 
includes a variable associated with unemployment.  As previously indicated, the 
choice of explanatory characteristics is often determined largely by data availability 
(Hill, 2012) and if key data is not available at the requisite scale for the study area, it 
is helpful to the reader, and to avoid the suggestion of omitted variable bias, if such 
data issues are made explicit.   
Data availability may not be the only driver of the diversity of these models.  
Given the spatial heterogeneity of housing markets, perhaps rather than being a slave 
to theoretical models, the researchers have implicitly incorporated drivers of local 
house prices.  For example in a very cold climate, good heating would be favoured 
by purchasers, as would the opposite in a hot climate.  Similarly, other factors such 
as government policy may drive house prices such as the First Home Buyers Grant 
scheme in Australia.  
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Sirmans, MacDonald, Macpherson and Zietz (2006) examine these data 
selection effects across a number of house price models in the US.  Firstly they 
suggest there are nine characteristics that appear most often in hedonic pricing 
models for detached dwellings, being:  house size, lot size, age of the house, number 
of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, garage, swimming pool, fireplace, and air 
conditioning.  Sirmans et al. (2006) research confirms that if the estimated 
coefficients vary by geographical location, time, type of data, and model 
specification, the results show that the estimated coefficients for some characteristics 
vary significantly.  
Hence, the existing models may lack external validity not only outside of the 
US, but even outside of their study area.  This research confirms great care must be 
taken to ensure the study areas are sufficiently similar, as well as the market 
fundamentals, before a pre-existing methodology is replicated in another jurisdiction.   
It is therefore imperative that the researcher has a thorough understanding of the 
local housing market drivers in the selected study area and that models are specified 
to incorporate such features of the market.  It is also helpful for researchers to fully 
articulate data collection issues to avoid suggestions of omitted variable bias when 
data is not available.  
4.3 SELECTION OF STUDY AREA, DURATION AND SCALE  
This archival analysis of the existing US econometric models has been useful 
for the purposes of identifying relevant selection criteria for the study area, study 
duration and scale of the sample set.  These are not clearly stated in the majority of 
the models, and appear to be implicit assumptions.   
Analysis of the models detailed in the previous chapter give little 
enlightenment as to the study area or durations selected.  Study areas in each instance 
are major metropolitan centres (or the full state as with Burge) that charge impact 
fees.  The studies vary in length from 1 year (Evans-Cowley et al.) and 15 years 
(Shaughnessy), with infrastructure charges being introduced before the start date for 
some studies and after the start date for others.  With the exception of Evans-Cowley 
et al. (2009) no rationale is provided for study durations, apart from the implication 
that those are the periods that data was available for.  This is an unsatisfactory 
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finding and gives little guidance on the selection of study areas or durations for any 
subsequent works.   
The scale of the study is determined somewhat by the duration i.e. more 
records over a longer time period.  These studies showed considerable variance from 
the smallest (Lawhon:  760) to the largest (Campbell: 279,321).  Hence the size of 
the available data set in itself does not appear to be a key selection criterion.   
Further, whilst some studies examined the impacts on all housing, no 
comparisons were made between the proportions of new to existing homes, with 
some studies having high new to existing ratios, indicating a rapidly growing and 
changing housing market likely to have increased requirements for new 
infrastructure (Campbell 1 new:1.7 existing); whilst others had comparatively low 
new to existing house ratios indicating a well established housing markets with 
perhaps lower demands on new infrastructure (Mathur 1:10.5).   
4.3.1 Thematic Conclusions 
This archival analysis of the existing US econometric models has been useful 
for the purposes of identifying relevant selection criteria for the study area, study 
duration and scale of the sample sets used in the extant studies.  Unfortunately the 
selection criteria for each of these items are not clearly stated in the majority of the 
models.  One is left to infer selection criteria from general discussion.  Perhaps this 
finding is consistent with Meen’s (2002) theory of data driven models, with study 
area, duration and scale being a function of what data is available, rather than any 
firm theoretical premise.  
One relevant market feature that was common to all studies was the presence 
of higher than average population growth in each of the study areas.  Therefore, it is 
this criterion that is deemed to be the overriding factor in study area and duration 
selection, over scale, or proportion of new to existing housing.  This analysis will 
assist in identifying potentially suitable study areas (and durations) for this 
Australian research and other future research. 
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4.4 MODEL SPECIFICATION 
As previously established, hedonic regression methodology of varying 
functional forms, is well established for this type of analysis, however a number of 
these authors elected to also incorporate additional econometric techniques.  Lawhon 
utilises linear hedonic regression only.  Mathur combines semi-log hedonic 
regression with instrumental variable approach with comparable results.  
Shaughnessy employs linear hedonic and double log repeat sales methods, again with 
comparable results.  Campbell specifies two identical models, one linear hedonic and 
one semi-log hedonic, with vastly different results of which he only reports the linear 
hedonic findings.  Burge utilises a two stage model with the first stage generating a 
linear repeat sales index, the natural log of which becomes an independent variable 
in the second stage fixed effects and random trend models that appear to produce 
similar result.  Evans-Cowley et al.’s (2005) study on lot prices employs four semi-
log models:  a hedonic, a fixed effect and two random effect models each with 
similar results and strong significance; only the fourth model is reported on despite 
the hedonic model having a higher Adjusted R2 = 0.3065.  Evans-Cowley et al.’s 
(2009) study on house price impacts utilises a semi-log hedonic model and a 
treatment effect model as inputs into a second stage semi-log hedonic model to 
produce a single set of results.  
4.4.1 Thematic Conclusions 
This evidence suggests that despite various attempts at overcoming the 
limitations of basic hedonic models, the results in the literature are relatively 
consistent and more complex econometric forms may not add any additional 
accuracy to the estimation of the house price impacts of infrastructure charges.  
Hence, hedonic analysis may remain appropriate for future studies, with only its 
functional form open to debate. Further, the existing models and literature give little 
indication as to the preferred functional form.  Indeed, Delaney and Smith (1989a, 
p46) noted:  
“Hedonic theory is deficient with respect to the a priori 
specification of the “best” functional form of the hedonic model to be 
used in analysis of a particular market (Halvorsen and Pollakowski, 
1981).  It is possible that several functional forms perform equally well in 
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predicting price when fitted to a set of data.  As Butler (1982) noted, 
“researchers who have compared alternative functional forms for 
hedonic indexes of housing have found little basis for choosing one form 
over another” (p 97).  Consideration of the nature of capitalisation of 
infrastructure charges suggest the use of a linear reduced form equation 
for estimating the hedonic model.” 
Thus despite the various functional forms employed by these 
authors, a simple linear reduced form equation may remain appropriate.  
4.5 ON PASSING RATIO ANALYSIS 
A variety of econometric methods and model specifications were evident in the 
US models.  These differences in approach and functional forms can make 
interpretation and comparison of findings difficult.  Difficulty in comparison 
between models is also compounded by the variances in the adopted functional form, 
prevailing average house price, treatment of regression results and presentation of 
findings.   
For ease of comparison, this research has derived an “on-passing ratio” to 
enable consistency in the interpretation and comparison of findings.  This is the ratio 
of infrastructure charge to house price effect (increase).  Any ratio in excess of 100% 
is evidence of over passing of the infrastructure charge to the house buyer, with a 
ratio of less than 100% being evidence of under passing.  A ratio of 0% would 
indicate no passing of infrastructure charges to home buyers.  The on-passing ratio 
expressed in the following expresses the infrastructure charge driven house price 
effect as a dollar amount for each additional $1.00 of infrastructure charge charged, 
however due to variations in functional form, care must be taken comparing results 
between studies.  The numbers in parentheses herein are the regression result 
coefficients for infrastructure charges for each model.  
Lawhon  
Whilst Lawhon’s (2004) findings for infrastructure charges were not 
statistically significant (t=0.4672), for demonstration purposes the on-passing ratio 
will be calculated.  Given Lawhon’s model is linear, the correct interpretation is: 
Δy=β1Δx. That is, if you change x (infrastructure charge) by one (dollar), we’d 
expect y (house price) to change by β1 (infrastructure charge co-efficient) (Kephart, 
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2013).  However as the infrastructure charge is a dummy variable in this instance, the 
dollar amount of the fee drops into the denominator.  Lawhon’s model produced an 
infrastructure charge coefficient β =1661, for an infrastructure charge of $1,182.  
Hence, the on passing ratio is 141% (=1661/1182*100) albeit not statistically 
significant in this instance.  
Shaughnessy 
Given Shaughnessy’s (2003; 2004) hedonic model incorporates a linear 
functional form and the infrastructure charge is a continuous variable, the correct 
interpretation of the coefficient outputs is Δy=β1Δx.  That is, if you 
change x (infrastructure charge) by one (dollar), we would expect y (house price) to 
change by β1 (infrastructure charge co-efficient) (Kephart, 2013).  Shaughnessy’s 
(2003; 2004) model produced an infrastructure charge β=1.64 for new and β=1.68 for 
existing housing.  Hence, the on passing ratio is 164% (=1.64/1*100) for new and 
168% (=1.68/1*100) for existing housing.   
Turning to his repeat sales methodology which employs a log-log functional 
form, an average house price in the study area is $100,000 for both new and existing 
homes, the correct interpretation of the coefficient outputs is  %Δy=β1%Δx.  That is, 
if x (infrastructure charges) changes by one (percent), we’d expect y (house prices) to 
change by β1 percent. Shaughnessy’s (2003; 2004) repeat sales model produced an 
infrastructure charge β=1.67.  Hence the on passing ratio for existing houses using 
the repeat sales method is 167% (=0.0000167 * 100,000), which is not different from 
the findings using the hedonic methodology. 
Mathur  
Given Mathur’s (2003) thesis equations are semi-log models, the correct 
interpretation of the coefficient outputs is: %Δy=100⋅β1⋅Δx	(Kephart, 2013).		That is 
if x (infrastructure charges) change by one (dollar), we would expect y (house prices) 
to change by 100⋅β1 percent.  Mathur’s (2003) model produced an infrastructure 
charge β=6.76e-6 for all houses and β=1.23e-5 for high quality new housing, where an 
average house in the study area was $200,000 for all houses (i.e. with no quality or 
type differentiation). Hence the on passing ratio is 135% (=6.76e-6 * 200,000) for all 
and 246% (=1.23e-5 * 200,000) for high quality new housing.   
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Turning to his instrumental variable regression methodology, the on passing 
ratio for all new houses using the instrumental variable regression method is 138% 
(=6.92e-6 * 200,000*100) which is not significantly different from the findings using 
the hedonic methodology. 
In Mathur et al.’s 2004 article, using the same regression results (coefficients) 
he stratifies the average house prices of $246,000 and $291,000 for all and high 
quality houses respectively, generating different on-passing ratios of 166% 
(compared to 135%) and 358% (compared to 246%) for all and high quality houses 
respectively.  This demonstrates how when non-linear specifications are used, it is 
inappropriate to interpret the “headline” on-passing ratio as a linear relationship.  As 
this effect will change dependent upon the predominating average house price in the 
study area.  Therefore care must be taken in interpretation as it is inappropriate to 
extrapolate these findings into other jurisdictions where the underlying housing 
market may be different.   
Campbell 
Campbell (2004) runs two hedonic models, one in linear form and one semi-
logarithmic.  Considering first the linear model for the full data set of new and 
existing houses, the correct interpretation of the coefficient outputs is Δy=β1Δx 
(Kephart, 2013).  That is, if x (infrastructure charges) change by one (dollar), we’d 
expect y (house prices) to change by β1.  Campbell’s (2004) model produced an 
infrastructure charge β=1.43 for new houses and β=1.07 for existing houses.  Hence, 
the on passing ratio is 143% (=1.43/1*100) for new and 107% (=1.07/1*100) for 
existing housing.   
For the semi-logarithmic version of the full data set for new and existing 
houses, the correct interpretation of the coefficient outputs is: %Δy=100⋅β1⋅Δx.		That 
is if x (infrastructure charges) change by one (dollar), we’d expect y (house prices) to 
change by 100⋅β1 percent and hence the on passing ratio is 429% (=5.91e-5 * 72,000) 
for new and 246% (=5.97e-6 * 72,000) for existing new housing.  Clearly the findings 
between these two methods differ considerably, however Campbell does not provide 
any discussion on the findings from his second equation, nor the relatively low 
adjusted R2 for all but the last model: 0.12 new linear, 0.25 new semi-log, 0.19 
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existing linear and 0.65 existing semi-log.  These findings may be considered weak 
apart from the existing semi-log model.  
Burge 
Burge (2005; Burge and Ihlanfeldt, 2006) estimates a two-way (area and time) 
fixed effect (“FE”) semi-log hedonic model and a random trend (“RT”) model.  For 
Burge’s FE model, the correct interpretation of the coefficient outputs is 
%Δy=100⋅β1⋅Δx (Kephart, 2013).  That is, if we change x (infrastructure charges) by 
one (dollar), we’d expect y (house prices) to change by 100⋅β1 percent.  Burge’s 
model produced an infrastructure charge β=5.4e-6 for all houses, β=5.76e-6 for small 
houses, β=7.53e-6 for medium houses, β=5.81e-6 for large houses.  Hence the on 
passing ratio for all houses is 72% (=$134,000 average house price*0.0000054), 
small houses is 42% (=$73,000*0.00000576), medium sized houses is 91% 
(=$121,000 *0.00000753) and large houses is 134% (=$230,000*0.00000581).  
These calculations are derived from Burge and Ihlandfeldt (2006) as not all summary 
statistics are provided in the PhD version.  They are similar to Burge’s (2005) 
reported findings of $0.39 for small, $0.82 for medium and $1.28 for large homes.  It 
is assumed that Burge uses all housing in his data set (pooled new and existing). 
The RT findings are similar to the FE findings, however none are statistically 
significant and thus calculation of the on-passing ratio adds little to this discussion.  
Evans-Cowley et al. 
Evans-Cowley et al.(2009) is the only study to provide calculation details to 
assist with interpretation of their co-efficients:   
“The coefficient on the Years Since Fee variable is 0.0013 and the 
average Years Since Fee for all homes in fee cities equals 7.62. 
Therefore, for the average home in fee cities, the effect of a $1,000 
infrastructure charge equals 3.728% [exp(0.0267 + 7.62 x 0.0013) – 1 = 
e0.03661 - 1], which translates to a house price increase of $7,893 (0.0372 
x $144,033 x 1.47), a percentage difference of 5.48% and a price 
multiplier of 5.37 ($7,893/$1470).  
The effects of infrastructure charges differ between new and 
existing homes. The infrastructure charge coefficient is 0.0311 for new 
homes versus 0.0268 for existing homes. The sign on the Years Since Fee 
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variable is negative for new homes (_0.0031) and positive (0.0023) for 
existing homes, suggesting differences between the short-run and long-
run effects of infrastructure charges. Consider the average new home 
selling for $210,054 in a ‘‘fee’’ city 7.33 years after the fee is imposed in 
the city (i.e., the new home sample averages). For the average new home, 
a $1,000 infrastructure charge causes sales prices to increase by 0.84% 
[exp(0.0311 - 7.33 x 0.0031) - 1]. This translates to a price increase of 
$3,035 for the average new home, with an average infrastructure charge 
of $1,720. Thus, for new homes, the average percentage change and price 
multipliers are 1.44% and 1.76%, respectively.” p185 
Similarly, an on-passing ratio of 603% is calculated for existing houses.  
4.5.1 Thematic Conclusions 
As demonstrated in a number of these examples when non-linear specifications 
are used, it is inappropriate to interpret the “headline” on-passing ratio as a linear 
relationship.  The house price effect will change dependent upon the predominating 
average house price in the study area only.  Hence the on-passing ratio is an output of 
such models, and it may be inappropriate to use such ratios to approximate effects in 
other jurisdictions.  This conclusion further underscores the importance of 
undertaking separate research in Australia on this topic so as to correctly estimate the 
house price effects of infrastructure charges and thus inform industry and policy 
makers.   
 
4.6 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
As detailed in Chapter 1, Stage 1 of this research project incorporates a 
qualitative mixed methods approach that incorporates an exploratory sequential 
instrument development design.  The approach triangulates the literature review, 
with archival research and semi-structured interview process.  This approach was 
designed to ensure a detailed and systematic review of prior works on this topic was 
undertaken and that any information gaps due to incomplete or dated studies, or 
limited access to information could be overcome with interview data from the semi-
structured interviews (Berg, 2009).  Specifically the purpose of the semi-structured 
interview phase is to provide a deeper level of insight into implicit assumptions in 
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the model and data selection process, as well as insight into the functionality and 
characteristics of the US housing markets and Australian housing markets that are 
relevant to econometric model design and assumptions. 
Potential US interviewees were selected from prior author lists identified as 
part of this research, and other published experts in the field of the house price 
effects of infrastructure charges (impact fees). Criteria for selection of the 
interviewees included: 
 Have authored (or co-authored) empirical studies on the house price 
effects of infrastructure charges in the past decade and these works 
resulted in findings of significance; or 
 Were acknowledged industry experts in the field of housing 
development and infrastructure charges; and  
 Were available for interview during this researcher’s three week study 
tour of the US in September, 2012. 
Interviewees were recruited primarily via direct email approach, with email 
addresses sourced from internet searches of academic profiles.  Face-to-face 
meetings with the interviewees were arranged subject to the interviewee’s 
availability. The majority of interviews were held in the interviewees work place, 
with the remainder occurring at one of two US conferences the author attended and 
presented at being the:  2012 International Conference on Construction and Real 
Estate Management (Kansas City) and the 2012 Growth and Infrastructure 
Consortium (Atlanta, Georgia).  
Interviewees were questioned broadly on the local context surrounding their 
models, selection of independent variables, implicit assumptions made, housing 
market structure matters, the interpretation of results and other related items.  The 
interviewees included:   
 Dr Tim Shaughnessy, Associate Professor, Louisiana State University 
Shreveport, Economics/Finance Department, Louisiana 
 Dr Shishir Mathur, Associate Professor, Urban and Regional Planning, San 
Jose State University, California 
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 Dr Gregory S. Burge, Associate Professor, Economics, University of 
Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma 
 Dr Douglas Campbell, Instructor, Department of Economics, University of 
Memphis, Tennessee  
 Professor Fred Forgey, Professor of Finance, UTA College of Business, 
Director, Graduate Real Estate Programs, UTA Fort Worth, Texas  
 Professor Ron Rutherford, Professor of Finance, University of South Florida, 
Tampa, Florida 
 Professor Thomas M. Springer, Professor of Finance and Real Estate, 
Associate Director, Richard H. Pennell Center for Real Estate Development, 
Clemson University Clemson, South Carolina 
 Professor Arthur C (Chris) Nelson, Presidential Professor of City and 
Metropolitan Planning, Director of Metropolitan Research, College of 
Architecture + Planning, University of Utah,  Salt Lake City, Utah 
 Professor Julian C. Juergensmeyer, Professor and Ben F. Johnson Jr. Chair in 
Law and Director, Center for the Comparative Study on Metropolitan 
Growth, Georgia State University College of Law, Atlanta, Georgia 
 Professor Vicki Been, Professor and Director Furman Center for Real Estate 
and Urban Policy, New York University School of Law, New York, New 
York  
 Mr Clancy Mullen, Executive Vice President, Duncan and Associates, 
Houston, Texas;  Convenor Growth and Infrastructure Consortium; author 
annual National Impact Fee Surveys; and webmaster for 
www.impactfees.com. 
Dr Larry Lawhon was not contacted for interview as he did not meet the 
selection criteria.  Professor Jennifer Evans-Cowley did not respond to requests for 
interview, however three of her co-authors were interviewed.  
The purpose of these interviews and discussions was to supplement the 
archival research analysis of the existing models for the purposes of better 
understanding the external validity of these prior studies.  Each interview lasted for 
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one to two hours, being a combination of questions associated with their published 
works and free flowing discussion on similarities and differences between the US 
and Australian housing markets and economies in general.  Questions relating to 
their research focused on implicit assumptions, approach and methodology, selection 
of independent variables, access to data, data collection issues and suggestions for 
future research.   
Australian (Queensland) property development experts were more widely 
available for interview given the author was based in Brisbane, in proximity to the 
study area/s.  The purpose of the interviews with Queensland property development 
experts was similar to that for the US experts in relation to housing market 
functionality, development fundamentals, and the prevailing infrastructure charging 
regime.  These interviews were less formal in nature, with the focus of the questions 
being in clarification of the author’s own knowledge of the market33.  This process 
ensured bias was not introduced into the analysis.   Interviews were a combination of 
face to face interviews and telephone interviews.  Due to the potentially politically 
sensitive nature of this study, the identity of all Queensland interviewees was 
withheld.  The interviewees were a combination of industry professionals and 
government officers.  
The data gathered in these interviews has informed a thematic analysis of the 
structure of the US housing markets to those in Brisbane, Australia.  This enabled the 
identification of key similarities and differences in the two housing markets and 
institutional factors that impact underlying assumptions associated with 
functionalities of housing markets and thus specification of house price models.  The 
data from these semi-structured interviews inform the remainder of this chapter and 
are an important component in the formation of thematic conclusions and the overall 
contribution of this research. 
 
                                                            
 
33 The author has 20 years experience in the Brisbane residential development industry.  
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4.6.1 Features of US Infrastructure Charge Schemes 
The literature review in Chapter 2 indicated that infrastructure charging 
regimes differ not only from country to country, but in many countries, including 
Australia, it varies from State to State, and in countries such as the US may even 
differ between neighbouring local jurisdictions (counties).  Further, an important 
outcome of the archival research was identification of the need to gain an 
understanding of the features of the US housing market when considering the 
application of these models in the Australian context.  Hence, an understanding of 
the key features of the infrastructure charging regime in each study area is important, 
as it is relevant when making comparisons between jurisdictions.   
When making international comparisons, it is also important to be aware of any 
underlying structural differences in the respective housing markets and taxation 
regimes, to take any relevant factors into account when comparing the methodologies 
and results of prior studies.  This is particularly relevant for this research, where the 
findings of theoretical and empirical international works form the basis of the next 
quantitative stage of research.   
Preliminary phases of this research identified that the US and Australian (and 
in particular, Queensland) infrastructure charging systems contain some similar 
features, as well as critical differing aspects.  Understanding these similarities and 
differences are important to ensure assumptions made in the model specification 
process are appropriate for the study area context.   
The main purpose of the semi-structured interview process was to aid in the 
understanding and analysis of the data already gathered by the archival research.  
Triangulation of the semi-structured interview data with that gathered from the 
archival research and the literature review has enabled a number of key themes to be 
identified that inform the specification of the model to be developed and applied in 
Stage 2 of this research.  These key themes focus on the similarities and differences 
in both the US and Australian infrastructure charge systems and housing market 
functionality.  These themes are important as they highlight to the researcher areas 
where external validity of prior models exists, and areas where study area specific 
adaptation is required.  These themes are tabulated in Table 4.4 and discussed in the 
text following.  
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Table 4.4   
Key features of the US and Australian Infrastructure Charge Regimes  
Feature US34 Australia (Queensland) 35 
Time fees levied Upon planning approval or building 
permit 
Upon planning approval 
Time fees paid On platting of lots On sealing of lots 
Fees levied by Local jurisdiction (city or county) Local jurisdiction (local authority) 
Basis for charge Rational nexus and proportionality test 
as well as benefiting the new residents 
who paid for it. However often not 
representative of the marginal cost 
Full cost recovery of the marginal 
cost of infrastructure determined via 
a Priority Infrastructure Plan.  
Other development 
costs 
Exactions Conditioning 
Housing market Strong growth to 2008.  Fuelled by 
predatory sub-prime lending (Hudson, 
2011).  Housing market crash post 
2008 
Strong growth to 2008. Sub-prime 
lending virtually non-existent in 
Australia (RBA, 2012).  Housing 
market stable post 2008 
Fee increases  Frequent and high fee increases via 
scheduled increases 
Fees negotiated at development 
approval are escalated by inflation 
each year.  Adhoc additional annual 
fees can be levied.  Negotiated fees 
increasing rapidly 2003 – 2011.  
Scope of fees 
payable 
Water, sewerage, power, storm water, 
public transport, roads, parks, schools, 
police and law enforcement, fire 
services, government services 
Water, sewerage, power, storm 
water, public transport, roads, parks, 
libraries. Schools, police and law 
enforcement, fire services and 
government services are provided at 
a state level funded by general state 
taxes. 
Certainty of fee 
amounts and 
increases 
Fee amounts scheduled by county/city 
each year, with annual increases 
announced in advance of coming into 
effect 
Opaque, fully negotiated system with 
fees increasing rapidly pre- 2011.  
(Productivity Commission, 2011) 
                                                            
 
34 It is acknowledged that wide variances may exist between jurisdictions and infrastructure charge 
schemes across the US.  Unless otherwise indicated, the features noted herein are based on the 
study areas documented in the archival research, being parts of Texas, Florida and Washington and 
information provided by the interviewed authors.  
35 Consistent with the selected study period this analysis pre‐dates the Sustainable Planning (Housing 
Affordability and Infrastructure Reform) Act, 2011 that introduced maximum charges for a three year 
interim period.  
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Feature US34 Australia (Queensland) 35 
Property taxes Annual charge to home owners to fund 
city/county services.  Similar to 
council rates in Australia, but much 
more expensive to cover the wider 
range of services provided at a city or 
county level 
Nil generally for residential property.  
Council rates are payable to provide 
capital for the services provided at a 
local level.  Land Tax (State tax) is 
not generally payable on residential 
land.  
Nature of home 
building industry 
Land development and home building 
carried out by the same entity.  Buyers 
purchase completed home. 
Land developers generally separate 
from diverse home building market. 
Majority of new home buyers 
purchase land separately and then 
enter into construction contract with 
third party builder. 
Average house 
price  
Seattle, Washington $246,000 in 2003 
Texas $149,000 in 1999 
Florida (Orlando) $72,000 in 2002 
Florida (Dade county) $100,000 in 
2003 
Florida (all) $230,000 in 2004 
 
Brisbane, Queensland $305,000 in 
2004 (ABS, 2013) 
Fee amounts $900 - $5,726 Reported to be between $15,000 and 
$40,000 in 2010 (Productivity 
Commission, 2011) 
Source:  author, interviewees 
 
As can be observed from the table above, the key similarities between the US 
infrastructure charge and Australian infrastructure charge systems are that both fees 
are levied by local authorities on property developers as a condition of planning 
approval and payable at the end of development when the lot is created (“platting” in 
the US or “plan sealing” in Australia).  The definition and application of 
infrastructure charges and impact fees are therefore sufficiently similar for them to 
be considered interchangeably for the purposes of this research36.  The underlying 
principles of nexus, rationality and proportion are also alike although policies for full 
cost recovery are varied.  Fees/charges are not the only developer expenses in both 
countries, with developers often also required to contribute either land or other in-
                                                            
 
36 Some authors would argue that infrastructure charges are wider reaching, being a financial 
measure of all externalities (impacts) on the community (Been, 2005).   
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kind works as a condition of the development approval.  This is commonly termed 
“exactions” in the US and “conditioning” in Queensland.  These works are 
sometimes able to be offset against infrastructure charges/impact fees in both 
countries and are negotiated on a case by case basis.  Hence they are either excluded 
from the US models (explicitly or implicitly), as is the explicit intention with this 
dissertation. The market conditions in each jurisdiction were strong in the period 
leading up to the global financial crisis (pre-2008), with house price growth and 
increases in infrastructure charges a common feature37.   
Key differences in two the systems are the services for which the fees can be 
levied.  In the US, a far greater range of services are provided at a city or county 
level such as police, schools and fire services.  In Australia, infrastructure charges 
are levied primarily for local utilities and services only.  This feature is discussed 
further in the following paragraph in relation to property taxes.  Another key 
difference is the certainty of the fee amount:  in the US these fees are set and 
scheduled with data publicly available; in Queensland the provisions of the 
Integrated Planning Act, 1997 (and its 2003 amendments) and the Sustainable 
Planning Act, 2009 require fees to be charged in accordance with a local authority 
Priority Infrastructure Plan (“PIP”).  Whilst the intention of the PIP process was to 
provide transparency, their complexity instead drove uncertainty with rapid, steep 
and unforeseeable increases resulting in charges being negotiated privately between 
developer and local authorities and varying greatly from project to project38.  Whilst 
State legislation requires Queensland councils to maintain an infrastructure charge 
register, the data contained lacks sufficient detail to be interpreted in a meaningful 
manner.  It is the observation of this author that difficulties in accessing regional 
level data on infrastructure charges would appear to be a key factor as to why this 
type of research has not previously been carried out in Australia.  
                                                            
 
37 With the exception only of Mathur’s (2003) Snohomish county which did not produce findings of 
significance.  
38 As at October 2010, Gold Coast City Council was the only local council in Queensland with a PIP in 
place (Nicholls, 2011).  
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Other key differences between the US and Queensland fee regimes stem from 
institutional differences.  One of these is the levels of government and the services 
provided by each.  The US has four levels of government being: federal, state, county 
and city.  The majority of economic and social infrastructure services are provided at 
a county or city level, funded by property taxes levied on property owners.  These 
taxes are a significant occupancy cost and are explicit to the service/amenity 
provided.  For example, your children may only attend a school in the city/county in 
which you live and pay for through your property taxes.  It is these property taxes 
and the services they provide that form the basis of the “new view” associated with 
on passing of infrastructure charges discussed previously39.  Within a metropolitan 
area, there may be a number of “cities” for which the level of services/amenity varies 
greatly, with resident access determined by their home address.  Clearly some 
counties/cities are better funded than others and are able to provide a higher level of 
service/amenity.  It follows that these neighbourhoods are more desirable, with 
residents willing to pay higher house prices to live in these well serviced locations.   
In contrast, Australia has three levels of government:  federal, state and local 
authority.  Responsibility for social infrastructure (schools, hospitals, fire and police 
services) lies mainly at a state level funded through consolidated revenue raised 
through general state taxes.  Only local economic infrastructure (utilities, roads, 
public transport etc) are funded at a local authority level, which residents pay for via 
council rates, and these do not vary significantly between jurisdictions.  The effect of 
this is that every resident in the State of Queensland has access to essentially the 
same level of services and amenities and hence proximity to one service/amenity 
over another is not a primary decision making factor for the majority of households.  
Further, jurisdictions in Queensland are very large, and each usually discrete to a 
metropolitan centre.  The capital city of Brisbane is the only exception to this, with 
the Greater Brisbane region spanning five local government areas.   
The nature of the new housing market also differs significantly between the 
two countries.  Firstly, the Australian new house market is dominated by a few 
                                                            
 
39 Refer to section 2.6.3.2 for a description of the “new view” 
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corporatised land developers, and multitudes of cottage home builders.  Land estates 
are heterogeneous with planning authorities having little appetite for repetition of 
similar looking housing product within estates.  It is the land developers that are 
responsible for payment of the infrastructure charges, and enjoy a return on cost 
(profit) commensurate with the risk undertaken in purchasing the land, navigating the 
often extended approval process, obtaining finance, commissioning the requisite civil 
works together with marketing and selling the completed (vacant) lots.  House 
builders operate on low margins, building non-standardised homes either 
speculatively or under contract to the end home owner.  Multiple house builders 
generally operate on any one subdivision. Consistency in housing design and 
materials used in an estate is determined by the land developer and enforced with 
builders through covenants.  In contrast the US new housing system is dominated by 
home builders who subdivide the land, build standardised housing for sale to end 
users.  This feature of the two markets is important in data analysis and in the 
differentiation of a New versus an Existing house for data categorisation purposes in 
Australia and is discussed further in Section 5.4.1.   
Secondly, the US housing market appears highly segregated as previously 
discussed in Section 3.9.1, with two, three and four bedroom homes being almost 
evenly represented by number and the Florida state wide average price for a four 
bedroom house being more than double that for a two bedroom house.  Modern 
Australian master planned communities take a “salt and pepper” approach to house 
size to encourage community diversity.  However despite calls for greater housing 
affordability, a predominance of three and four bedroom housing remains.  A survey 
of houses listed for sale in the Greater Brisbane area at the time of writing indicate 
only 3% of houses comprise two bedrooms or less, 22% of houses comprise three 
bedrooms, 41% of houses comprise four bedrooms and 33% of houses comprise five 
or more bedrooms (realestate.com.au, 2014,)40.  Thus the Australian housing market 
could be said to be more heterogenous than the US from a house design perspective, 
                                                            
 
40 Houses for sale in the Greater Brisbane region as at February, 2014 as listed on 
www.realestate.com.au 
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but more homogenous from a housing size/product perspective, with larger homes 
being the predominating housing type in the study area.  
A further differentiating factor that has an effect on the housing markets of the 
two countries is the personal income tax system.  In the US, many personal expenses 
are tax deductible such as:  home loan mortgage payments and property taxes 
(Poterba and Sinai, 2008) where expenses associated with income producing 
properties are not.  The contrary situation exists in Australia, whereby no personal 
expenses associated with one’s principle place of residence are tax deductible, but a 
phenomenon called “negative gearing” encourages high income earners to purchase 
homes as an investment, with all expenses associated able to be tax deductible.  This 
feature of the tax system in Australia incentivises investment in the residential 
market with a reported 18% of tax payers in Australia being landlords (Rowland, 
2009).  
The final differentiating feature of the two housing markets is the level of fees 
and average house prices.  The average house price in the US models varied from 
$72,000 (Orlando, 2002) to $246,000 (Seattle, 2003), whilst the average house price 
in Brisbane at the same time was $305,000.  The average infrastructure charges in 
the US are low ($900 - $5,726) compared to Queensland ($15,000 - $40,000) and are 
thus a lesser proportion of the average house price at the same time.  
 
4.7 STAGE 1 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
It is appropriate to recognise the contributions of this Stage 1 qualitative 
research.  Its exploratory sequential instrument design mixed methods approach 
triangulates archival research with semi-structured interviews and literature review.  
This approach is consistent with established two-stage mixed methods theory (See 
Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007) and has enabled a detailed analysis of the existing 
body of work on the house price impacts of infrastructure charges.   
In relation to contributions to knowledge, firstly, this research has provided a 
systematic review of extant models.  Other reviews of these works provide 
summaries of the findings, contributions and limitations of each study, with the most 
recent review concluding with 2004 works.  This review has instead approached the 
analysis from an investigative perspective, analysing selection of the variables 
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employed and study areas selected by each author.  It has examined the wide 
variances in approach, study durations and data requirements, pondering the author’s 
choices from the perspective of a researcher seeking to uncover evidence of an 
evolution in the methodologies employed.  This evidence was not found.  Instead, 
this research has revealed that comparable and significant results can be generated 
from studies with both limited and numerous data inputs; from studies of long or 
short duration.  The one requisite factor appears to be strong growth in the study 
area, and yet that factor is in itself a contravention of the core assumptions for 
econometric models of normal growth.  In summary, this research has provided 
evidence that authors contemplating similar studies in other countries should not be 
deterred by the apparent extensive data requirements and complexity of some of 
these models.  This research suggests that simple form standard hedonic models, 
with relatively basic data inputs may produce significant and useful results.   
This research has also considered an interesting question for the applied 
econometrician:  which comes first, data or model specification?  Much like the 
“chicken and the egg” conundrum, model specification and data collation are an 
iterative process, rather than one based in theory, a process that appears to be remain 
largely undocumented.  The literature tells us that the choice of independent 
variables for use in house price models is often determined largely by data 
availability (Hill, 2012).  However, data availability may not be the only driver of the 
diversity of the models examined herein and the researcher must consider other 
factors.  Given the spatial heterogeneity of housing markets, perhaps rather than 
being a slave to theoretical models, the authors have implicitly incorporated local 
drivers of house prices in their data sets and model specification.  For example in a 
very cold climate, good heating would be favoured by purchasers, as would the 
opposite in a hot climate.  Proximity to quality amenities and services segment some 
housing markets, whilst more homogenous features prevail in others.  Other factors 
such as exclusionary or stimulatory government policy may drive house prices.  It is 
therefore imperative that the researcher has a thorough understanding of the local 
housing market drivers in the selected study area and that models are specified to 
incorporate such features of the market.  Hence, the US models in their existing form 
may lack external validity and great care must be taken to ensure the characteristics 
of study areas are sufficiently similar, as are the market fundamentals, before pre-
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existing methodologies are replicated and their findings and conclusions are adopted 
in other jurisdictions.    
The issue of comparison of the US findings has also been an important finding 
from this Stage 1 research.  In unpacking the methodologies, specification and 
functional forms of these models, it has become apparent that it is inappropriate to 
compare the findings of one model with another due to the varying functional forms.  
In order to address this gap in the literature, this research has highlighted the correct 
interpretation of various functional forms, and calculated on-passing ratios for all 
models.  This ratio facilitates the more appropriate comparison of model findings and 
highlights potential risks to researchers in the interpretation of findings.  
Finally, this research has provided a useful comparison of the key features of 
the US and Australian housing markets, infrastructure regimes and taxation systems.  
It has highlighted a number of similarities between the two countries, and equally 
importantly it has considered key differences in the functionality of the two housing 
markets and institutional factors.  These factors become important when considering 
the external validity of the US models into other markets, and the rationales provided 
for findings.  For example, a number of the more recent authors are supporters of the 
“new view” theory, which suggests that infrastructure charges do increase house 
prices, but that this is due to homeowners willingly capitalising the benefits 
associated with additional services and amenities into the house price, and thus 
saving on property tax increases in the future.  The link between house prices, access 
to quality services/amenities and property taxes is implied at best in most of this 
literature but is a strong underlying assumption of the new view.  However property 
taxes are not used as infrastructure funding mechanisms in all countries, and hence 
this assumption could not hold where property taxes (or similar) do not exist.  This 
new view does have its detractors in the US (see Been, 2005) and does not ring true 
in an egalitarian market where a relatively constant level of services and amenities 
are provided to all, funded from consolidated revenue, as in Australia.  Hence it is 
imperative that the researcher fully understand the drivers of house prices in the 
study area and ensure models are appropriately specified, and findings interpreted 
according to the local market conditions and local institutional factors.  Further 
research on the comparative features of these two housing markets and taxation 
systems would provide researchers and policy makers with insights into the relative 
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performance of housing markets in each country.  This could be particularly 
informative in the post GFC environment where the US housing market crashed and 
the Australian housing market remained stable.  
 
4.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter forms the final phase of Stage 1 of this research project, further to 
the literature review in Chapter 2 and the archival research in Chapter 3.  This 
chapter syntheses the findings from the archival research phase, details the semi-
structured interview phase and emergent themes, and triangulates these to conclude 
the qualitative component of this thesis.  In doing so, it sets the framework for the 
Stage 2 component which seeks to specify, test and apply an econometric model that 
will estimate the house price impacts of infrastructure charges in Australia for the 
first time.  
Specifically, this chapter has further analysed the information derived from the 
US literature, as well as that from the semi-structured interview process to consider 
whether the US and Australian infrastructure charging regimes and housing markets 
are sufficiently similar for the international empirical models to be used as a basis for 
assessing the impact of infrastructure charges on the price of housing in Australia.   
This research highlights the variances in data requirements for studies that 
essentially test for the same effect, which is the impact of infrastructure charges on 
house prices.  Some studies collect data in great detail, whilst others use only a 
selection.  In considering the external validity of any or all of these studies, one must 
consider that detailed data may not be readily available in all countries and/or 
jurisdictions.  This factor may be one reason why all available works on this topic 
come from the US where such data is relatively readily available, and yet the issue of 
developer paid infrastructure charges adversely affecting housing affordability exists 
in many developed and developing countries.  Other developed countries such as UK 
and Australia do have readily available data on housing markets, however their 
historically opaque infrastructure charging systems may have stymied attempts at 
such analysis in those countries to date.  
The main purpose of the semi-structured interview process was to aid in the 
understanding and analysis of the secondary data already gathered by the archival 
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research.  Interviewees were questioned on the local context surrounding their 
models and the selection of variables, implicit assumptions made, market structure 
matters and the interpretation of results and other related items.  Triangulation of this 
data has revealed a number of important factors that will inform specification of the 
model to be developed and applied in Stage 2 of this research.   
In identifying and analysing the similarities and differences of these models, as 
well as the fee schemes, housing market structures and taxation systems, this chapter 
has addressed the third research question of this thesis:   
3. Can international empirical models be used to assess the impact of 
infrastructure charges on the cost of housing in Australia? 
The findings from this qualitative stage of research suggest that the theoretical 
premise of international empirical models is relevant to house price models.  
However, due to structural and institutional differences in housing markets great care 
and skill must be employed by the researcher to ensure study area specific demand 
and supply side independent variables are appropriately selected and that the model 
is specified to be appropriate for local housing market characteristics.   
Further research on this topic in any jurisdiction will first need to establish 
what housing data, including infrastructure charge data is readily available and then 
gain an understanding of the nature of the study area housing market drivers to 
ensure models are correctly specified.  In saying that it is nonetheless apparent that 
even relatively sparse data can be sufficient for a functional model and that the 
theoretical bases for these models does have external validity. 
The analysis to this point ends Stage 1 of this research project.  As detailed in 
Section 1.5, Stage 1 was designed to address the first three research questions via a 
process of literature review, archival research and semi-structured interviews.  This 
process and the findings have been documented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 and are 
illustrated in Figure 1.4.1 overleaf.  
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Figure 4.1  
Thesis Outline 
 
Source:  Created by Author 
The remainder of this thesis now turns to the Stage 2 research component, and 
the final research question, whereby an appropriate econometric model is specified 
which seeks to estimate the price impacts of infrastructure charges on house prices in 
Brisbane, Australia.  In Chapter 5, the approach adopted, available data, study area 
and model specifications are detailed.  Chapter 6 provides the findings of Stage 2 of 
this research which provides the first estimate of its kind in Australia from which 
policy makers can base decisions upon.   Chapter 7 concludes. 
 
 
 Chapter 5: Stage 2 Data and Approach 151 
Chapter 5:   Stage 2 Data and Approach  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters have provided the Stage 1 research and findings for this 
research into the question of who really pays for urban infrastructure by examining 
the effect of infrastructure charges on house prices.  Chapter 1 established the 
significance of the research problem as having roots in both the housing affordability 
and infrastructure funding debates.  Chapter 2 presented the theory of on-passing of 
infrastructure charges and reviewed the literature, revealing no empirical evidence 
from Australian researchers despite the issue of infrastructure charge impacts on 
housing affordability being identified in many government and industry reports.  
However, a deep body of empirical work exists in the US from which to draw upon 
for this thesis.   
Chapter 3 described the first half of the archival research phase of this two 
stage exploratory sequential instrument design mixed method research.  It analysed 
the various different econometric techniques used by US researchers to estimate the 
price effects of infrastructure charges on house prices over the past decade.  Chapter 
4 completed the archival research phase, focusing on the independent variable 
selection, study area and study duration selection, and interpretation of findings from 
models with differing functional forms.  This past chapter also presented findings 
from semi-structured interviews with prior authors from which a comparative 
analysis of the US and Australian housing markets and taxation systems was 
presented.  Chapter 4 concluded with presentation of the Stage 1 findings and the 
contributions to knowledge from the qualitative exploratory stage of this research.   
Stage 1 of this research thus provided the thematic framework for the 
remainder of this work which will now design and apply an econometric instrument 
to estimate the effect of infrastructure charges on house prices in Brisbane, Australia 
for the first time.  
 152 Chapter 5: Stage 2 Data and Approach 
The remainder of this thesis now turns to the Stage 2 research component, and 
the final research question, whereby an appropriate econometric model is specified 
which seeks to estimate the price impacts of infrastructure charges on house prices in 
Brisbane, Australia.  This chapter describes the approach, model and data for this 
research project.  The next section, 5.2 explains the basis for the approach in this 
study.  The study area and study period are outlined in section 5.3, with the data and 
its source described in section 5.4.  This chapter concludes with details the 
econometric model specification adopted in section 5.5.  Chapter 6 provides the 
findings of this research which provides the first estimate of its kind in Australia 
from which policy makers can base decisions upon.   
5.2 APPROACH 
Technological advances in software packages and institutional data collection 
have made analysis of housing markets at a national, state, regional and metropolitan 
level a relatively simple process (Meen, 2001).  However, despite seemingly 
extensive institutional data capture, it is the availability of data that often drives 
model specification, rather than pure theoretical basis (Meen, 2002).  With model 
specification driven by the suitable econometric technique, let us begin by firstly 
selecting a suitable econometric technique.  Data availability will be addressed in the 
following section. 
5.2.1 Econometric Technique 
As demonstrated in the previous chapters, econometric models tend to become 
anything other than simple as they attempt to overcome ongoing limitations of data 
availability, model specification pitfalls and market function fundamentals.  The 
previous chapters outlined various techniques that have been employed in the 
literature over the past three decades in an attempt to estimate the effect of 
infrastructure charges on house prices.  In all cases, hedonic models formed the basis 
of the extant analysis, with other techniques employed such as repeat sales indices, 
stock flow models, instrument variable regression, fixed and random effects and 
treatment effects.  However in many cases, the more complex models provided 
insignificant findings and supplied no additional evidence over the basic hedonic 
method.  This evidence suggests that despite various attempts at overcoming the 
limitations of basic hedonic models, the results in the literature are relatively 
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consistent and more complex econometric forms may not add any additional 
accuracy to the estimation of the house price impacts of infrastructure charges.  
Hence it can be concluded that despite the numerous econometric model variations 
undertaken to date, no single technique has emerged as the preferred house price 
model over the basic hedonic methodology and that a simple linear form equation 
may remain appropriate. 
5.2.2 Approach Adopted 
As discussed previously, review of the empirical models used internationally to 
estimate the effect of infrastructure charges on house prices suggests that the use of 
an ordinary least squares (“OLS”) hedonic regression model is appropriate for this 
study.  The hedonic approach described in earlier chapters is a relatively 
straightforward method once the requisite data is acquired and transformed into the 
appropriate scale and format.  The relative simplicity of the hedonic approach is one 
of its strengths and hence why it has been in use since Rosen’s (1974) seminary work 
and forms the core of each of the prior studies described in Chapter 3.   
A linear hedonic regression model is appropriate for use in this research 
because: 
a) It is a well-established method of decomposing various housing 
characteristics into measurable prices and quantities; 
b) The interpretation of the effect of infrastructure charges on house prices is 
straight forward and not subject to misinterpretation; 
c) The traditional model can be adapted to incorporate independent variables 
suitable to reflect the characteristics of the local housing market and 
associated institutional factors that affect house prices; and 
d) A linear hedonic regression model that is specified for Australian market 
conditions is an advance over the existing literature, for which only US 
literature exist.  
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5.3 STUDY AREA AND STUDY PERIOD 
This study examines the effect of infrastructure charges on new and existing 
houses in Brisbane, Queensland, Australia.  Brisbane is the State capital of 
Queensland and is the major metropolitan centre of South-East Queensland which is 
Australia’s third largest metropolitan region.  South East Queensland is populated by 
3.1 million people, of which approximately 70% reside in the Greater Brisbane area, 
accounting for approximately half of the State’s population (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2012).  The Greater Brisbane population has grown rapidly over the 
decade to 2012, averaging 2.2% annually, or a total of over 440,000 new residents, 
bringing the population to over 2.1 million people.  Much of Brisbane and 
Queensland’s population growth is driven by overseas and interstate migration, 
which contributed approximately two-thirds of the state’s new residents in 2012 
(Brisbane Marketing, 2014). 
Consistent with Meen’s (2002) theory of data driven models, the study area 
selection is a function of the availability of data (or lack thereof).  The study period 
selected is also a function of the availability of data, together with the evolving 
nature of infrastructure charging legislation in Queensland in recent years.  The study 
period for this research is from 2005 to 2011.  This time frame co-incides with a 
period of high growth in population as well as in infrastructure charges.  It also 
corresponds with the dates for which the Priority Infrastructure Plan (“PIP”) 
provisions of the Integrated Planning Act 1997 were in effect.  The study period end 
co-incides with the late 2011 introduction of maximum adopted infrastructure 
charges.  This maximum fee regime set a fixed price by way of a maximum charge 
for the first time in Queensland, replacing the pre-existing full cost recovery PIP 
regime.  This 2011 legislation was designed to be an interim measure only, to be in 
place for three years while further reform investigation took place.  Hence, maximum 
“fixed” charges are potentially a short term feature only, and were forecast to change 
again within three years (Nicholls, 2011; Nicholls, Persign, and Lamb, 2011).  Thus 
the reasons why and end date of 2011 was chosen for this research are: the temporary 
nature of this maximum fee structure, the non-uniform transitionary period 
arrangements, and long project lead times meaning some projects undertaken after 
2011 may still be operating under old PIP approvals.  The start of the study period 
corresponds with the availability of data as described further in Section 5.4.4. 
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Data limitations also influenced the study area selection within Brisbane.  New 
development in Brisbane stretches along the major transportation routes to the north 
and south of the central business district and to a lesser extent the east and west due 
to geographical constraints.  The data used for this study includes a sample of 
suburbs in Brisbane’s northern growth corridor as well as the same in Brisbane’s 
southern growth corridor.  The northside study area sits in Brisbane’s outer northern 
suburbs, within the Moreton Bay Regional Council (South) local authority and 
incorporates the area formerly known as Pine Rivers Shire Council41.  The southside 
study area is located in Brisbane’s middle ring southern suburbs and is defined by the 
boundaries of the local government area “BCC (Yeerongpilly)”42 as defined by State 
Government records.  The terms “northside” and “southside” are familiar in Brisbane 
and reference a location depending on which side of the Brisbane River it is situated 
on.  The suburbs included in both the northside and southside study areas are 
outlined in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 respectively.   
The market conditions in each study area were similar for the duration of the 
study period.  Strong market conditions existed in the lead up to the global financial 
crisis in 2008/2009.  Government stimulatory policy came into effect in 2009 which 
sustained the local housing market, through a “soft landing”43 (Priemus and 
Whitehead 2014).  Prices of both new and existing houses in Brisbane have 
maintained positive growth over the post GFC period, albeit at declining volumes as 
indicated in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2.  
  
                                                            
 
41 In the 2008 local government amalgamations, the Moreton Bay Regional Council replaced three 
established local government areas:  the City of Redcliffe and the Shires of Pine Rivers and 
Caboolture.  
42 The Brisbane City Council (“BCC”) local government area is subdivided broadly into parishes for 
government data collection purposes. 
43 For details of the Federal Government’s First Home Owners Grant see Section 5.4.4  
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Figure 5.1  
Residential Land and Dwelling Prices - Brisbane 2001 - 2013 
 
Source: Queensland Government Statisticians Office (2014)  
 
Figure 5.2  
Residential Land and Dwelling Sales - Brisbane 2001 - 2013 
 
Source: Queensland Government Statisticians Office (2014) 
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5.4 DATA DESCRIPTION 
As discussed previously, it is access to required data sets that often drives 
model specification.  This section details the sources and nature of structural, 
locational, jurisdictional and policy data obtained, issues with data availability and 
the requisite assumptions made to enable analysis. 
5.4.1 Structural Data  
Full sales record data for all residential sales for the period 2003 – 2011 in the 
local government areas in this study was provided by Price Finder, a commercial re-
seller of the state and local government sales records.  This provided the structural 
data for all single unit (detached) house sales in the study areas over the study period.  
The structural data provided included:   
 address 
  real property description 
 lot size 
 sale price 
 sale date (contract date) 
 settlement date 
 number of bedrooms 
 number of bathrooms 
 number of carparks 
 zoning 
 sale type 
 land use and  
 buyer and seller details.   
Sirmans et al. (2006) identified the nine most used data categories for hedonic 
house price models as being:  house size, lot size, house age, number of bedrooms, 
number of bathrooms, and the presence of a garage, swimming pool, fireplace, and 
air conditioning.  Comparing the available data for Brisbane with Sirman et al.’s 
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(2006) most commonly used independent variables, it can be seen that lot size, 
number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, and the presence of a garage were able 
to be utilised.  Data on the size of the house and the age of the house were not 
available in the Brisbane data set, nor were data for the presence of swimming pool, 
fireplace, and air conditioning.  These factors do not render this dataset invalid.  
Sirmans et al.’s (2005) study on the composition of 125 hedonic house price models 
indicated that only approximately 42% of models incorporate house size; 25% 
included variables for the presence of a swimming pool, 47% for a fireplace and 30% 
for airconditioning,  However 63% incorporated an age variable, and this is 
important in this study particularly in the differentiation between new and existing 
housing.  How this categorisation was achieved in the absence of house age data is 
detailed over leaf in the discussion on the Lot, Existing house or New house 
categorisation. 
Recall also the findings from the Stage 1 qualitative process revealed that a 
model with few or many independent variables could result in significant findings.  
Thus given the data available comprises a reasonable match with hedonic house price 
literature, these variables are deemed appropriate for use in this study.  However data 
cleansing was required as detailed below.  
The Brisbane Sales data was cleansed to remove:  related party transactions, 
part sales, multiple transaction sales, and court order transactions as these sales are 
unlikely to reflect market value.  These were able to be identified via the “sale type” 
category.  Sales of multiple unit dwellings were removed, as were land uses that are 
incompatible with suburban single unit dwellings such as group title, rural, industrial 
or commercial uses, indentified via the “land use” category.  This removed any 
attached or detached housing that was identified as “group title” or “building units” 
for example townhouses and apartments respectively.  Sales in the top and bottom 
percentiles of sales prices and lot area were also removed:  sales less than $5,000 
and/or less than 100 sqm were removed; sales greater than $2 million and/or 
4047sqm (1 acre) were removed.  The zoning category was not used to cleanse the 
data set, as it was deemed not reliable as it appeared not to have been updated when 
planning approvals were achieved.  For example, new estates that had been 
developed were still zoned “future urban”.  This resulted in a data set of all single 
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residential house and vacant lot sales that had sold in arms length transactions in the 
Brisbane northside and southside study areas between 2003 and 2011.   
Each sale record was then categorised as either a vacant Lot, Existing house or 
New house.  This was necessary to split the data set by one of these three categories 
in order to identify any differential pricing effects.  The data categories used for this 
process were:  real property description, address, sale date and buyer and seller 
details.  The decision making criteria for this categorisation was somewhat complex 
due to the nature of the local house building industry and the fact that “house age” 
data is not available.   
In Queensland, land developers generally sell vacant lots to home buyers, who 
then enter into a construction contract with a house builder.  The vacant lot sale 
details are captured by government records due to the transfer of title, however the 
value of the combined “house and land package” when it is first constructed is not 
captured due to the private nature of the construction contract between the builder 
and the consumer.  An exception to this occurs when the builder constructs a 
“spec44” house and on-sells the completed new home to a home buyer and the full 
sale price is reflected in the sale price, however this is the exception rather than the 
norm, with significant transfer duty savings possible by the separate contract 
approach.  Hence in order to categorise the sales data, data rules were established: 
 Lot – an IF/THEN formula was used to categorise a sale as a Lot where the land 
use type in the sale record was “Vacant Urban Land” or “Vacant Large House 
Site” as categorised in the data set; 
 Existing v. New house – any house which sold (or resold) within four years of 
the initial lot sale was deemed to be a New house sale45.  Four years was selected 
as this provides time for pre-selling of the lot prior to registration of the lot, as 
well as construction of the house post registration of the lot, a holding period to 
                                                            
 
44 “Spec” is short for speculative where a builder buys the lot from a developer and builds a home 
“speculatively” upon it, with the intention of on‐selling it to a new home buyer.  
45 The contract date was used as this is the date the price is agreed between the parties and is used 
for initial mortgage security purposes. 
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avoid capital gains tax46 and a selling period.  Any house sale that did not meet 
these New house criteria, was categorised as an Existing house.  Hence an 
Existing house became any house sold more than four years after the sale of its 
vacant lot in either a new or established suburb.  Individual house sales were 
able to be identified via both their address and real property description (unique 
lot and plan number) which were provided in the data set.  The sales data was 
also checked by vendor to ensure any corporate house builder sales were 
correctly categorised as New even if a prior Lot sale had not been recorded.  
Whilst the study period commences in 2005, 2003 and 2004 sales data was 
included in the dataset.  This enabled the categorisation of New sales from the 
2003 and 2004 Lot data.  
Other relevant structural data provided with the data set was the lot area, 
number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms and number of carparks (eg. garage 
spaces) associated with each house sale.  Bedroom, bathroom and carpark data was 
missing for approximately one third of the data set.   The sales with incomplete data 
were removed. 
This resulted in a total Brisbane data set of 29,662 house sales, comprising 
4,699 new house sales and 25,053 existing house sales and 13,739 lot sales during 
2005-2011.  
5.4.2 Locational Data 
The sales data set supplied full address details for each sales record, including 
the suburb the house was located in.  Surprisingly in Sirmans et al,’s (2005) review 
of 125 hedonic house price models, only 7% included location variables, 12% 
included distance (from amenities, transportation, CBD etc.) variables and 8% 
included school district data.  These findings  could be due to the fact that many 
studies are of finite locations to start with, and hence no further sub-categorisation is 
deemed necessary.  Alternatively it could be due to the GIS data, which facilitates 
such analysis, only becoming readily available in more recent years. 
                                                            
 
46 Capital gains tax is not payable in Australia for a principle place of residence owned by an 
individual tax payer for greater than one year (Australian Government, 2013).  
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The study area used in this research incorporates a large part of the major 
metropolitan area in this capital city.  Sub markets exist across the city on both the 
northside and southside, and this location was deemed to be a significant independent 
variable for inclusion.  Location is often a proxy for other housing market drivers 
such as proximity to major transportation corridors, employment centres, good 
schools, flood prone areas (negative) or socio-economic factors.  GIS data can be 
used to generate data on such factors where available.  Unfortunately, no GIS data 
was available in the dataset sourced for this research to derive any proximity 
variables from.  How a “location” category could be incorporated from the available 
data as detailed below.  
As uncovered in the Stage 1 research, the US property tax system and access to 
the services it finances, is considered an important factor in many of the extant house 
price models that estimate the impact of infrastructure charges.  That is, a house in an 
area that has well funded services and amenities is more desirable.  Thus buyers are 
willing to pay more to live in those areas, than those which are less well serviced (ie. 
lower quality schools, roads, fire departments, law enforcement etc.)  This is in 
contrast to the egalitarian nature of Australian society where such services and 
amenities are largely funded by general revenue from State taxes and available to all 
residents.    
Both the Brisbane northside and southside study areas incorporate established 
suburbs as well as newly developing suburbs, with new and existing housing being 
close substitutes from a services and amenities perspective.  That is, all suburbs in 
the study areas have access to essentially the same level of basic utilities, roads, 
schools, public officials, law enforcement, fire and community services.  Each study 
area includes only one local authority sub-area.  This is a characteristic particular to 
the Queensland market, where very large local government areas exist47.  The local 
authority sub-areas were selected as they are roughly consistent with the catchment 
areas for housing markets, assuming residents wish to buy within a desired locality.  
It is acknowledged that substitutability at the fringes with the neighbouring sub-areas 
                                                            
 
47 For example, the Brisbane City Council area is some 1,380 square kilometres. 
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will exist to some extent, however as this is a two-way effect, it is fair to assume a 
net zero outcome.   
Whilst in theory, all residents have access to the same level of services and 
amenities regardless of the suburb they live it, housing markets do vary within the 
study areas, with some suburbs in the study areas being more or less desirable than 
others.  In order to take such factors into consideration the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics’ (“ABS”) “Index of Relative Socio-economic Advantage and 
Disadvantage” (“IRSAD”) has been utilised48.  This index summarises information 
about the economic and social conditions of people and households within an area, 
including both relative advantage and disadvantage.  This index provides a 1 – 10 
rating at a suburb level as a relative measure of socio-economic advantage and 
disadvantage.  A low score indicates relatively greater disadvantage and a lack of 
advantage in general.  A high score indicates a relative lack of disadvantage and 
greater advantage in general (ABS, 2013).  This 1-10 suburb rating has been used in 
this study as a proxy for the desirability of a house’s “location”, with a score of 10 
being a highly desirable location for house buyers, and a score of 1 being a less 
desirable location for house buyers.  It therefore follows that one would expect house 
prices to be higher in the more desirable suburbs, and lower in the less desirable 
suburbs by virtue of the nature of the suburb as detailed below.  
The variables that are included in the IRSAD index can be found in Table 5.1.  
Each variable has a loading that indicates the correlation of that variable with the 
index.  A positive loading indicates an advantaging variable whilst a negative loading 
indicates a disadvantaging variable. 
   
                                                            
 
48 Socio‐Economic Indexes for Areas (SEIFA) is a product developed by the ABS that ranks areas in 
Australia according to relative socio‐economic advantage and disadvantage. The indexes are based 
on information from the five‐yearly Census. IRSAD of one of the SEIFA indexes.  
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Table 5.1   
IRSAD Included Variables 
Variable Description Loading 
INC_HIGH % of people with stated household equivalised income greater than $52,000 per year 0.84 
HIGHMORTGAGE % of occupied private dwellings paying mortgage greater than $2,800 per month 0.70 
DIPLOMA % of people aged 15 years and over whose highest level of educational attainment is a 
diploma qualification 
0.63 
OCC_PROF % of employed people classified as Professionals 0.62 
HIGHBED % of occupied private dwellings with four (4) or more bedrooms 0.52 
OCC_MANAGER % of employed people classified as managers 0.42 
HIGHRENT % of occupied private dwellings paying rent greater than $370 per week 0.40 
SPAREBED % of occupied private dwellings with one or more spare bedrooms 0.37 
ATUNI % of people aged 15 years and over at university or other tertiary institution 0.36 
HIGHCAR % of occupied private dwellings with three (3) or more cars 0.35 
NOEDU % of people aged 15 years and over who have no educational attainment 0.37 
OVERCROWD % of occupied private dwellings requiring one or more extra bedrooms 0.45 
NOCAR % of occupied private dwellings with no cars 0.49 
OCC_SERVICE_L % of employed people classified as low skill Community and Personal Service workers 0.51 
OCC_DRIVER % of employed people classified as Machinery Operators and Drivers 0.57 
SEP_DIVORCED % of people aged 15 years and over who are separated or divorced 0.57 
LOWRENT % of occupied private dwellings paying rent less than $166 per week (excluding $0 per 0.67 
DISABILITYU70 % of people under the age of 70 who have a long-term health condition or disability and 
need assistance with core activities 
0.67 
UNEMPLOYED % of people (in the labour force) who are unemployed 0.69 
ONEPARENT % of one parent families with dependent offspring only 0.69 
OCC_LABOUR % of employed people classified as Labourers 0.78 
CHILDJOBLESS % of families with children under 15 years of age who live with jobless parents 0.80 
NOYEAR12ORHIGHE % of people aged 15 years and over whose highest level of education is Year 11 or lower 0.82 
NONET % of occupied private dwellings with no internet connection  0.82 
INC_LOW % of people with stated household equivalised income between $1 and $20,799 per year 0.89 
Source: ABS (2013) 
Table 5.2 indicates variables that ABS initially considered for the index, but 
were subsequently excluded due to low loadings (not adding enough value to the 
final index).  
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Table 5.2   
IRSAD Excluded Variables 
Variable Description 
DIALUP % of occupied private dwellings with a dialup internet connection 
FEWBED % occupied private dwellings with one (1) or no bedrooms 
CERTIFICATE % of people aged 15 years and over whose highest educational attainment is a certificate III or IV 
OWNING % of occupied private dwellings owning dwelling without a mortgage 
OCC_SALES_L % of employed people classified as Low-Skill Sales 
ENGLISHPOOR % of people who do not speak English well 
Source: ABS (2013) 
 
A list of the relevant IRSAD ratings for the suburbs included in the Brisbane 
northside and Brisbane southside study areas may be found in Table 5.3 and Table 
5.4 respectively.  These have been derived from the 2011 census data.  It is assumed 
that these ratings are relatively time invariant and will have remained stable over the 
study period.  
Table 5.3   
IRSAD Ratings – Brisbane Northside  
Suburb Rating. Suburb Rating. Suburb Rating. 
Albany Creek 10 Ferny Hill 9 Mount Samson 10 
Arana Hills 9 Griffin 9 Murrumba Downs 8 
Bray Park 6 Highvale 10 North Lakes 9 
Brendale 3 Joyner 9 Petrie 7 
Bunya 3 Kallangur 4 Samford Valley 10 
Cashmere 10 Kurwongbah 8 Samford Village 10 
Dakabin 7 Lawnton 3 Strathpine 4 
Dayboro 8 Mango Hill 9 Warner 10 
Eatons Hill 10 Mount Glorious 9   
Everton Hill 9 Mount Nebo 9   
Source: ABS (2013) 
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Table 5.4   
IRSAD Ratings – Brisbane Southside  
Suburb Rating. Suburb Rating. Suburb Rating. 
Acacia Ridge 1 Heathwood 10 Rocklea 3 
Algester 7 Inala 1 Runcorn 7 
Archerfield 2 Kuraby 9 Salisbury 6 
Calamvale 9 Macgregor 7 Stretton 10 
Carole Park* 1 Moorooka 7 Sunnybank 6 
Coopers Plains 4 Mt Gravatt 7 Sunnybank Hills 7 
Doolandella 5 Nathan 8 Tarragindi 10 
Drewvale 9 Oxley 8 Upper Mt Gravatt 6 
Durack 2 Pallara 6 Wacol 2 
Eight Mile Plains 9 Parkinson 10 Willawong 5 
Ellen Grove 1 Richlands 4   
Forest Lake 8     
* Suburb not included.  Rating derived from neighbouring suburb ratings.  
Source: ABS (2013) 
 
5.4.3 Jurisdictional data 
Jurisdictional data incorporates regional or macro-economic factors that might 
affect the price of housing such as household income levels, local crime rates, 
population growth, housing supply, labour force,  unemployment rate,  construction 
cost index,  mortgage interest rates,  and other occupancy costs.  This data is not 
supplied in the sales record database, hence other data sources were required to build 
the requisite data set for this study. 
Sirmans et al.’s (2005) survey of 125 hedonic house price models gives little 
guidance as to the preferred independent variables to include taking account of 
jurisdictional features.  A crime rate variable featured in 6% of the studies and 
foreclosure in 4% as the only jurisdictional factors regularly appearing in hedonic 
house price models.  A house price trend variable was however included in over 10% 
of the models, which could be interpreted as a proxy for general housing market 
movements that incorporate the prevailing macro-economic environment.  Also, 
remembering that Sirmans et al,’s (2005) study noted that a characteristic of hedonic 
house price models is that they are location specific (supported in their findings with 
only 7% incorporating location variables), if the prevailing macro-economic 
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conditions impact the full study area consistently, then it could be argued that there is 
little to be gained from their inclusion.  The exception to this is unless changes in 
house prices due to changes in macro-economic conditions are the subject of the 
research or are a known or suspected variable of significance in house price 
movements over the study duration.   
The inclusion of jurisdictional factors was considered important for this study 
due to two factors.  Firstly, given there are two sub-study areas it is possible that 
jurisdictional factors impact these differently.  Where possible, separate data for 
Brisbane northside and southside was gathered.  Secondly, the extant models devoted 
considerable attention to jurisdictional variables, attempting to account for a variety 
of house price drivers from both the demand and supply perspective.  
The selection of demand and supply variables for this study was a process 
driven by a number of factors including: reference to the extant models, exclusion of 
variables that were not of relevance to the Australian market (for example property 
tax and service/amenity measure variables), consideration of the drivers of house 
prices in the study area (refer Figure 3.1) and availability of the required data sets 
over the study period at the requisite scale and at the required intervals.   
Jurisdictional data for this study was sourced from the ABS web site, with the 
exception of data on the 30 year home mortgage interest rates, consumer sentiment 
and inflation, which was sourced from the Reserve Bank of Australia (“RBA”) web 
site.  Where monthly or quarterly data existed, annual averages were derived (by 
calendar year) to remain consistent with the annual intervals selected for this study 
(refer section 5.4.4).   
Data on supply and demand house price drivers were sought at a local 
government level (rather than State level) to ensure regional sub-market effects were 
suitably accommodated.  The local government area of “Brisbane” was used for the 
southside data set, and “Moreton Bay” used for the northside data set, with both 
being part of the Greater Brisbane metropolitan area.  
Demand variables for which the requisite data was available include:  changes 
to household income, population change, unemployment, change in project home 
construction costs, 30 year average variable mortgage interest rates, and consumer 
sentiment data.   
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From the supply perspective, data at a State-wide level was available for:  
building approvals, building commencements and building activity (each able to be 
segmented for new residential construction).  However, only the building approval 
data was available at a local government level, captured from 2006.  Whilst it is 
acknowledged that not all buildings that are approved proceed to construction, and 
that either of the other two data sets might be more desirable, access to approval data 
at the local government level was deemed superior to only state-wide data for 
commencements and activity.  Using State-wide data, simple linear regression was 
used to estimate pre 2006 data for change in building approvals at the local 
government level (R2 = 81% Brisbane, 91% Moreton Bay) in order to populate the 
requisite fields for 2005.  Similarly, the increase in median household income data at 
a local government level was available only between 2005 and 2010 at a local 
government level.  A similar technique was used to estimate missing data for 2011 
from the State-wide data that was available (R2 = 98% Brisbane, 90% Moreton Bay).   
Unless otherwise stated herein, each of these data sets was available over the 
full study period, some available at a local government level, whilst others were only 
available at a national level as indicated in Table 5.5.  Inflation data was used to 
adjust all variables to 2005 dollars. 
Table 5.5   
Jurisdictional Data Source 
Variable Jurisdiction Source 
Change in building 
approvals 
LGA ABS Cat 8731.0 - Building Approvals, Australia, Jan 2014, Local Government 
Area: Queensland, 2006-2012 , TABLE 03. Number of Dwelling Units Approved,
by Sector, all series - Queensland 
Increase in median 
household income 
LGA ABS, Cat 6524.0.55.002 - Estimates of Personal Income for Small Areas, Time 
Series, 2005-06 to 2010-11 , Table 3 
Population change LGA ABS, Cat 3218.0  Regional Population Growth, Australia, Table 3   
Unemployment rate LGA ABS Cat 6291.0.55.001 Labour Force, Australia, Detailed - Electronic Delivery, 
Table 16. Labour force status by Region (SA4) and Sex 
Construction cost index Brisbane 
(capital city) 
ABS, Cat 6416.0 - House Price Indexes: Eight Capital Cities, Mar 2012,  Project 
homes percentage change from the corresponding quarter of previous year 
(Brisbane) 
30 year average mortgage 
rate 
Australia RBA Statistical Tables, F5 Indicator Lending Rates, Bank Variable Standard 
lending rate 
Consumer sentiment Australia RBA Statistical Tables, G8  Indicators Of Spending And Confidence, Westpac-
Melbourne Institute consumer sentiment index 
Consumer price index 
(inflation) 
Australia RBA Statistical Tables, G2  Consumer Price Index, All Groups 
* LGA = Local Government Area.  “Brisbane” for southside, “Moreton Bay” for Northside .  Source:  Author 
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Property tax variables are a feature of the majority of the prior US models, 
however none have been incorporated in this model.  As discussed previously, this is 
primarily due to the fact that Queensland does not have a property tax regime.  Local 
authority rates are the closest comparable tax item applicable in Queensland.  Local 
authority rates are charged to home owners for the provision of services such as: 
roads, bridges, kerbing and channelling and parks and gardens, immunisation, 
libraries and community activities, free trees, and pest eradication (Brisbane City 
Council, 2014).  However, due to the utility nature of services provided, and the 
economies of scale from the large local government areas, these rates are not of the 
scale of property taxes in the US which can be in the order of tens of thousands of 
dollars per annum and are a significant annual occupancy cost.  In contrast, a 
suburban house in Brisbane would expect annual rates in the order of $1,200 - 
$1,500.  Water and sewerage consumption charges are invoiced separately by 
Queensland Urban Utilities.   
Local government rates are essentially constant across a jurisdiction, levied 
against the site value of the lot. The “site value is its expected realisation under a 
bona fide sale assuming all non-site improvements for the land had not been made” 
and is assessed every three years (Queensland Government, 2014a, p22).  Site value 
data was provided as part of this data set and was considered for use as a separate 
variable given its relationship to the physical and locational nature of the lot as well 
as the prevailing market conditions.  However site value was discarded as an 
independent variable as the valuation dates provided in the data set were inconsistent 
and not up to date and thus deemed not reliable.   
 
5.4.4 Policy Data 
Policy data is not traditionally a separate component of the hedonic model, 
despite the effect of government policy on housing markets and thus prices being 
well documented.  Policy items such as decisions to levy infrastructure charges are 
usually incorporated with jurisdictional data, however they have been classified 
separately in this study to draw attention to the impact of such government initiatives 
on house prices.  The two government policy variables that are relevant to house 
prices over the study period in Australia are:  infrastructure charges and the First 
Home Owners Grant.    
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Infrastructure Charge Data 
In Queensland, infrastructure charges are levied at a local authority level, 
negotiated at the time of planning approval.  The cost base and negotiation process 
for determining these charges over the study period was opaque given that neither 
Brisbane City Council nor Moreton Bay Regional Council (or its predecessor Pine 
Rivers Shire Council) had Priority Infrastructure Plans (“PIPs”) in place, despite 
being required to do so by the State legislation.  Each developer negotiated 
separately the relevant charges for each development application.  Thus obtaining 
data on levied infrastructure charges proved difficult.  Given this research pivots on 
access to infrastructure charge data at a lot level, it is this factor that has driven the 
approach to this research and selection of the study area/s. 
Infrastructure charge data at a local authority level was initially sought for this 
study.  Section 724 of the Integrated Planning Act states that each local authority in 
Queensland is required to maintain an Infrastructure Charge register (Queensland 
Government, 2009b).  The relevant provision of the Act is indicated in Figure 5.3: 
Figure 5.3  
Infrastructure Charge Register Provisions 
(3) The infrastructure charges register and the regulated infrastructure charges register must, for each charge levied, include 
each of the following— 
(a) the real property description of the land to which the charge applies; 
(b) the schedule under which the charge was levied; 
(c) the amount of the charge levied; 
(d) the amount of the charge unpaid; 
(e) the number of units of demand charged for; 
(f) if the charge was levied as a result of a development approval or compliance permit—the approval or permit 
reference number and the day the approval or permit will lapse; 
 (g) if infrastructure was to be provided instead of paying the charge—details of any infrastructure still to be provided.  
(4) Also, the infrastructure charges register must include— 
(a) the charge rate, stated in the infrastructure charges schedule, for each charge levied; and 
(b) if the charge rate has been adjusted for inflation— 
(i) details of how it was adjusted; and 
(ii) the adjusted charge rate. 
Source:  Queensland Government, 2009b, s 724  
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Three of the five largest local authorities in South East Queensland were 
approached to supply data from their Infrastructure Charge Register for this research.  
After initial positive responses from each party, each cited “legal reasons” for not 
supplying the requested data, and one cited high workloads and the cost prohibitive 
nature of extracting the requested infrastructure charge data.  One local authority was 
willing to provide a copy of its Infrastructure Charge Register in pfd format (not 
database compatible).  Examination of this Register revealed two issues with the data 
that rendered it not useful.  Firstly the infrastructure charge data recorded was at a 
“parent lot” level; that is it stated the total amount of infrastructure charges levied on 
a parcel of unsubdivided land.  This was unhelpful as it did not identify the 
subsequent subdivision, the number of “child lots” that it was to be subdivided into, 
nor the land use applicable (hence residential subdivisions could not be delineated 
from other development types).  Secondly the data set was incomplete with many 
fields not populated.  Discussions with other local governments revealed that 
Infrastructure Charges Registers held did not aggregate or relate data to other 
systems and could only be used to enquire on a specific charge/application on a case 
by case basis.   
The State government department responsible for infrastructure was then 
approached to supply the requisite infrastructure charge data for this study.  After 
examination of its records, the State revealed it did not hold data on infrastructure 
charging in Queensland from which a charge per lot could be derived.  Thus despite 
legislative provisions for infrastructure charge data to be publicly available, this 
proved not to be the case on a large scale basis necessary for regional analysis.  This 
opaque nature of the Queensland infrastructure charging regime is a key 
differentiating factor from the US studies whereby infrastructure charges are 
transparent and certain, being a scheduled and published rate per lot.   
In the absence of regional level infrastructure charge data, data at a project 
level within the identified local government areas was targeted.  The assumption was 
made that infrastructure charges applicable to one (or more) typical projects in a 
region may be assumed to be of a similar scale to the typical charges levied on other 
projects undertaken at that time in the same local government area.  The limitations 
of this necessary assumption are discussed in Section 6.5. 
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Large private land developers were approached to supply infrastructure charge 
data for their projects.  Private developers were targeted over the publicly listed 
entities that are active in this market due to a number of factors including:  similar 
scale and nature of projects, professional and experienced staff, long term business 
models, access to decision makers for the release of information and the limited risk 
of shareholder backlash should findings become public49.   
The developers that were approached supplied data on the infrastructure 
charges levied on their typical projects in the study area.  The total infrastructure 
charges applicable to each stage in those projects was divided by the number of lots 
in that stage to determine the typical charge per lot.  The applicable infrastructure 
charge per annum for the study period was derived from the year each stage was 
released and sold.  Given the “lumpy” nature of this data, annual intervals were 
chosen for this study, with weighted averages adopted for infrastructure charge data 
when more than one stage was sold in a calendar year.   
Consideration was given as to whether a lag should be incorporated, given 
infrastructure charges are levied at the time of development approval, which is often 
a year or more prior to the sale of the lot/house.  This lag effect is applied 
inconsistently in the US studies, despite the same timing effects between charges 
being levied and sale of the house/lot being similar to that in Australia.  The decision 
to incorporate a one year lag in this study took into consideration a number of 
factors: 
 The plan seal date for the project was used to determine the applicable 
weighted average infrastructure charge per lot across the local government 
area for that calendar year.  The plan seal date reflects completion of that 
stage of subdivision; 
 Analysis of the sample projects indicated that development approvals lagged 
plan sealing dates on average by 15 months, however with variance up to four 
years; 
                                                            
 
49 Each developer involved wished to remain anonymous and hence no project identifiers are 
included in this research. 
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 Settlement of lots can only occur after plan sealing dates, but presales may 
have occurred up to nine or more months prior.  The (market) price of the lot 
is determined at the sale date i.e. contract date (be that a presale or a normal 
sale).  The timing of selling or pre-selling is opportunistic and largely 
determined by market demand; 
 Developers will only bring stages onto the market at a time when they are 
profitable, hence older approvals may be held until market demand warrants 
further supply of lots.  Hence if higher charges are levied (making stages 
unprofitable in prevailing market conditions) those lots will be brought to the 
market when market conditions are more favourable; 
 The complexities in the data analysis associated with:  pre-selling or post 
selling of lots, as well as the delay or bringing forward of stages might apply 
equally to all projects in the study area.  Hence this effect is determined to be 
random and thus fits the requisite assumptions for regression analysis.  Hence 
the use of the infrastructure charge per lot applicable to a stage sold in any 
calendar year, lagged by one year (project average of 15 months rounded 
down to one year) is deemed appropriate as an average measure.   
As mentioned previously, the end of the study period aligned with the 2011 
introduction of maximum adopted infrastructure charges.  The start of the study 
period aligns with the commencement date of the projects for which data was made 
available.  In both the northside and southside study areas, this was 2004.  Hence 
sales data from 2005 is the commencement of this study period, to allow for the one 
year lag in infrastructure charge data.  The basis for deriving the annual charges for 
each study area is described below.  
Northside - The northside infrastructure charges were adopted from a 430 lot 
development with connection to all usual urban infrastructure and access to a wide 
range of local services and amenities.  This project was developed in stages from 
2003 through to 2011.  The annual infrastructure charge per lot started at $4,268 in 
2004, increasing steadily up to $13,597 per lot in 2011.   
Southside - The southside infrastructure charge data was derived from two 
projects by the same developer from 2004 to 2009.  The first project was a 200 lot 
residential subdivision developed in three stages from 2004 to 2007.  The second 
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project was a 150 lot development, developed in four stages from 2006 through to 
2009.  Both projects had connection to all usual urban infrastructure and access to a 
wide range of local services and amenities.  The annual average infrastructure charge 
per lot started at $5,751 in 2004, increasing steadily up to $14,555  per lot in 2009.   
The significant increases in infrastructure charges per lot over the study period 
in both localities are consistent with the industry concerns over that time that lead to 
the 2011 infrastructure charges reform (refer Chapter 1).  This was a period of 
considerable uncertainty and lack of transparency as local governments sought to 
move to a full cost recovery regime and yet Priority Infrastructure Plans were not in 
place.  Lagging of infrastructure charges by one year resulted in a study period for 
the northside of 2005 – 2011 and southside of 2005 – 2010.   
 
First Home Owners Grant 
The First Home Owners Grant (“FHOG”) and other associated government 
initiatives are an important feature of the Australian housing market due to their 
stimulatory objectives.  The impact of the FHOG on house prices is well documented 
and thus warrants inclusion in any house price model discussion50.  In summary, in 
July 2000 the Federal Government introduced the FHOG in the amount of $7,000 to 
offset the cost of the GST on houses.  This grant was given to any buyers entering 
the housing market for the first time and was not means or income tested.  It was 
initially designed to incentivise first home owners into the housing market, counter 
the effects of the GST and to maintain activity in the housing sector.  From time to 
time the Federal and State Governments increase the grant amount for set periods in 
order to stimulate activity in the housing market.  Transfer duty or other concessions 
may also be introduced by governments as fiscal policy measures.  Some of these 
incentives have not discriminated between existing and new housing, whilst others 
apply to new housing only in order to stimulate the construction sector (Randolf, 
Pinnegar and Tice, 2013; Blight, Field and Henriuqez, 2012; Dungey, Wells and 
Thompson, 2011).   
                                                            
 
50 For full details of the FHOG and various other State initiatives see Randolf et al., 2013, Blight et al., 
2012, Dungey et al., 2011. 
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The study period for this research of 2005 – 2011 incorporates the strong 
housing market in the lead up to the GFC in 2008 as well as the post GFC market 
retraction.  Stimulatory policy by both State and Federal Governments is credited 
with stabilising the housing market post GFC (Primeus and Whitehead, 2014).  This 
incorporated an increase to the FHOG of up to $21,000 for new homes combined 
with transfer duty and other savings at the State level.  The net effect of assistance to 
first home buyers from 2000 to 2010 is reported by Dungey et al. (2011).  The net 
assistance of government incentives (as a percentage of mean house price) in 
Queensland over the study period for both new and existing houses was relatively 
flat, below 2% until mid 2008.  The post GFC stimulatory policies increased these 
incentives to near 6% of the mean house price for new houses, and 4% for existing 
houses in 2009, falling back to pre-GFC levels in 2010 (Dungey et al., 2011).    
Preliminary model specifications for this thesis attempted to incorporate the 
stimulatory impact of the FHOG in 2009 for both new and existing homes, and for 
new homes only in 2011.  Dummy variables were introduced for these years 
consistent with Dungey et al.’s (2011) findings which reported on the change to 
government incentives as a percentage of mean house prices in each Australian state 
over the study period.  Unfortunately inconsistent results were produced due to 
limitations of the data.  These limitations are largely attributed to the interval 
selected for this study.  As discussed previously, the nature of the infrastructure 
charge data necessitated the used of annual intervals, however in the post GFC 
period when the government stimulatory packages were in effect, the FHOG 
payment was not in effect for full calendar years.  The $14,000 additional payment to 
the FHOG was initially in effect from end 2008 to 30 June 2009.  It was extended til 
30 September 2009 and then halved til 31 December 2009, falling back to $7,000 
thereafter.  In August 2011, the Queensland Government introduced a further 
incentive of $10,000 (on top of the Federal $7,000 FHOG) payable on new house 
and land packages up to $600,000, which was in effect until 30 April, 2012 
(Queensland Government, 2014b).  As can be seen the short term nature of these 
policies does not fit in an annual model, with the effects not consistent across the full 
interval.  
Hence due to data limitations, the FHOG was not incorporated into the final 
model.  Should more detailed infrastructure charge data be available in the future that 
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enables shorter  study intervals (say quarterly), then it would be desirable to 
incorporate the FHOG into such a model.   
5.4.5 Data Summary 
The final data set for this study comprised a total of 29,752 house sales in 
Brisbane from 2005 - 2011, comprising 4,699 new and 25,053 existing house sales 
and 13,739 lot sales.  Table 5.6 describes the final independent variables adopted for 
this study in the model estimation.  As mentioned previously, inflation was used to 
adjust all variables to 2005 dollars. 
Table 5.6   
Variable Legend 
Variable Definition 
IA_Price House price 
Structural Attributes  
Area Lot size in square metres 
Bedrooms Total number of bedrooms 
Bathrooms Total number of bathrooms 
Carparks Total number of car parking spaces 
Type Dummy variable indicating whether the house is Existing (0) or New (1) 
 Lot data was a separate data set not requiring a Type variable 
Locational Attributes  
SEIFA 
1-10  ranking of suburb as indicated by the Index of Relative Socio-economic Advantage and 
Disadvantage (IRSAD) 
Region Dummy variable indicating whether the house is Brisbane Northside (0) or Southside (1) 
  
Jurisdictional Attributes  
Year Time dummy for year of sale 
AC_Inc Percentage rate of change in population (LGA) 
AC_Pop Percentage increase in median household income (LGA) 
AC_Bul Percentage change in building approvals  (LGA) 
A_Upr Unemployment rate (LGA) 
A_Cci Construction cost index for Brisbane (capital city) 
A_Mgr Average 30 year mortgage rate (Australia) 
A_Css Consumer confidence index (Australia) 
  
Policy Attributes  
IA_Ifc_1L Annual infrastructure charge adopted on a per lot basis, based on year of sale of lot, lagged by one 
year 
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The summary statistics for the full data set (All housing), as well as New and 
Existing housing is provided in Table 5.7 and for Lots in Table 5.8.  
 
Table 5.7   
Summary Statistics –Housing  
 All  New  Existing 
Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
IA_Price 471,863.63 148,510.16 523341.08 138858.869 462208.40 148276.713 
Area 687.58 333.59 575.6831 199.89158 708.5697 349.09909 
Bedrooms 3.63 0.77 3.93 .634 3.58 .784 
Bathrooms 1.78 0.65 2.09 .471 1.72 .659 
Carparks 1.93 0.74 1.96 .500 1.92 .776 
Type 0.16 0.37 a a b b 
Region 0.47 0.50 .39 .487 .48 .500 
SEIFA 7.26 2.48 8.28 1.994 7.07 2.513 
Year 2007.61 1.72 2007.52 1.670 2007.63 1.731 
AC_Inc 2.77 0.69 5.0220 1.47187 4.9825 1.49349 
AC_Pop 4.99 1.49 2.8792 .71397 2.7444 .68466 
AC_Bul - 4.70 16.68 -2.7188 16.59528 -5.0676 16.67490 
A_Upr 3.59 1.00 3.4126 .99346 3.6197 .99980 
A_Cci 4.23 2.66 4.3238 2.67237 4.2087 2.65298 
A_Mgr 7.56 0.93 7.6020 .89738 7.5467 .93109 
A_Css 105.29 8.48 105.6387 8.51702 105.2292 8.47408 
IA_Ifc_1L 12,080.79 4,536.60 11438.1166 4465.83988 12201.3322 4539.71973 
n 29,752  4699  25053  
a. Type = 1, b Type = 0 
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Structural elements of a house are dropped in the Lot model as this model 
relates to the price of subdivided and serviced vacant residential lots only.  The house 
type (New or Existing) is not required as the Lot sales data set has been separated 
from the house sales data set.  
Table 5.8   
Summary Statistics – Lots - Brisbane   
Variable Mean Std Dev 
IA_Price 261,164.48 101,415.57 
Area 633.70 379.99 
Region  0.31 0.46 
SEIFA 8.41 1.78 
Year 2007.52 1.76 
AC_Inc 5.03 1.41 
AC_Pop 2.95 0.70 
AC_Bul - 1.94 16.01 
A_Upr 3.42 0.99 
A_Cci 4.03 2.56 
A_Mgr 7.50 0.88 
A_Css 106.24 7.86 
IA_Ifc_1L 10,973.33 4,377.38 
n 13,739  
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5.5 MODEL SPECIFICATION 
As detailed in the previous chapters, despite the various functional forms 
employed in the literature, a simple linear reduced form equation may be equally 
appropriate, and is the adopted form for this study:   
 
௜ܲ,௧ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚଶܮ௜ ൅ ߚଷܬ௜ ൅ ߚସܩ௜൅	ݑ௜,௧   5.1 
Where   
Pi,t =  sale price of house i in time period t 
Si =  Structural attributes of the house: lot area, number of bedrooms, 
bathrooms and car parking spaces, dummy for new or existing home  
Li =  Locational features:  region, socio-economic suburb rankings 
Ji = Jurisdictional factors: changes to household income levels, population 
growth, new housing supply, unemployment rate,  construction cost 
index,  mortgage interest rates;  consumer confidence 
Gi = Government policy: infrastructure charges 
ݑ௜,௧ =  error term or noise in the model for the ith observation at time t. 
 
A model for house prices in Brisbane was run firstly for the pooled data set 
(All Houses).  Separate models for both New and Existing houses were run to 
determine if a differential effect between new and existing housing was evident.  
Given new and existing homes are close substitutes for each other, theory supports 
the premise that a change in the price of one house type (be it new or existing) could 
impact the price of the other house type.  Hence, the interaction of Type 
(New/Existing) was then tested for.  The interaction between new and existing house 
prices was tested for in the form:  
 
௜ܲ,௧ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵܫܣ_ܫ݂ܿ_1ܮ௜ ൅ ߚଶܻܶܲܧ௜ ൅ ߚଷܫܥ. ܻܶܲܧ௜൅	ݑ௜,௧  5.2 
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Where   
ܫܣ_ܫ݂ܿ_1ܮ௜=  Annual infrastructure charge adopted on a per lot basis, based 
on year of sale of lot, lagged by one year   
TYPE =  New (1) or Existing (0) 
 
Similarly, separate regressions by Region (North and South) were attempted; 
however these were unsuccessful due to the very high multicolinearity of the 
jurisdictional variables and produced large changes in the coefficient estimates.  
Removing the jurisdictional variables still resulted in inexplicable results that reflect 
the limitations of the data.  Testing for interactions between Type and the two 
Regions was attempted utilising equation 5.3:   
 
௜ܲ,௧ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵܫܣ_ܫ݂ܿ_1ܮ௜ ൅ ߚଶܻܶܲܧ௜ ൅ ߚଷܫܥ. ܻܶܲܧ௜ ൅ ߚସܴܧܩܫܱ ௜ܰ ൅ ߚହܫܥ. ܴܧܩܫܱ ௜ܰ൅	ݑ௜,௧ 
                      5.3 
 
Where   
ܫܣ_ܫ݂ܿ_1ܮ௜=  Annual infrastructure charge adopted on a per lot basis, based 
on year of sale of lot, lagged by one year   
TYPE         =  Dummy variable indicating whether the house is New (1) or 
Existing (0) 
REGION   = Dummy variable indicating whether the house is on Brisbane 
Southside (1) or Northside (0) 
 
However these results were unsatisfactory, and upon reflection was likely due 
to there being no direct interaction between the southside and northside housing 
markets.  Hence this analysis was not included in the final models.   
Lastly a separate regression for Brisbane Lot prices was run utilising Equation 
4.1, however dropping the structural elements (apart from lot area) which become 
superfluous when no house is yet constructed on the lot.   
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The results of the regressions from the final models and discussion on the 
findings are provided in the following chapter.  
5.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter has been to describe the methodological approach, 
data and model adopted for use in estimating the effect of infrastructure charges on 
house prices in Brisbane.   
After encountering some difficulty, infrastructure charge data from two regions 
in the State capital of Brisbane was sourced, enabling analysis of the effect of 
infrastructure charges on all, new and existing housing, as well as the effect on 
vacant residential lots.   
Drawing on the thematic conclusions of the exploratory Stage 1 research, the 
quantitative component of this study was able to be conceptualised.  A hedonic 
approach has been utilised as it is a well established approach for which 
interpretation is relatively straightforward.   
The limitations of the adopted approach are acknowledged in the following 
chapter,  however this study is an important first step in addressing the research gap 
that exists in this area.  This model is the first of its kind in Australia that seeks to 
provide empirical evidence of the effect of infrastructure charges on housing 
affordability.   
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Chapter 6:   Stage 2 Findings 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this chapter is to complete the Stage 2 component of this thesis.  
It presents the findings of the quantitative component of this study into the impact of 
infrastructure charges on house prices and lot prices in Brisbane, Australia.  In so 
doing, this chapter addresses the final research question of this thesis: 
 
4. What is the impact of infrastructure charges on the price of housing in 
Australia?  
 
Firstly this chapter outlines the regression results for houses in section 6.2 and 
then vacant residential lots in section 6.3.  A discussion on these findings is 
presented in section 6.4.  Section 6.5 outlines the limitations of this research and the 
chapter concludes in section 6.6. 
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6.2 REGRESSION RESULTS – HOUSES 
The final data set for this study comprised a total 29,752 house sales in 
Brisbane from 2005 - 2011, comprising 4,699 new and 25,053 existing house sales 
and 13,739 lot sales.   As indicated in the previous chapter, a model for house prices 
in Brisbane was run firstly for the pooled data set (All houses).  Separate models for 
both New and Existing houses were run and lastly the interaction between house type 
(New or Existing) was then tested.  The regression results for each of the final 
models are indicated below.   
 
6.2.1 Step-Wise Process 
A step-wise approach was adopted to test the additional predictive value of the 
model upon the inclusion of more independent variables (Washington et al., 2011).  
The structural elements were regressed initially, with locational elements added in a 
second step, then the jurisdictional and government (policy) elements added in the 
final step.  The model summary for the step-wise process using the All Brisbane 
house data are indicated in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1   
Step Wise Process Model Summary- Housesd 
  R Adjusted R Std Error of   Change Statistics   
Model R Square Square Estimates R2 Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F 
change 
1 .683a .467 .467 108443.541 .467 5210.0 5 29746 .000 
2 .743b .552 .552 99457.403 .085 1873.6 3 29743 .000 
3 .756c .572 .571 97222.509 .020 173.89 8 29735 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Type, Carparks, Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms (Structural) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Type, Carparks, Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Year, Region, SEIFA  (Structural + Locational) 
c. Predictors:  (Constant),  Type,  Carparks,  Area,  Bedrooms,  Bathrooms,  Year,  Region,  SEIFA,  A_Cci,  A_Css,  AC_Inc, 
AC_Bul, IA_Ifc_1L, AC_Pop, A_Mgr, A_Upr  (Structural + Locational+ Jurisdictional + Policy) 
d. Dependent Variable: IA_Price 
These findings indicate that the predictive qualities of the house price model 
improve as the additional independent variables are added, as would be expected.  
This process was followed for each of the regressions performed. 
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6.2.2 All House Prices 
The regression results for the pooled data set for Brisbane houses are provided 
in Table 6.2.  All outputs are of the expected sign and significance at five percent 
with the exception of building approvals (significance only) and consumer sentiment 
(sign and significance).   Unemployment is significant at seven percent.   
The independent variables of building approvals, consumer confidence and 
unemployment are problematic in all models due to their high multicolinearity, 
which is a feature of the observational nature of the data.  On one hand it is tempting 
to remove these variables from the models all together.  However that leaves one 
open to criticism of potential omitted variable bias.  A number of the extant studies 
omit variables that theory would indicate have an impact on house prices.  It is 
unknown as to whether these variables were purposefully excluded in those models 
due to similar multicolinearity issues, or omitted in the model design process.  In this 
instance, the decision was made to leave these variables in the models despite their 
apparent lack of statistical significance due to a combination of factors:  firstly, 
whilst the jurisdictional variables add to the predictive value of the model, their 
contribution is incremental rather than substantial.  Secondly, these variables are 
consistent with house price theory and for them to remain avoids criticisms of 
omitted variable bias.  Thirdly, the variables in question are not the direct subject of 
this research;  and finally given highly correlated variables may not necessarily cause 
estimation problems, it is commonplace to leave them in a model, particularly one 
that relies on observational data (Washingon et al., 2011).     
Moving on to the regression results, given the linear nature of our model, the 
interpretation of the infrastructure charge coefficient (IA_Ifc_1L) output of 3.952 
together with a significance of .000, this indicates that these results provide strong 
evidence that a $1.00 increase in infrastructure charges increases all house prices in 
Brisbane by $3.95.   
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Table 6.2   
Regression Results – Brisbane Houses 
Model   Beta t Sig. Lower Bound* Upper Bound* 
1 (Constant) 71170.133 22.120 .000 64863.908 77476.358 
  Area 141.856 71.420 .000 137.963 145.750 
  Bedrooms 32808.207 30.774 .000 30718.635 34897.778 
  Bathrooms 89582.075 70.089 .000 87076.915 92087.236 
  Carparks 9939.191 10.960 .000 8161.724 11716.658 
  Type 34338.842 19.099 .000 30814.854 37862.830 
2 (Constant) 
-31193538.821 -
44.497 
.000 -32567566.003 -
29819511.639 
  Area 148.572 80.737 .000 144.965 152.179 
  Bedrooms 26844.006 27.341 .000 24919.589 28768.424 
  Bathrooms 71547.331 59.308 .000 69182.815 73911.846 
  Carparks 10266.891 12.295 .000 8630.169 11903.614 
  Type 32969.576 19.736 .000 29695.311 36243.841 
  SEIFA 14289.998 56.074 .000 13790.494 14789.502 
  Region 48922.196 39.258 .000 46479.670 51364.722 
  Year 15534.325 44.487 .000 14849.900 16218.749 
3 (Constant) -14289656.089 -4.368 .000 -20702008.705 -7877303.473 
  Area 147.350 81.866 .000 143.822 150.878 
  Bedrooms 26614.412 27.729 .000 24733.140 28495.684 
  Bathrooms 71745.412 60.830 .000 69433.668 74057.156 
  Carparks 10617.273 13.004 .000 9016.939 12217.608 
  Type 31499.814 19.265 .000 28295.007 34704.621 
  SEIFA 14396.730 57.781 .000 13908.361 14885.098 
  Region 53643.331 6.675 .000 37892.328 69394.334 
  Year 7211.509 4.447 .000 4032.694 10390.323 
  AC_Inc 5791.733 3.011 .003 2022.074 9561.392 
  AC_Pop 15909.311 2.968 .003 5402.143 26416.479 
  AC_Bul -198.914 -.702 .483 -754.157 356.328 
  A_Upr -13641.419 -1.806 .071 -28450.071 1167.234 
  A_Cci 10284.451 5.009 .000 6259.936 14308.967 
  A_Mgr -36982.961 -4.884 .000 -51823.465 -22142.456 
  A_Css -320.210 -.939 .348 -988.604 348.184 
  IA_Ifc_1L 3.952 7.417 .000 2.907 4.996 
*95.0% Confidence Interval  
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6.2.3 Existing House Prices  
Next, the data set was split by Type to test the difference in house price 
impacts due to infrastructure charges between existing housing and new housing.  
The literature indicates infrastructure charges have a higher inflationary effect on 
existing housing compared to new housing.  Whilst a higher level of overpassing is 
consistently observed in the literature (Existing compared to New) the degree to 
which this overpassing effect is amplified varies considerably between studies.  Little 
theory or rationale is presented as to why infrastructure charges increase existing 
house prices by more than new house prices.  
The stepwise procedure was again followed with the results indicating an 
improving predictive quality of the model as the jurisdictional and policy variables 
are added as indicated below.  The variable Type is removed as it is superfluous.   
Table 6.3   
Step Wise Process Model Summary- Existing Housesd 
  R Adjusted R Std Error of   Change  Statistics   
Model R Square Square Estimates R2 
Change
F Change df1 df2 Sig. F 
change
1 .687
a .472 .472 107759.635 .472 5596.127 4 25048 .000 
2 .750
b .563 .562 98082.742 .091 1729.770 3 25045 .000 
3 .764
c .583 .583 95759.229 .021 154.767 8 25037 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant),  Carparks, Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms (Structural) 
b. Predictors: (Constant),  Carparks, Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Year, Region, SEIFA  (Structural + Locational) 
c. Predictors:  (Constant),  Carparks,  Area,  Bedrooms,  Bathrooms,  Year,  Region,  SEIFA,  A_Cci,  A_Css,  AC_Inc, 
AC_Bul, IA_Ifc_1L, AC_Pop, A_Mgr, A_Upr  (Structural + Locational+ Jurisdictional + Policy) 
d. Dependent Variable: IA_Price 
 
The regression results for the 25,053 Existing house data set is provided in 
Table 6.4.  All outputs are of the expected sign and significance at five percent with 
the exception of building approvals (both sign and significance), unemployment 
(significance only) and consumer confidence (sign only).   
Given the linear nature of our model, the interpretation of the infrastructure 
charge coefficient (IA_Ifc_1L) output of 3.565 and significance of .000, this 
indicates that these results provide strong evidence that a $1.00 increase in 
infrastructure charges increases existing house prices in Brisbane by $3.56.   
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Table 6.4   
Regression Results – Existing Houses 
Model   Beta t Sig. Lower Bound* Upper Bound* 
1 (Constant) 76752.470 22.662 .000 70114.178 83390.762 
  Area 139.140 68.522 .000 135.160 143.120 
  Bedrooms 32926.410 29.167 .000 30713.692 35139.128 
  Bathrooms 87624.612 65.123 .000 84987.296 90261.928 
  Carparks 9567.893 10.267 .000 7741.338 11394.447 
  (Constant) -31795355.4 -42.39 .000 -33265479.3 -30325231.5 
2 Area 146.358 78.335 .000 142.696 150.020 
  Bedrooms 26521.479 25.704 .000 24499.095 28543.863 
  Bathrooms 68516.353 54.144 .000 66036.015 70996.692 
  Carparks 10029.803 11.761 .000 8358.246 11701.360 
  SEIFA 14724.433 54.739 .000 14197.195 15251.671 
  Year 15836.439 42.387 .000 15104.128 16568.749 
  Region 50179.764 37.402 .000 47550.117 52809.411 
  (Constant) -18532657.4 -5.277 .000 -25416832.2 -11648482.6 
  Area 145.258 79.592 .000 141.680 148.835 
3 Bedrooms 26462.432 26.268 .000 24487.873 28436.991 
  Bathrooms 68817.871 55.692 .000 66395.850 71239.892 
  Carparks 10378.336 12.461 .000 8745.863 12010.810 
  SEIFA 14749.258 56.156 .000 14234.448 15264.068 
  Year 9301.686 5.343 .000 5889.205 12714.167 
  Region 45712.234 5.336 .000 28921.032 62503.436 
  AC_Inc 4323.978 2.087 .037 262.205 8385.750 
  AC_Pop 16448.521 2.837 .005 5085.394 27811.647 
  AC_Bul 229.834 .757 .449 -365.021 824.689 
  A_Upr -2775.518 -.342 .732 -18677.966 13126.931 
  A_Cci 10471.111 4.756 .000 6156.101 14786.120 
  A_Mgr -27883.372 -3.412 .001 -43903.279 -11863.466 
  A_Css -705.090 -1.912 .056 -1428.071 17.890 
  IA_Ifc_1L 3.565 6.266 .000 2.450 4.680 
*95.0% Confidence Interval  
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6.2.4 New House Prices  
The same process was then applied to the 4,699 New house data set.  The 
stepwise procedure was again followed with the results indicating an improving 
predictive quality of the model as the jurisdictional and policy variables are added as 
indicated below.  The variable Type is removed as it is superfluous.   
 
Table 6.5   
Step Wise Process Model Summary- New Housesd 
  R Adjusted R Std Error of   Change  Statistics   
Model R Square Square Estimates R2 
Change
F Change df1 df2 Sig. F 
change 
1 .602
b .363 .362 110910.394 .363 667.508 4 4694 .000 
2 .657
c .431 .430 104810.919 .069 188.411 3 4691 .000 
3 .671
d .451 .449 103083.167 .020 20.821 8 4683 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant),  Carparks, Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms (Structural) 
b. Predictors: (Constant),  Carparks, Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Year, Region, SEIFA  (Structural + Locational) 
c. Predictors:  (Constant), Carparks, Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Year, Region, SEIFA, A_Cci, A_Css, AC_Inc, AC_Bul, 
IA_Ifc_1L, AC_Pop, A_Mgr, A_Upr  (Structural + Locational+ Jurisdictional + Policy) 
d. Dependent Variable: IA_Price 
 
The regression results for the New house data set is provided in Table 6.6.  All 
outputs are of the expected sign and significance at five percent with the exception 
again of building approvals (both sign and significance), unemployment 
(significance only) and consumer confidence (sign only).    
Given the linear nature of our model, the interpretation of the infrastructure 
charge coefficient (IA_Ifc_1L) output of 4.694 and significance of .002, this 
indicates that these results provide strong evidence that a $1.00 increase in 
infrastructure charges increases new house prices in Brisbane by $4.69.   
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Table 6.6   
Regression Results – New Houses 
Model   Beta t Sig. Lower Bound* Upper Bound* 
1 (Constant) 37191.848 3.466 .001 16156.191 58227.505 
  Area 195.553 22.305 .000 178.365 212.741 
  Bedrooms 27913.613 8.441 .000 21430.178 34397.048 
  Bathrooms 113806.119 27.878 .000 105803.054 121809.183 
  Carparks 12963.587 3.435 .001 5565.084 20362.090 
  (Constant) 
-29036230.566 -
15.149 
.000 -32793836.877 -25278624.256 
2 Area 199.891 23.675 .000 183.338 216.443 
  Bedrooms 25227.309 8.007 .000 19050.826 31403.791 
  Bathrooms 103082.912 26.516 .000 95461.476 110704.348 
  Carparks 11579.638 3.245 .001 4584.681 18574.595 
  SEIFA 12029.572 15.396 .000 10497.725 13561.419 
  Year 14441.131 15.126 .000 12569.407 16312.855 
  Region 41703.515 12.521 .000 35173.778 48233.252 
  (Constant) -1231169.278 -.137 .891 -18909580.924 16447242.367 
  Area 193.080 23.103 .000 176.696 209.465 
3 Bedrooms 24003.477 7.737 .000 17921.101 30085.854 
  Bathrooms 102232.747 26.703 .000 94727.034 109738.461 
  Carparks 12434.172 3.539 .000 5545.413 19322.931 
  SEIFA 12442.444 16.109 .000 10928.161 13956.727 
  Year 777.255 .174 .862 -7984.808 9539.317 
  Region 89928.398 3.910 .000 44833.248 135023.549 
  AC_Inc 12479.622 2.409 .016 2321.766 22637.477 
  AC_Pop 16419.595 1.170 .242 -11083.955 43923.145 
  AC_Bul -1945.120 -2.429 .015 -3515.362 -374.878 
  A_Upr -54317.090 -2.563 .010 -95869.475 -12764.706 
  A_Cci 9469.512 1.683 .092 -1560.995 20500.019 
  A_Mgr -72085.602 -3.508 .000 -112373.233 -31797.971 
  A_Css 1283.543 1.402 .161 -511.572 3078.657 
  IA_Ifc_1L 4.694 3.126 .002 1.750 7.638 
*95.0% Confidence Interval  
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6.2.5 Interaction between Existing and New House Prices  
Finally, the pooled data set was used to test if there was an interaction effect of 
house price impacts due to infrastructure charges between Existing housing and New 
housing.  This is relevant as infrastructure charges are only levied on new housing, 
and yet evidence has emerged of an inflationary price effect on both new and 
existing housing, consistent with the literature.  A two-way interaction utilising the 
Type dummy was employed as described in the previous chapter (see equation 5.2).  
The stepwise procedure was again followed for consistency with the results 
indicating an improving predictive quality of the model as the jurisdictional and 
policy variables are added as indicated below.   
 
Table 6.7   
Step Wise Process Model Summary- Two-Way Interaction:  Existing and New Houses d 
  R Adjusted R Std Error of   Change Statistics   
Model R Square Square Estimates R2 
Change
F Change df1 df2 Sig. F 
change 
1 .683a .467 .467 108443.541 .467 5210.0 5 29746 .000 
2 .743b .552 .552 99457.403 .085 1873.6 3 29743 .000 
3 .756c .572 .572 97213.027 .020 155.35 9 29735 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Type, Carparks, Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms (Structural) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Type, Carparks, Area, Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Year, Region, SEIFA  (Structural + Locational) 
c. Predictors:  (Constant),  Type,  Carparks,  Area,  Bedrooms,  Bathrooms,  Year,  Region,  SEIFA,  A_Cci,  A_Css,  AC_Inc, 
AC_Bul, IA_Ifc_1L, IC_Typ, AC_Pop, A_Mgr, A_Upr  (Structural + Locational+ Jurisdictional + Policy) 
d. Dependent Variable: IA_Price 
 
The regression results for the pooled data set for Brisbane are provided in 
Table 6.8.  All outputs are of the expected sign and significance at five percent 
probability, again with the exception of building approvals (significance only) and 
consumer sentiment (sign and significance) and unemployment significant at ten 
percent.   
Interpretation of these outputs requires reference to Equation 5.2.  This result 
provides evidence that a $1.00 increase in infrastructure charges increases existing 
house prices by $4.04 (B1 = IA_Ifc_1L) and new house prices by $3.14 (B1 + B3 = 
IA_Ifc_1L + IC_Typ). This interaction result is of a similar scale to the earlier 
findings of both the pooled data set and separated data sets (ie. New and Existing) 
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and hence provides further evidence  that the scale of overpassing of infrastructure 
charges to house prices (both new and existing houses) is in the order of 300% - 
400% overpassing.  These findings are discussed further in Section 6.4. 
 
Table 6.8   
Regression Results – Two-Way Interaction: Existing and New Houses 
Model   Beta t Sig. Lower Bound* Upper Bound* 
1 (Constant) 71170.133 22.120 .000 64863.908 77476.358 
  Area 141.856 71.420 .000 137.963 145.750 
  Bedrooms 32808.207 30.774 .000 30718.635 34897.778 
  Bathrooms 89582.075 70.089 .000 87076.915 92087.236 
  Carparks 9939.191 10.960 .000 8161.724 11716.658 
  Type 34338.842 19.099 .000 30814.854 37862.830 
2 (Constant) -31193538.821 -44.49 .000 -32567566.003 -29819511.6 
  Area 148.572 80.737 .000 144.965 152.179 
  Bedrooms 26844.006 27.341 .000 24919.589 28768.424 
  Bathrooms 71547.331 59.308 .000 69182.815 73911.846 
  Carparks 10266.891 12.295 .000 8630.169 11903.614 
  Type 32969.576 19.736 .000 29695.311 36243.841 
  SEIFA 14289.998 56.074 .000 13790.494 14789.502 
  Region 48922.196 39.258 .000 46479.670 51364.722 
  Year 15534.325 44.487 .000 14849.900 16218.749 
3 (Constant) -14617444.888 -4.465 .000 -21033903.282 -8200986.4 
  Area 147.355 81.877 .000 143.827 150.882 
  Bedrooms 26603.391 27.720 .000 24722.285 28484.498 
  Bathrooms 71735.855 60.828 .000 69424.325 74047.384 
  Carparks 10642.098 13.035 .000 9041.810 12242.385 
  Type 41926.809 9.706 .000 33460.255 50393.364 
  SEIFA 14407.629 57.822 .000 13919.240 14896.019 
  Region 53026.044 6.596 .000 37269.745 68782.342 
  Year 7371.028 4.542 .000 4190.263 10551.793 
  AC_Inc 5646.766 2.935 .003 1875.900 9417.632 
  AC_Pop 16097.713 3.003 .003 5590.616 26604.810 
  AC_Bul -160.967 -.568 .570 -716.887 394.954 
  A_Upr -12552.951 -1.659 .097 -27382.740 2276.838 
  A_Cci 10250.941 4.993 .000 6226.739 14275.142 
  A_Mgr -36004.428 -4.750 .000 -50861.699 -21147.157 
  A_Css -359.735 -1.054 .292 -1028.723 309.254 
  IA_Ifc_1L 4.044 7.575 .000 2.998 5.091 
IC_Typ -.902 -2.608 .009 -1.580 -.224 
*95.0% Confidence Interval  
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6.3 REGRESSION RESULTS – LOTS 
 
6.3.1 Step-Wise Process 
As indicated previously, a step-wise approach was adopted to test the 
additional predictive value of the model upon the inclusion of more independent 
variables.  This process was also followed for analysis of the Lot sales for 
consistency.  The structural elements were regressed initially, with locational 
elements added in a second step, then the jurisdictional and government (policy) 
elements added in the final step.  The results of the process using 13,739 Brisbane 
Lot data are indicated in Table 6.9 below. 
 
Table 6.9   
Step Wise Process Model Summary- Lots d 
  R Adjusted R Std Error of   Change Statistics   
Model R Square Square Estimates R2 
Change
F Change df1 df2 Sig. F 
change 
1 .571a .326 .326 83251.851 .326 6649.6 1 13737 .000 
2 .631b .399 .398 78655.266 .072 551.82 3 13734 .000 
3 .641c .411 .411 77847.298 .013 36.821 8 13726 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Area, (Structural) 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Area, Region, SEIFA, Year (Structural + Locational) 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Area, Region, SEIFA, Year, A_Cci, A_Css, AC_Inc, AC_Bul, IA_Ifc_1L, AC_Pop, A_Mgr, A_Upr 
(Structural + Locational+ Jurisdictional + Policy) 
d. Dependent Variable:  IA_Price 
 
Structural variables relating to house characteristics are dropped as this model 
relates to the price of subdivided and serviced vacant residential lots only.  These 
findings indicate that the predictive qualities of the lot price model improve as the 
additional independent variables are added, as would be expected, albeit with a lower 
initial adjusted R2 and lower incremental effect thereafter when compared to the 
preceding house models.  This is not unexpected as vacant lots are more homogenous 
in nature than the housing subsequently built upon it.  
The regression results for the Lot data set for Brisbane are provided in Table 
6.10.  All outputs are of the expected sign and significance at five percent probability 
again with the exception of income, building approvals and unemployment (all sign 
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and significance); and the construction cost index (sign and significance at ten 
percent).   
Given the linear nature of our model, the interpretation of the infrastructure 
charge coefficient (IA_Ifc_1L) output of 1.693 and significance of .008, this result 
provides strong evidence that a $1.00 increase in infrastructure charges increases 
new Lot prices in Brisbane by $1.69.   
 
Table 6.10   
Regression Results- Lots 
Model   Beta t Sig. Lower Bound* Upper Bound* 
1 (Constant) 164571.585 119.155 .000 161864.335 167278.835 
  Area 152.427 81.545 .000 148.763 156.091 
2 (Constant) 
-21503629.850 -26.810 .000 -23075791.649 -
19931468.051 
  Area 158.724 89.100 .000 155.232 162.216 
  SEIFA 3635.625 9.534 .000 2888.191 4383.058 
  Year 10767.793 26.963 .000 9984.996 11550.590 
  Region 55220.188 36.313 .000 52239.423 58200.954 
3 (Constant) -16734106.193 -4.422 .000 -24151369.149 -9316843.237 
  Area 158.802 89.938 .000 155.341 162.263 
  SEIFA 3446.636 9.062 .000 2701.100 4192.173 
  Year 8281.758 4.422 .000 4610.608 11952.908 
  Region 88386.788 8.313 .000 67545.763 109227.814 
  AC_Inc -295.477 -.114 .910 -5392.846 4801.892 
  AC_Pop 43476.047 6.991 .000 31286.186 55665.908 
  AC_Bul 186.173 .522 .602 -513.070 885.415 
  A_Upr 10457.635 1.113 .266 -7952.611 28867.881 
  A_Cci -4533.609 -1.636 .102 -9966.447 899.228 
  A_Mgr 20413.933 2.099 .036 1354.505 39473.361 
  A_Css -971.569 -2.366 .018 -1776.604 -166.534 
  IA_Ifc_1L 1.693 2.633 .008 .433 2.954 
*95.0% Confidence Interval  
 
These findings are discussed further in the following section.  
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6.4 FINDINGS 
6.4.1 House Prices 
This study provides strong evidence that infrastructure charges in Brisbane, 
Queensland, after accounting for macroeconomic conditions and other factors that 
influence housing price, significantly increased the price of both new and existing 
houses during the period of 2005 to 2011, increasing house prices to a magnitude of 
between three to four times the cost of the infrastructure charge levied per house.  
This evidence supports the theory that despite infrastructure charges being levied on 
property developers, these supply chain costs are passed onto the end home buyer, 
resulting in higher house prices for all houses, and thus reducing housing 
affordability for all house buyers in the community.  This study provides evidence 
that not only are infrastructure charges being passed onto consumers, they are being 
significantly over-passed.  This finding is positive evidence in support of the research 
hypothesis for this thesis.  Hence, as expected it is home buyers that bear the burden 
of infrastructure charges and are the party who is really paying for urban 
infrastructure.   
This finding of over-passing is consistent with the literature and theory.  In 
saying that however, there are both notable similarities and differences between the 
US findings and these findings for Australia.  Remember it is important to consider 
the on-passing ratios calculated in Chapter 4 for comparison, rather than the reported 
findings cited in Chapter 2 that do not take into account the correct interpretation of 
non-linear models.  
Firstly, at $3.95 for every $1.00 infrastructure charge (or 395% overpassing for 
All), the all house findings are approximately double the average study range quoted 
in the US literature of $1.50 - $1.70 (Nelson et al., 2008).  Whilst this could be due to 
data limitations, it is also possible that is a reflection of the nature of the Australian 
housing market.  Recall from earlier analysis that the US housing market is highly 
segmented, with two, three and four bedroom houses representing approximately 
equal proportions of the housing stock in the State of Florida (Burge, 2005).  In 
comparison, two bedroom houses are rare in the Brisbane market even in the 
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established house sector, with approximately a quarter of homes having three 
bedrooms, and the remaining three quarters comprising four or more bedrooms51 (see 
Section 3.8.1).  Burge’s (2005) findings suggested that infrastructure charge impacts 
were highest in the larger homes, where greater price elasticity is suggested to exist 
(42% onpassing for small houses versus 134% for large houses).  Mathur also 
stratified his research to test for such differential on-passing effects.  Using house 
quality as an independent variable (rather than house size as for Burge,) Mathur et 
al.’s (2004) findings also suggested higher overpassing to high quality homes (358% 
onpassing for high quality housing compared to 166% for average quality).  Thus it 
could be interpreted that the Australian housing market comprises on average higher 
quality/larger homes than in the US and that these Australian findings are consistent 
with the US findings that developers can more readily pass additional costs onto 
higher quality housing.  
The high on-passing ratio in Australia could also be a function of the 
uncertainty associated with a fully negotiated opaque infrastructure charging regime.  
During the study period, infrastructure charges were escalating rapidly resulting in 
general confusion and uncertainty in the wider development industry around forecast 
project costs (Nicholls, 2011).  Conversely, in the US studies, set fees per lot were 
scheduled with annual increases announced in advance.  Theory suggests that in a 
fully transparent system, such supply chain costs are able to be passed back to the 
land owner, and yet overpassing at a consistent level existed in all US studies 
undertaken.  Indeed Shaughnessy’s (2003) study on land price impacts suggested that 
back-passing and over-passing were occurring contemporaneously, albeit with weak 
evidence.     
A second comparative finding is that whilst the average of US studies is quoted 
at $1.50 - $1.70 (Nelson et al, 2008), this may not be representative of all studies.  
Many authors tested for the differential effects on new and existing houses, however 
not all authors pooled their datasets to estimate the effect on all housing in the 
community as was done in this study.  Of the US models only Burge (2005) (72%) 
                                                            
 
51 Detached houses for sale in the Greater Brisbane region as at February, 2014 as listed on 
www.realestate.com.au 
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and Evan’s-Cowley et al.(2009) (537%) analysed the infrastructure charge effect on 
all houses.  And only Evan’s-Cowley et al. (2009) then separated their dataset to 
further examine the differential effects on new and existing houses; a model 
enhancement followed by this study.  This study’s findings of 395% for all houses is 
within the range of the findings in the literature and provides further evidence that 
existing home owners share the burden of infrastructure charges by way of the 
increased cost of existing housing (Brueckner 1997; Singell and Lillydahl 1990; 
Yinger 1998).  Existing housing generally forms the bulk of a market and plays a 
central role in price setting.  Existing housing may be a close substitute to new 
housing and if the price of new housing is increasing due to cost pressures and strong 
market conditions, then the price of existing housing will be drawn up as sellers 
capitalise on profit taking opportunities.   Hence buyers of existing housing are 
paying for the house price impacts of infrastructure charges in new development 
areas, for which they either receive no benefit, or if there is a benefit (such as new 
road connections or upgrades) then they have not contributed to the cost of such 
services.  This over passing to existing home owners is a windfall capital gain to 
existing home owners, to the detriment of housing affordability within the 
community whereby homes that previously might have been more affordable are 
dragged up in price due to their close substitutability with more expensive new 
homes.   
Thirdly, it is relevant to compare the observed effect for new houses compared 
to existing houses.  This study suggests the new house effects ($4.69) are higher than 
for existing houses ($3.56) in Australia.  The results of prior studies that test the 
differential effect on new and existing homes are not consistent in this regard.  This 
Australian finding is consistent with Campbell (2004) ($1.43 new and $1.07 
existing).  However the converse was found by Evans-Cowley et al.(2009) with 
existing houses significantly more impacted than new houses ($1.76 new and $6.03 
existing).  Both Mathur (2003) and Shaughnessy’s (2004) findings were similar for 
new and existing housing (Mathur: $1.34 new, $1.47 existing; Shaughnessy, $1.64 
new, $1.68 existing).  Thus the literature is inconsistent in regard to the differential 
effects between new and existing housing.  Indeed, Nelson et al. (2008) questions 
whether overpassing does actually occur for existing houses, with the evidence to 
that time ranging from $1.07 (Campbell) to $1.68 (Shaughnessy).  Evans-Cowley et 
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al.’s (2009) subsequent findings ($6.03), together with the findings from this study 
($3.56) confirm that overpassing in the existing house market is indeed occurring, 
albeit at varying rates.   
Little commentary is provided in any of the prior studies on this observation in 
the existing housing market.  With existing housing being the predominant housing 
type in most housing markets, any inflationary price effects to existing housing will 
have an impact on housing affordability across the wider community.  A possible 
explanation of the impact of infrastructure charges on existing houses is that the 
effect is a function of local housing markets and the relative substitutability of new 
and existing houses.  In a market with good quality existing homes, new homes of a 
high standard might be developed to entice existing owners into new housing stock.  
A propensity of developers to build high quality new housing may lead to higher on-
passing consistent with the findings of Burge (2005) and Mathur (2003) discussed in 
the prior paragraph.  In such an environment, new house price effects may be higher 
than existing house price effects due to elasticity in the quality new home market.  
On the other hand, existing house prices might be affected to a large extent if the 
existing housing stock in a local market is of a low quality and new housing is 
introduced aimed at similar target markets.  The price of existing housing is dragged 
up as home buyers exercise a preference for better located existing housing that can 
be cost effectively renovated, compared to newer houses built on the urban fringe.  
Studies that show similar findings may exist in areas with high substitutability in new 
and existing housing markets.  Remembering that in Australia, new and existing 
housing are close substitutes from a services perspective as all residents have access 
to essentially the same level of services and amenities.  In saying that, many older 
suburbs have the benefit of better proximity to those services.  
Finally, new house effects and existing house effects in this study are close in 
magnitude.  As can be seen from above, with the exception of Evan’s-Cowley et 
al.(2009), this is consistent with the literature.  Evan’s-Cowley et al.’s (2009) study 
incorporates a “years since fee introduced” variable to test for short and long term 
impacts.  When this variable is removed (making its approach more consistent with 
earlier studies) the existing house impact reduces to $2.50.  
With the findings of overpassing of infrastructure charges to home buyers in 
the Australian market now established, the rationale for such a phenomenon requires 
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consideration.  Various reasons for overpassing have been hypothesised in the 
literature, however no studies have provided evidence in this regard.  The rationale 
provided tends to sit in one of two camps being that of the “old view” where 
overpassing is a burden to the buyer in compensation to the developer for increased 
risks, financing and holding costs associated with increases to the supply chain costs 
and approval time frames (Singell and Lillydahl 1990, Baden and Coursey 1999, 
Mathur 2003, Campbell 2004); and the “new view” where the extent of overpassing 
represents a willingness of the buyer to prepay for the provision of services and 
amenities that would be otherwise funded by future property taxes (Yinger, 1998, 
Shaughnessy, 2003, Burge, 2004, Evans-Cowley et al., 2009).  These are discussed 
further in Section 7.4 Contributions to the Literature.  
6.4.2 Lot Prices 
This study also provides evidence to support the hypothesis that infrastructure 
charges are over passed to vacant residential lots.  Whilst the findings for lots ($1.69) 
are lower than for houses, this is still positive evidence of overpassing and is an 
important contribution to the literature on lot price effects.    
In contrast to house price studies, the evidence on price impacts for vacant 
residential lots is thin.  This is thought to be due to the nature of the US housing 
market as described earlier, whereby the land developer also constructs the house 
thereupon and there is only a limited vacant lot market.  Evans-Cowley et al., (2005) 
provided weak evidence that a $1.00 infrastructure charge is attributed to a price 
increase of as little as a $0.13 for the developed lot.  This is a significant under-
passing of the charge.   This lower on-passing result when read in conjunction with 
overpassing at the house level, could be interpreted as evidence of profiteering by 
house builders.  This would be a troubling finding as house builders (as opposed to 
land developers when these are two separate suppliers) are not subject to any 
infrastructure charges.  No discussion on this finding is provided in the literature.  
Hence, the findings of this study are an important contribution to the literature 
where an active “house and land” market exists, with profit taking by house builders 
to be a consideration for further research.  
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6.4.3 Findings Summary 
This research provides strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that 
infrastructure charges increase house prices, with overpassing occurring in all house 
and lot markets examined.  For each $1.00 of infrastructure charge, all house prices 
in Brisbane increase by $3.95, with new houses increasing by $4.69 and existing 
houses increasing by $3.56.  Evidence of overpassing was also found in the vacant 
residential lot market, with $1.00 of infrastructure charge increasing lot prices by 
$1.69. 
These results are consistent with the international evidence of over passing of 
infrastructure charges and support the hypothesis of this thesis.  The Australian 
evidence in this instance indicates overpassing to new houses in the order of 
approximately double the US evidence, which is likely due to the nature of 
Australia’s house sizes and the opaque infrastructure charging regime.  Existing 
house overpassing is within the range established by recent literature, and provides 
further evidence of the detrimental effect infrastructure charges have on housing 
affordability across the whole community.  The evidence on lot effects is thin and 
this study provides an important contribution to the literature indicating overpassing 
occurs in this market also.  
6.5 LIMITATIONS 
Given this study is the first of its kind in Australia, it is acknowledged that it is 
subject to a number of limitations.  The main limitation of this study is associated 
with data gathering.  Infrastructure charge data collection was a challenge for this 
project, and is likely to be a reason why work of this nature has remained 
unexamined up until now.  However with a creative applied approach, results of 
significance have been generated. 
In the absence of any usable data from an institutional source, a number of 
assumptions were required in order to derive an appropriate average infrastructure 
charge per lot.  The approach adopted is described in the previous chapter.  The 
infrastructure charges from a typical project that was developed in the study area 
during the study period were used to derive an average charge per lot on an annual 
basis that corresponded with the calendar year the associated stage was completed 
and sold.  This approach assumes the project’s infrastructure charges were typical for 
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all projects in the study area at the time.  It also assumes the time lapse between 
planning approval and sale of the subsequent lots was typical for other developments 
in the study area.  These assumptions may or may not be correct, however all 
attempts were made to ensure these assumptions were reasonable.  Where more than 
one stage was developed in a calendar year, the average charges per lot for those 
stages were combined.  On the southside, where the data had the benefit of two 
overlapping projects, these amounts were averaged.  The relative consistency of the 
northside and southside data provides some comfort as to the reasonableness of the 
assumptions and approach adopted.  However it is acknowledged that it is possible 
that variance between projects does exist.  This can be due to a range of factors from 
developer negotiating power and skills to timing effects associated with older 
approvals being subject to one set of policies and new approvals being subject to 
revised provisions.  This is a market imperfection that is commonplace in an 
environment of rapidly and frequently changing infrastructure charge regimes.  The 
opaqueness of the fully negotiated regime further muddies analysis with the 
identification of what charges might apply to a specific lot a tortuous and 
complicated process for a researcher, let alone a potential buyer.  This feature of the 
Queensland infrastructure charge regime would appear to nullify many of the “new 
view” conclusions drawn by Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy (2004), Burge and 
Ihlanfeldt (2006) and Nelson et al.(2008) whereby new home buyers knowingly and 
willingly capitalise the forecast benefits associated with these charges into their new 
home purchase price.  
The costs imposed on developers at the time of development approval are not 
contained to just infrastructure charges (in Queensland) or impact fees (in the US).  
Often costly conditions are also imposed on development approvals.  The colloquial 
term for this in Queensland is “conditioning” whereas the more formal term 
“exactions” appears in the US literature.  This generally refers to works or the 
dedication of land over and above that required for the provision of basic services for 
the new development.  These costs are in excess of the reported infrastructure 
charges/impact fees and thus the inclusion of such costs into econometric price 
models is likely to further amplify the inflationary effect such policy decisions have 
on house prices and housing affordability.  On the other hand, some works 
undertaken by developers are allowed to be offset against their infrastructure charge 
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liability.  Every attempt was taken in this study to try to account for the effect of 
conditions and offsets in the sample projects used.  It is acknowledged that each 
project is unique and that it is an assumption of this study that the sample projects 
utilised represent an average total infrastructure charge that might be applicable to a 
typical project in its relative jurisdiction.  
Another limitation of the approach adopted is the relatively small sample set 
from which the average annual infrastructure charge amounts per lot were derived.  
Whilst a project of some 400 lots is a reasonable size project, it comprises only 
around 1% of the sample size on the northside and southside respectively.  However 
when compared to the New house sample set of 4,699 the representation improves to 
a more comfortable level.  
A further limitation of this study is associated with the categorisation of sales 
into New or Existing housing.  As discussed in the previous chapter a data rule was 
established which required manual coding of more than 80,000 sales records from 
2003 - 2011.  Any manual coding is subject to human error.  Critics of this work may 
also find fault in the four year criteria set for the New house category.  It is 
acknowledged that this time frame is somewhat subjective.  A three year time frame 
was initially set, however it was increased to four years to incorporate all the factors 
discussed in the Data Description, and to ensure an adequate sample size for the New 
data set.  Further, the number of New sales in the early years of the study period may 
be understated due to sales data having been collected from 2003 for a study period 
start in 2005 (a four year resale period applied to New sales, hence any New sales 
from 2001 and 2002 Lot sales may be incorrectly categorised as Existing).  
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6.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter has been to present the findings of the quantitative 
stage of this research project and thus address the final research question: 
 
4. What is the impact of infrastructure charges on the price of housing in 
Australia?  
 
The findings presented in this chapter provide evidence in support of the theory 
that despite infrastructure charges being levied on property developers, these costs 
are passed onto the end home buyer.  Not only are these fees being passed onto 
consumers, they are being significantly over passed for both houses and vacant lots 
in the order of 395% and 169% respectively.  That is, for every $1.00 of 
infrastructure charge, house prices in Brisbane increase by $3.95 and lot prices 
increase by $1.69.  Further, the effect on new and existing houses was considered 
separately, with every $1.00 of infrastructure charge increasing the price of a new 
house by $4.69 and an existing house by $3.56.  
These findings consistent with the literature, however they are larger than 
predicted particularly for new housing.  This could be attributed to characteristics of 
the Australian housing market such as large houses together with the opaque 
infrastructure charging regime creating uncertainty.   
The findings for all housing and existing housing are particularly relevant in 
the housing affordability debate.  This research provides negative evidence of the 
impact of the Queensland Government’s growth management policies on its housing 
affordability objectives, with a $28,000 infrastructure charge on developers, flowing 
through the housing market and wider community to add as much as $131,320 to the 
price of new houses and $99,680 to existing houses.  
This study provides the first empirical evidence that infrastructure charges, 
after accounting for macroeconomic conditions and other factors that influence 
housing price, contribute to increases in the price of houses and lots in Australia.  
This research addresses a significant gap in the literature on the house price effect of 
infrastructure charges outside of the US.    
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Chapter 7:   Conclusion 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Housing is becoming increasingly unaffordable in Australia, with a number of 
high level government reports now suggesting developer levies in the form of 
infrastructure charges on new housing as a contributing factor.  This proposition has 
been suggested by industry over many years as infrastructure charges have rapidly 
increased in many jurisdictions.  However the academic community in Australia has 
been slow to provide any evidence to inform the debate on who really pays for this 
urban infrastructure:  the developer, original land owner, the new home buyer or the 
community at large.   
Recent research, industry and government reports in Australia provide 
anecdotal and qualitative support for the proposition that developer levied 
infrastructure charges are passed onto new home buyers, but to date no empirical 
studies have sought to estimate the extent of this price effect on housing in Australia.  
This study is the first such research to address this gap in the literature.  This research 
is important as it informs policy makers at all levels of government on the 
consequences of user-pays growth management strategies on their parallel housing 
affordability policies.  
This concluding chapter is arranged as follows:  section 7.2 recaps the 
objectives of this research and discusses how the research design met these 
objectives.   It describes the thesis outline and how each of the research questions 
was addressed.   Next Section 7.3 presents an overview of the key findings for each 
of the research questions.  Section 7.4 details this research’s contribution to the 
literature.  Section 7.5 presents an agenda for future research on this important topic, 
followed by final conclusions in section 7.6.   
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7.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN 
The specific purpose of this research has been to empirically estimate the 
impact infrastructure charges have on house prices in Australia.  This research is 
important as housing is becoming increasingly unaffordable in Australia, and 
industry and government are at odds as to the extent that additional supply chain 
costs, such as infrastructure charges, have on house prices.  In addressing this 
research issue, the following four research questions were examined: 
 
1. Is there empirical evidence in Australia that the imposition of 
infrastructure charges by governments increases the price of housing?  
(Chapter 2) 
2. Is there empirical evidence internationally that the imposition of 
infrastructure charges by governments increases the price of housing?  
(Chapter 2) 
3. Can international empirical models be used to assess the impact of 
infrastructure charges on the cost of new housing in Brisbane, 
Australia? (Chapters 3 and 4) 
4. What is the impact of infrastructure charges on the price of new 
housing in Brisbane, Australia?  (Chapters 5 and 6) 
 
These research questions were addressed via an exploratory sequential 
instrument development model, a mixed qualitative and quantitative methodology as 
detailed by Creswell and Plano Clark (2007).  
The research design for this project was broken down into two stages as 
illustrated in Figure 7.1.  Stage 1 was a qualitative process, designed to address the 
first three research questions.  The findings from Stage 1 informed the methodology 
adopted for the Stage 2 quantitative work which addressed the fourth and final 
research question.   
This two-stage, mixed methods approach was adopted because of the 
investigative inquiry nature of the first three research questions, the findings of 
which would determine the methodology adopted for the final question.  Together, 
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these research questions required a sequential yet concurrent multifaceted mixed 
methods approach that included:  pragmatism, deductive and inductive logic, 
integrated qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis.   
 
Figure 7.1  
Research Design and Methodology 
 
Source:  Created by Author 
 
Stage 1 comprised the qualitative component of this mixed method research.  It 
was necessary to break down each activity into component parts due to the fact that 
this was the first research of its kind to be undertaken outside of the US/Canada.  The 
effects of infrastructure charges (or their equivalent) in the US has been the subject 
of academic interest for over 30 years with the findings of overpassing to home 
owners well established.  However the literature review revealed little consistency in 
the econometric methodologies employed, and questions of external validity of 
models became apparent due to differing housing market fundamentals between 
 206 Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Australia and the US.  Thus the archival research component and semi-structured 
interviews were built into the research design.  The purpose of the archival research 
phase was to reveal any evidence of econometric methodological evolution.  The 
semi-structured interviews with authors of prior US literature on this topic informed 
that process by providing a deeper level of insight into their model and data selection 
process, the challenges they faced, as well as insight into the functionality and 
characteristics of the US housing market.  Stage 1 enabled a comprehensive analysis 
of the prior works in this field of research that had all occurred in the US.  This data 
and analysis is important as it can now be used to form the basis of research on this 
topic in other countries around the world.  Stage 1 concluded with a comparison of 
the key US housing market characteristics that are relevant to econometric model 
design and assumptions, with the Australian housing market characteristics.  
Completion of this Stage was important to ensure that the econometric model design 
utilised in Stage 2, and the underlying assumptions are appropriate in the Australian 
context.  It was also important to understand the respective housing markets and 
institutional characteristics to ensure data was appropriately utilised and the results 
interpreted in a practical and applied manner.  
Stage 2 comprised the quantitative component of this research.  Using the 
Stage 1 findings, an appropriate econometric methodology for this first such study 
outside of the US was specified.  The data appropriate for the Australian context was 
detailed and the various data sources identified.  The empirical findings of the model 
utilised were detailed, with separate regressions run for both new and existing 
housing, as well as the pooled dataset, and for lot sales as well.  Hence, Stage 2 
specifically addressed the final research question and the broader thesis question of 
“who really pays for urban infrastructure?” with evidence provided supporting the 
research hypothesis that infrastructure charges are passed on to home buyers.  The 
findings further supported the hypothesis that these charges are passed on in greater 
than a dollar for dollar fashion, with evidence of overpassing in the order of 300-
400% to both new and existing homes provided.  
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7.2.1 Addressing the Research Questions 
This thesis was structured to systematically address each research question in 
turn.  Chapter 1 provided the introduction to the research problem.  It outlined the 
background to the growing debate on infrastructure charges as a contributor to 
declining housing affordability.  It defined the research questions and described the 
methodology to be adopted.  Chapter 2 detailed the theory of the passing on or 
passing back of infrastructure charges and described the parties likely to be burdened 
by the cost of new urban infrastructure.  Chapter 2 also provided the literature 
review, responding to the first two research questions, with the first answered in the 
negative, and the second in the affirmative.   
Chapter 3 detailed the archival research component of this thesis, unpacking 
and analysing extant works on this topic in the search for evidence of a preferred 
methodology to take forwards into Stage 2.  No such evidence was uncovered.  
Chapter 4 concluded the Stage 1 works.  This chapter was also informed by the semi-
structured interview process and was designed to start addressing the third research 
question.  It drew on the data from the first three Chapters, as well as the findings of 
the semi-structured interviews to triangulate the emergent themes and assess the most 
appropriate econometric methodology to utilise for the first such study to be 
undertaken outside of the US, and thus address the third research question.  This 
question was addressed in the affirmative, with important provisions relating to the 
importance of the researcher understanding underlying market drivers and 
fundamentals in the study area and adapting existing models accordingly. 
Chapters 5 and 6 comprise the Stage 2 part of these works and address the final 
research question.  The adopted approach, model and data are described in Chapter 5 
and the findings are detailed and analysed in Chapter 6.  This thesis outline is 
illustrated in Figure 7.2 
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Figure 7.2  
Thesis Outline 
 
Source:  Created by Author 
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7.3 KEY FINDINGS 
This section is devoted to outlining the key findings associated with each of the 
four research questions posed in this thesis. 
 
7.3.1 Question 1 
Is there empirical evidence in Australia that the imposition of 
infrastructure charges by governments increases the price of housing?   
This question was primarily addressed via a comprehensive literature review of 
Australian scholarly literature on the relationship between infrastructure charges (or 
the interstate equivalent) on house prices.  Research and advocacy produced or 
sponsored by industry bodies in Australia on the relationship between infrastructure 
charges and house costs was also reviewed.  A number of recent state and federal 
government research and policy publications were found that identify infrastructure 
charges as a potential contributor to declining housing affordability in Australia. 
The issue of house price increases due to government charges and taxation on 
housing affordability has received academic attention in Australia in recent years, as 
has the cost of various town planning provisions (both costs and time delays).  These 
studies are off the back of growing discontent and anecdotal evidence from the 
housing and development industries over the past decade on the increasing tax and 
regulatory burdens to this sector and the corresponding impact on housing 
affordability.   
Qualitative and case study findings are provided in the Australian literature but 
no empirical studies were found.  In any case, none of the existing literature 
specifically addressed the impact infrastructure charges have on house prices, 
separate from other charges such as application fees, stamp duty/transfer duty and the 
like.  The existing qualitative work is consistent with the theory that government 
charges do get passed onto home buyers, thus increasing house prices.   
The only exception to these findings is a 1999 study by Watkins, who 
concludes exactly 50% of any infrastructure charge is paid by the developer, with the 
remaining 50% being either passed forward to the home buyer or back to the original 
land seller.  Unfortunately Watkins’ study did not provide any explanation for this 
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finding and his findings have been ignored by subsequent domestic and  international 
authors.  
Thus, no empirical evidence was found in the Australian context to support the 
hypothesis that infrastructure charges levied by governments are passed on to 
consumers by way of higher house prices.  
 
7.3.2 Question 2 
Is there empirical evidence internationally that the imposition of 
infrastructure charges by governments increases the price of housing?   
The literature review then moved to the international stage to seek evidence on 
the relationship between infrastructure charges (or the international equivalent) and 
house prices.  This international analysis focused on the UK and US which have 
comparable planning systems to Australia and established infrastructure cost-
recovery policies.  Literature from other countries was searched but no studies were 
identified. 
Given Australia’s historical links to the UK, its infrastructure charging system 
was reviewed first.  Theoretical issues concerning the impact of planning and 
regulation on housing affordability were found to have received considerable 
attention in the British literature, consistent with in Australia.  However, no empirical 
works were identified.  This was likely due to the opaque and fully negotiated nature 
of the infrastructure charging regime in the UK and the consequent lack of data from 
which to build a model.   
In contrast, the US provided a deep body of literature on this topic with 
numerous empirical studies into the effect of infrastructure charges on housing prices 
over the previous three decades.  In excess of a dozen empirical studies were found 
to have examined this very topic in North America (US and Canada), as have 
innumerable theoretical works over the past three decades.  The theoretical argument 
is well developed and consistent in its findings that infrastructure charges do increase 
the price of housing in strong markets in the short term, and that prices also increase 
in the longer term when weaker market conditions prevail.  Whilst the empirical 
evidence is not as consistent, a pattern has emerged over a number of studies that 
indicates for every $1.00 increase in infrastructure charges, all housing in a 
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community (new and existing pooled) increases by between $0.82 and $5.37, with 
new house prices increasing by $1.50 - $1.70, existing house prices increasing by 
$0.83 and $6.03 and the price of developed vacant residential lots increasing by 
$0.13 to 1.20.  The reasons for these price impacts are still under debate, as are the 
impacts to the supply of new housing and the passing back effect to land holders.  
It is somewhat surprising that no empirical work has been carried out on this 
topic outside of North America, despite the wide usage of infrastructure charges in 
many countries.  The UK’s system of fully negotiated outcomes with no set charges 
may have resulted in difficulties in obtaining data for any such analysis to occur in 
that country.  Australia’s regime is evolving, fluctuating between cost recovery and 
fixed fees with no nexus or proportionality rationale.  It is important that policy 
makers are equipped with information on the flow on effects of planning policies so 
as to fully understand the impacts of the infrastructure charges levied.   
Hence at the conclusion of the literature review, there was significant 
international evidence in support of the hypothesis that infrastructure charges levied 
by governments are passed on to consumers by way of higher house prices.  The 
international evidence also supports the further hypothesis in the majority of cases 
that such charges are not passed on in an dollar for dollar fashion, but are “over 
passed”, increasing the cost of housing by more than the cost of the charge alone. 
 
7.3.3 Question 3 
Can international empirical models be used to assess the impact of 
infrastructure charges on the price of housing in Brisbane, Australia? 
From the preceding literature review, two key sub-issues became apparent.  
Firstly, the extant studies employed a range of differing econometric techniques.  
There appeared to be little consistency in approach and with many of the more recent 
studies occurring contemporaneously across the US, there was little evidence of a 
preferred methodological approach or model evolution.  Study area, study duration, 
study size, and data requirements varied considerably between studies also.  Further 
examination of these matters was important to ensure an appropriate econometric 
technique, data set and study area/duration/size was selected for use in Australia.  
Secondly, nuances of the US housing market were apparent that did not apply in the 
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Australian context, for example the inter-relationship between property taxes and the 
range of services and amenities infrastructure charges funded.  Whether these items 
could be removed from the models, and the models adapted for the Australian 
context without affecting their predictive qualities, were an important consideration 
in addressing the third research question.  Data from the archival research and semi-
structured interview process was collected and analysed in order to address these two 
issues.   
The various econometric techniques and functional forms were examined first 
for the purposes of uncovering evidence of the evolution of a preferred approach. In 
the recent studies examined, a range of techniques were utilised that claim to 
overcome limitations of earlier works.  In many of these studies, the basic hedonic 
technique was utilised, together with more advanced techniques that sought to better 
estimate the house price effect associated with infrastructure charges.  It was found 
that the more complicated techniques provided no stronger evidence than the basic 
hedonic approach.  Further, there was no evidence of model evolution, or emergence 
of a preferred approach.  It was also found that interpretation of model results was 
somewhat inconsistent and great care is required in determining whether it is 
appropriate to compare findings between studies in different study areas.  An “on 
passing ratio” was developed in this work to assist in this interpretation and 
comparison of findings of models with differing functional forms.  Given this study 
was to be the first of its kind outside the US, that the basic hedonic model was found 
to provide findings of equal or greater significance to more complex models, and the 
risk of misinterpretation is high with more complex functional forms, it was found 
that a linear hedonic approach consistent with house price hedonic methodology 
could be applied for use in Australia.   
Unpacking of the extant models also involved an analysis of the range of 
independent variables utilised in the various approaches.   The purpose of this work 
was to determine what variables were relevant, and whether that data was available 
for the Australian study area selected.  The range of data sets utilised in the existing 
works was as varied as the econometric approaches.  Very little consistency existed 
between the extant models with some studies utilising very few data, whilst others 
incorporated an extensive range of items that might be deemed to influence house 
prices.  This finding, whilst confounding was deemed to be consistent with the theory 
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that availability of data often drives model specification, rather than theory.  It also 
shed light on the importance of the researcher understanding the practical drivers of 
study area housing markets and ensuring variables were selected that enabled the 
contributory effects of each to be observed.  Mis-specification or omitted variable 
bias is possible if models from one locality are used in another without appropriate 
adaptation. 
These regional and sub-regional house price drivers and the associated 
functionality of study area markets were often implicit assumptions and were rarely 
stated in the published works.  However it was apparent that whilst the US housing 
markets and house price drivers had similarities with those in Australia, there were 
key differences as well and it was important to determine whether those differences 
limited the external validity of the US models.  Data gathered in the archival research 
stage was supplemented with data collected in the semi-structured interview process.  
This enabled a comparison of the US and Australian housing market characteristics 
to be made.  This comparison was important as it highlighted the areas of adaption 
required for the US model methodologies to be applied in other housing markets.    
By triangulation of all the data collected to this point, there was sufficient 
evidence to conclude that international empirical models could be used to assess the 
impact of infrastructure charges on the price of housing in Australia, however any 
such model required careful adaptation to the proposed study area to ensure it was 
appropriately specified to incorporate the local housing market institutional 
characteristics, house price drivers and that appropriate data sets be available.  This 
completed Stage 1 of this research.  
 
7.3.4 Question 4 
What is the impact of infrastructure charges on the price of housing in 
Brisbane, Australia? 
Stage 2 of this research utilised the findings of Stage 1 to specify an 
econometric model to measure house price impacts of infrastructure charges in 
Australia for the first time.   A data set for both the Brisbane southside and northside 
housing markets was gathered.  This data comprised the relevant structural, 
locational and jurisdictional characteristics of housing in the study sub-areas.  House 
 214 Chapter 7: Conclusion 
sale data was obtained from a commercial data reseller and other locational and 
jurisdictional data was derived from various sources including the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics and the Reserve Bank of Australia.  Obtaining infrastructure charge data 
was a challenge as publicly available sources were not in a useable format and a 
creative approach was required.  Property developers in each study sub-area were 
approached to supply data from their projects and this was adopted as typical for lots 
developed in the respective years of the model.   The final data set for this study 
comprised a total 29,752 house sales in Brisbane from 2005 - 2011, comprising 
4,699 new and 25,053 existing house sales as well as 13,739 residential lot sales.   
Testing and validation of the model resulted in a final model for All, New and 
Existing housing in the form:   
௜ܲ,௧ ൌ ߚ௢ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܵ ൅ ߚଶܮ௜ ൅ ߚଷܬ௜ ൅ ߚସܩ௜൅	ݑ௜,௧   7.1 
Where   
Pi,t =  sale price of house i in time period t 
Si =  Structural attributes of the house: lot area, number of bedrooms, 
bathrooms and car parking spaces, dummy for new or existing home  
Li =  Locational features:  region, socio-economic suburb rankings 
Ji = Jurisdictional factors: changes to household income levels, population 
growth, new housing supply, unemployment rate,  construction cost 
index,  mortgage interest rates,  consumer confidence 
Gi = Government policy: infrastructure charges 
ݑ௜,௧ =  error term or noise in the model for the ith observation at time t. 
 
The Lot model excluded the structural attributes of the house apart from the lot 
area.  The interaction effects of New and Existing housing were also tested for. 
The regression results for the effect of infrastructure charges on house prices in 
Brisbane were of the expected sign and significant.   They indicated that for every 
$1.00 of infrastructure charge levied on developers, all house prices increase by 
$3.95, with existing house prices increasing by $3.56 and new house prices 
increasing by $4.69.  An alternative interpretation is the on passing ratio of 395% for 
 Chapter 7: Conclusion 215 
all houses, 356% for new houses and 469% for existing houses.  These findings were 
higher than expected and higher than the US model average findings, particularly for 
new housing.  The interaction model findings were consistent with these findings, 
and proved further support of the scale of the overpassing of infrastructure charges to 
not only new home owners, but to all home buyers in a community.   
These findings provide positive evidence in support of the research hypothesis 
for this thesis:  infrastructure charges are passed on to house buyers, thus increasing 
house prices.   These findings support the further hypothesis that infrastructure 
charges are not passed on in an dollar for dollar fashion, but are “over passed” to 
compensate developers for the additional risks and holding costs associated with an 
opaque and uncertain infrastructure charging regime.   
This finding is a significant contribution to the housing affordability debate in 
Australia.  It provides the first empirical evidence of the adverse flow on effects of 
developer levied infrastructure charges on housing affordability for not only new 
home buyers, but the whole housing community.  Proponents of user-pays 
infrastructure charges suggest that only those who benefit from the new estate 
services and amenities bear the associated costs of infrastructure charges, however 
this study provides evidence that it is the whole community that is bearing the cost 
by way of increased house prices, even in existing suburbs.  Home owners in these 
existing suburbs benefit by way of windfall capital gain, which in Australia is not 
generally taxable.   
Hence, a charge that government may think it is levying on developers, is 
being passed on to new home buyers, some of which elect instead to buy established 
housing in nearby suburbs thus driving up those house prices as well.  Housing 
affordability is very negatively impacted and the consequent windfall capital gain by 
existing home owners is not taxable.   It could be said that the primary winners of 
this policy situation are the home mortgage providers who benefit from the interest 
charged on the additional $110,000 or so over the life of the loan, which over a 30 
year mortgage will amount to $338,000 in total repayments, or an additional $939 
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per month mortgage repayments (Commonwealth Bank, 2014)52.  Refer section 7.4.2 
for further discussion on this finding. 
The large overpassing effect observed in this research as compared to the US 
literature is likely to be a combination of two effects.  Firstly, Brisbane has a 
predominance of large housing compared to areas of the US such as Florida.  US 
models that tested for the differential effect of infrastructure charges on large houses 
had findings consistent with this research.  Secondly, the US charges are set fees that 
are published each year, with increases published well in advance of any changes.  
That is, a transparent and certain system that carried low risk of unexpected increases 
in charges.  This is in contrast to the infrastructure charging system in place in 
Queensland during the study period, whereby local authorities were operating in a 
period of flux, moving to a cost recovery system where charges were unpredictable 
at the time of land acquisition and increasing rapidly.  A business environment 
characterised by uncertainty and lack of transparency carries greater risk for those 
industry participants.  Hence it is likely that the higher than expected findings in this 
research are at least in part due to developers seeking higher compensation for the 
additional risk associated with developing residential estates in this uncertain 
business environment.   
Thus the fourth research question has been addressed.  Evidence has been 
supplied for the first time in Australia that infrastructure charges are increasing the 
price of housing in Australia for both new and existing home buyers as illustrated in 
Figure 7.3.    
  
                                                            
 
52 Based on $110,000 fully amortising loan for a term of 30 years, at 9.61% interest which is the 30 year average 
variable interest rate (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2013)  
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Figure 7.3  
Who really pays for urban infrastructure? 
 
Source:  Author  
 
Not only do these findings inform Australian policy makers, these findings are 
also a significant contribution to the international literature in a number of ways.  
Firstly, this is the first empirical research on the impact of impact of infrastructure 
charges on house prices identified by this research outside of the US/Canada.  It tests 
the external validity of the US models and findings.  With a relatively consistent 
pattern for new house effects having emerged from the US studies, it is tempting to 
predict that similar effects might be universal.  This research reveals that the 
magnitude of such price effects may be subject to local macro and micro economic 
factors and housing market institutional factors.  Whilst the theory for these models 
may have external validity, it is important that the researcher have an intimate 
knowledge of local market drivers to ensure the model is specified and interpreted in 
accordance with local market factors.    
Secondly, it provides evidence against the “new view” that has become popular 
in the US literature over the past decade.  The new view suggests that overpassing of 
infrastructure charges to house prices is not a supply chain effect (burden to home 
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buyers) but a signal of the willingness of home buyers to pre-pay for the expected 
new amenities and services these charges will provide on the expectation of reduced 
property taxes in the future (benefit to home buyers).  Australia does not have a 
property tax system for the provision of schools, fire protection, law enforcement and 
the like.  In our egalitarian system, these services are provided to all residents at a 
state-wide level, funded through general revenue.  Hence, in the absence of the 
underlying assumptions for the new view to prevail, this research provides evidence 
in support of the old view, or supply chain theory of the incidence of infrastructure 
charges.  Under this theory, infrastructure charges are a supply chain cost which 
developers pass on to consumers (home buyers) together with a margin to 
compensate them for the additional holding costs and risks associated with the 
development of residential land in an opaque, uncertain and rapidly changing 
infrastructure charge regime.   
Thirdly, this study is important as it straddles the very strong pre-GFC housing 
market, as well as the “soft landing” that followed in Australia.  Theory suggests that 
in a softer housing market, such as after the GFC, there is less price elasticity and 
developers share the burden of infrastructure charges by way of lower profit margin 
and/or willingness to pay lower land prices in the short term.  This study suggests 
that even in a soft market, infrastructure charges are over passed to all home buyers 
in the community.  
 
7.4 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE 
This research makes a number of contributions to the literature on the impact 
of infrastructure charges on house prices and the wider topics of housing 
affordability and government housing policy.   
7.4.1 First Australian Evidence 
This study is the first of its kind in Australia that estimates the house price 
impacts of infrastructure charges.  Whilst there has been considerable debate at a 
government and industry level, there have been no empirical studies conducted in 
Australia to inform this debate.  Academic literature on the topic of constraints to 
housing supply and housing affordability in general have provided anecdotal 
evidence at best to imply the effects of infrastructure charges.  In the absence of any 
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empirical evidence, the question of who really pays for urban infrastructure has 
remained a political “hot potato”.  The findings of this study have the potential to 
contribute to housing policy at a local, state and even federal government level.   
7.4.2 Housing Affordability 
This research provides the first evidence to suggest that not only are 
infrastructure charges passed on to house buyers, but there is a significant over-
shifting  associated with an on-passing ratio in the order of 395%, or in other words, 
for every $1.00 of infrastructure charges, all house prices (both new and existing) 
increase by $3.95.  In Queensland, where the maximum adopted infrastructure 
charge for a new three (or more) bedroom home is $28,000, this one government 
charge could be adding $110,600 to the price of housing in Brisbane.  An additional 
$110,600 on the cost of housing over a 30 year mortgage, will amount to $337,995 in 
total repayments, or an additional $939 per month (Commonwealth Bank, 2014).   
If we consider that one of the primary objectives of this research was to 
provide evidence of the effect on the government’s policy of developer-paid urban 
infrastructure on housing affordability, and thus how this government policy impacts 
the objectives of its housing affordability policies, then this finding meets that 
objective.  Here we have provided evidence of a $28,000 charge that is levied on the 
developers of new housing, flowing through the supply chain, the housing market 
and the community in general and resulting in an additional $939 per month in 
mortgage repayments for all house buyers.  This finding is larger than expected and 
is likely to cause much discussion at a policy, local government and industry level.  
7.4.3 External Validity 
This study provides an important contribution to the literature as it is the first 
such study into the house price effects of infrastructure charges outside of the 
US/Canada.  This is relevant for two reasons:  firstly to test the external validity of 
the extant models and secondly to provide evidence in the “new v. old view” debate, 
which is covered in the following section.   
This research spent considerable time analysing similar studies conducted in 
the US/Canada over the past 30 years, with particular emphasis on six studies from 
the past decade.  Whilst there were differences in the approach between each of those 
studies, a consistency emerged in the later studies, particularly in the new house price 
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effect of around $1.50 - $1.70 over passing.  Whereas, existing home effects varied 
considerably: from between 142% and 592% in older studies (Delaney and Smith 
1989b, Singell and Lillydahl 1990) and between 83% (under passed) and 603% in 
more recent studies (Mathur et al., 2004, Evans-Cowley et al.,2009).  There was 
limited evidence in the lot market. 
With a relatively consistent pattern for new home effects having emerged in the 
US literature over a number of studies, it is therefore tempting to predict that similar 
effects might be universal.  However, it is important to recognise difference in 
housing markets from urban, regional and national scales as well as between nations 
(Meen, 2001).  This research has highlighted a number of key similarities and 
differences in the housing markets between the US and Australia that has highlighted 
the need for adaptation in model specification and data collection.  Data collection 
was a challenge for this project.  However with a creative approach, results of 
significance have been generated.  These results support the theory and international 
evidence of over-passing of infrastructure charges, however it suggests that the 
magnitude of these effects may be subject to local macro and micro economic factors 
which need to be taken into consideration.  This research has highlighted that the 
researcher must take care extrapolating results from one housing market to another 
without due consideration of the underlying fundamentals.  An intimate knowledge 
of the how house price theories apply in local markets are essential to avoid 
fundamental flaws.  
7.4.4 Old v. New View 
Turning to the “new v. old view” debate.  As identified earlier, this issue shifts 
the discussion to whether the overpassing of infrastructure charges is a benefit or 
burden to the home owner.  Under the old view, infrastructure charges are a “form of 
taxation that is hidden from housing consumers” (Baden and Coursey, 1999, p1), 
whereas under the new view buyers willingly and knowingly capitalise forecast 
future property tax savings and the value of funded amenities into the upfront capital 
cost of housing.   
The new view has been criticised for its requisite assumption of a sufficiently 
knowledgeable and optimistic buyer that was capable of attributing a financial value 
to its desired services and amenities, accurately forecasting their associated property 
tax liabilities, presuming that future property tax rates would remain steady and 
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willingly pre-paying this amount up front (Been, 2005).  Under the new view, 
infrastructure charges create no burden on the home owner, as the home owner is 
knowingly and willingly pre-paying property taxes for services and amenities it 
values, such as the provision of schools and law enforcement.   
This study could be said to provide the first evidence in support of the old 
view, by virtue of the fact that the requisite assumptions for the new view do not 
exist in Australia53.  Australia as an egalitarian society does not have a property 
taxation system similar to the US.  Non-utility services and amenities that are funded 
in the US by property taxes are in the main funded in Australia at a state level from 
broad based consolidated revenue.  The new view assumptions stated in the literature 
are explicit however there are a number of implicit assumptions that the literature 
appears to have overlooked.  For the new view to hold it assumes a mature market 
that has a well established and predictable infrastructure charge and local 
jurisdictional rating/taxation system.  It also assumes this system and the quantum of 
costs is well understood not only the policy makers and the development industry, 
but also the community (land holders and home buyers) (Been, 2005).  That is, a 
fully transparent and predictable system of infrastructure charges and the associated 
provision of services and amenities must exist.  It must assume the local municipality 
runs a balanced budget, reducing rates/taxes if surplus funds are raised as a result of 
increased property prices.  It must also be assumed that the homeowner does in fact 
receive the full value of the services and infrastructure provided by these additional 
fees in the foreseeable future.  Further, there must be a precedent for significant 
reductions in local jurisdictional rates (or property taxes in the US) for home buyers 
to be willing up pay the upfront cost of such benefits.  In a market such as Florida, 
the study area for a number of extant models, where infrastructure charges have been 
common place since at least the early 1980’s, this general market knowledge may 
exist for the new view to prevail.  However, not even Been (2005) is convinced of 
this:  “An increase in the value of the home of between $1.00 and $1.68 per $1.00 of 
impact fee on the promise of a rate rollback seems extraordinarily optimistic on the 
part of the homebuyers” (Been, 2005, p 162). 
                                                            
 
53 Refer Chapter 2 (Section 2.6) for details on the requisite assumptions for the new view. 
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The new view rationale for increases in existing house prices is equally as 
confounding.  Theory tells us that if the infrastructure charge does provide a level of 
amenity to new houses, but not to existing houses, then existing houses “will rise in 
price only to the extent that the higher value of new houses may provide a reduction 
in taxes demanded of existing homes” (Been, 2005, p158).  The new view literature 
provides very little interpretation on their findings associated with existing house 
price increases.  Nelson et al.(2008) does respond to Been’s criticisms, providing the 
example of a new school or road relieving overcrowding/congestion for the existing 
owners.  Such an argument begs the further question of why would 
overcrowding/congestion exist if not for growth.  So if growth is truly paying its own 
way, then existing owners would not be burdened by overcrowding/congestion and 
thus not require any benefit from the newly funded (and constructed) infrastructure.  
Clearly there are potentially short and long term effects that do come into play in 
such an argument.  However, considering the Australian situation, whereby schools 
particularly, and regional roads are funded at a State level and not via infrastructure 
charges, then Nelson et al.(2008) argument can hold no weight.  
A further premise of the new view is that house buyers are sufficiently 
informed so as to knowingly and willingly estimate future property tax savings, 
apply the appropriate discount factor (Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004) and make 
an upfront payment in advance via an increased house purchase price.  For this 
premise to hold, the infrastructure financing system must be transparent and 
predictable, and the other implicit assumptions for the new view must also hold.  
However, in many parts of world, infrastructure finance is evolving policy.  For 
example, in Queensland, Australia the infrastructure charges regime by comparison 
is in its infancy.  After five years of legislative reform, the Sustainable Planning 
(Housing Affordability and Infrastructure Charges Reform) Amendments Bill 2011 
commenced in July 2011, which introduced maximum charges across the State.  This 
followed a period of considerable uncertainty of charges with protracted negotiation 
of outcomes within a cost recovery framework.  This was a temporary measure to be 
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in place for three years whilst further consultation occurred54.  The new maximum 
charge regime may provide certainty for the developers and undeveloped land 
owners but it is a significant departure from the legal principles of proportionality 
and nexus that have hither to been a core test in the setting of charges in most 
jurisdictions other than the UK.  In parts of Queensland, infrastructure charges 
increased by more than 100% in the first decade of this century (Productivity 
Commission, 2011) and industry now reports significant reduction in charges further 
to the new maximum set charge regime55.   
It is therefore fair to conclude that Queensland does not meet the criteria of a 
well established and predicable infrastructure charging system, and hence it is 
expected that the old view will prevail for a number of years after stabilisation of the 
current (or future) system.  Under the old view, infrastructure charges are a supply 
chain cost that is passed onto consumers.  Over passing occurs due to a combination 
of effects.  Firstly, additional uncertainty and delay in the approval process, results in 
developers recouping more than the cost of the charge alone as they seek higher 
profit margins to compensate them for the uncertainty associated with a rapidly 
changing regulatory environment (Singell and Lillydahl 1990, Baden and Coursey 
(1999), Campbell 2004; Mathur 2003).  Secondly, interest is charged on these supply 
chain (development) costs which the developer seeks to recoup from the house buyer 
in order to maintain profit margins (Singell and Lillydahl 1990).  Thirdly, a number 
of development costs are determined as a percentage of either the sale price or total 
development costs, thus increasing the house price to maintain developer margins 
(Crowe 2007).  So not only are impact fees passed directly onto homeowners, there 
is an over-shifting effect to compensate developers firstly for the additional 
uncertainty (risk) and secondly a return of funds invested component, either for the 
developer, or its financier over the development period (Ellickson and Been, 2005). 
                                                            
 
54 The Sustainable Planning (Infrastructure Charges) and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2014 is 
due to come into effect on 1 July 2014, which further amends the Queensland infrastructure 
charging regime, largely maintaining maximum adopted infrastructure charges.  
55 It is outside the scope of this research to consider how this funding gap will be resolved by local 
councils.   
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In conclusion, the literature is still split on the reasons for the over-shifting 
phenomenon associated with infrastructure charges.  If over-shifting is due to 
increasing supply chain costs and structural uncertainty, then home owners are 
bearing this additional burden, brought on by the nature of the housing industry 
and/or implementation of the infrastructure charging policy of the day.  However, if 
the new view premise holds, and infrastructure charges are indeed valued for their 
amenity providing characteristics, then the outstanding research question evolves.  
Rather than asking whether infrastructure charges increase housing costs, perhaps the 
question becomes:  Does the home buyer gain the full benefit of the cost for which 
they have paid?  Clearly, further examination of this over-shifting phenomenon is 
required, and may be the subject of further research. 
7.4.5 Impact of GFC 
This study period straddled the very strong pre-GFC housing market, and the 
“soft landing” that followed in Australia.  This study is the first to produce 
significant findings for infrastructure charge related house price impacts in anything 
other than a strongly growing housing market.  This is important as the theory 
suggests it is easier for developers to pass the cost of infrastructure charges onto 
home buyers in a rising housing market.  Theory suggests that in a softer housing 
market, such as after the GFC, there is less price elasticity and developers share the 
burden of infrastructure charges by way of lower profit margins and/or seek to pass 
the charges back to land owners by way of lower land prices.  This study suggests 
that even in soft market conditions, infrastructure charges are over passed to all home 
buyers in the community. 
 
7.5 FUTURE RESEARCH 
As indicated previously, a key limitation to this research is the lack of available 
data on infrastructure charges.  This necessitated a creative applied approach that 
derived annual infrastructure charge amounts per lot for a typical project in the study 
area.  Future research would benefit from working closely with local authorities to 
gain access to more detailed infrastructure charge data, so that the associated house 
price effects can be more accurately estimated.  Should more detailed infrastructure 
charges be made available, it is hoped that smaller intervals, such as quarterly, could 
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be utilised consistent with much of the economic data, thus enabling other 
independent variables such as the First Home Owners Grant to be incorporated.  
This research focused on the Greater Brisbane housing market, where a 
significant majority of the population of Queensland resides.  Both the northside and 
southside study areas incorporated major masterplanned communities as well as 
smaller infill and greenfield housing estates.  However, strong regional markets do 
exist in Queensland and it is inappropriate to presume that the magnitude of the over-
passing effect in the capital city is consistent in regional centres.  For example, the 
North Queensland economic hub of Townsville has a strong regional housing market 
supported by a major Australian Defence Force base and various other state and 
federal government agencies.  According to Isles (2014), infrastructure charges in 
Townsville represent up to 18% of lot prices compared to 9% in South East 
Queensland.  Further, each State and Territory in Australia has its own infrastructure 
charging regime and the consequent effect on house prices and housing affordability 
warrants empirical examination. Future research in other Australian capital city and 
regional housing markets is recommended in order to take into account the vagaries 
of local housing markets and/or differences in underlying market fundamentals.   
This research has focused on the effect of infrastructure charges on house 
prices.  Other research has instead examined the effect of infrastructure charges on 
housing supply, however the findings from such studies is mixed.  Market 
equilibrium models conclude that when increases to supply chain costs raise house 
prices above the level of demand, supply is reduced until demand led equilibrium 
returns (Shaughnessy, 2003).  Similarly, attempts to pass charges back to land 
owners stymies supply as land owners refuse to sell below their benchmark price 
(Evans, 2004b).  Other studies suggest that the presence of infrastructure charges (in 
a transparent system) creates certainty for developers and a framework for a timely 
development approval process, thus increasing supply (Burge et al., 2007).   Again, 
each of the extant studies are US based and the external validity of the underlying 
assumptions warrant testing in the Australian market.   
This research has focused on single detached dwellings (low density housing).  
International studies also exist on the price effects to medium density dwellings as 
well as other non-residential market sectors such as commercial and retail.  Further 
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research into the price effects of infrastructure charges in these markets may also be 
timely.  
 
7.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has summarised the purpose, activities and findings of this thesis.  
It has outlined how a two-stage exploratory sequential instrument development 
mixed method approach was utilised to estimate the impact of infrastructure charges 
on house prices for the first time in Australia.  This research is an important 
milestone in both the housing affordability and infrastructure funding debates in 
Australia.  It has provided the first empirical evidence that infrastructure charges 
levied on property developers by government, are not only passed on to new home 
buyers, but are over passed with a flow on effect to all homes in the community.   
This research is an important contribution to the international literature as 
many countries struggle with providing both housing affordability and cost effective 
access to urban infrastructure.  As the first identified research of its kind outside of 
the US, it sets a framework for how similar models can be structured in other 
countries.   
This research has set the agenda for future research on this topic and the related 
topic of infrastructure charge impacts to housing supply, impacts to medium and high 
density housing, as well as to other property sectors.   
In summary, understanding “Who really pays for urban infrastructure” is 
critical to Australia’s long term growth and this research provides the first empirical 
data for government to test its policy objectives and outcomes against.   
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